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LAND USE INSTITUTIONS IN AN URBANIZING LANDSCAPE  
 
 
Development of land use can be controlled through public means such zoning or 
through private agreements such as property owners’ associations, conservation easements 
and contracts.  This dissertation investigates land use institutions in an urbanizing landscape, 
specifically zoning’s impact on land use change and fragmentation, citizen led monitoring of 
neighborhood zoning violations, alternatives to zoning, and entrepreneurial citizens’ 
development of alternative land use institutions.   
In order to assess the impact of land use institutions in an urbanizing environment, I 
use multiple methods including an institutional analysis that provides the context for 
understanding the interrelationships between bureaucrats, politicians, and the citizenry.  
Statistical analyses uncover the relationship between zoning and land cover change and forest 
fragmentation.  A game theoretic study highlights conditions to expect zoning compliance, 
especially when GIS reduces information costs.  An institutional analysis and agent-based 
model explore the creation of alternative land use institutions.  
Five conclusions are derived from this study.  First, zoning is driving some 
conversion of land to urban uses, although this may be due to the types of zoning rules that 
are adopted.  Second, zoning could be used more effectively to reduce forest fragmentation.  
Third, adoption of online GIS technology could improve zoning enforcement through a 
reduction in citizen monitoring costs.  Fourth, viable alternatives to zoning exist for 
openspace preservation and cooperative management.  Finally, government insensitivity and 
changing citizen preferences drive the demand for alternative institutions.  Land use 
institutions in urbanizing landscapes can protect community resources, but communities need 
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to be more conscious about their decisions regarding institution creation, implementation, and 
enforcement in order to control the urbanizing process and reduce unwanted effects.  
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Chapter 1:  Land Use Institutions in an Urbanizing Landscape 
 
 
Uncontrolled urban growth has led to the widespread conversion of rural 
agricultural and forested land throughout the world.  Unchecked growth in the developing 
world has created problems with basic infrastructure, sanitation, and disease (Ernould, 
2000).  In the developed world urban sprawl has been linked to dependency on 
automobiles, habitat destruction and fragmentation, and degradation of air and water 
quality (Geller, 2003).  Biotic homogenization, such as the proliferation of lawns, is a 
frequent effect of urbanization often leading to species extinction.  McKinney (2002) 
argues that urbanization endangers more species than any other type of land use in the 
United States.   
Development of land use can be controlled through public means such as growth 
management and zoning or through private agreements such as property owners’ 
associations, conservation easements, and contracts.  The most common land use control 
mechanism in the United States is zoning (Diamond and Noonan, 1996).  This 
dissertation investigates land use institutions in an urbanizing landscape, specifically 
zoning’s impact on land use change and fragmentation, citizen led monitoring of 
neighborhood zoning violations, alternatives to zoning, and entrepreneurial citizens’ 
development of alternative land use institutions.   
Control of urban development is an ever-growing concern for planners, as cities 
and suburbs expand.  Many communities are concerned about protecting natural 
resources, as well as maintaining vibrancy of existing cities.  Urban sprawl is a 
controversial issue throughout the United States, yet scholars struggle to identify sprawl 
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beyond a simple measure of population density.  In comparison, most people recognize 
that land surrounding cities is increasingly urbanized, whether suburbs and exurbs are 
sprawling is a point of contention.  Within this dissertation I do not seek to venture into 
the urban sprawl debate.  Instead, I address a number of issues of concern in an 
urbanizing environment, specifically conversion of land to urban uses, fragmentation, and 
opportunities for cooperative private land management. 
Zoning is one tool used to control the urbanization process in the United States.  
Today zoning is often used to manage growth as comprehensive land use plans by 
incorporating growth management strategies in addition to traditional separation of uses 
zoning ordinances.  Within the United States, zoning has been used since the 1920s in 
more or less successful efforts to control development.  Zoning refers to the actual local 
rules regarding land use, which are applied to particular zones.  Comprehensive plans are 
required to provide long term vision and guidelines for application of the zoning 
ordinances.  Zoning without planning is considered arbitrary (Revell, 1999), but one 
cannot simply look at the visionary guidelines in planning to understand growth 
management.  Rather zoning’s impact should be judged by an investigation of actual land 
use within jurisdictions, as well as any evaluation of local government’s implementation 
of zoning. 
Recently, some states have required growth management controls in local land 
use plans (Feiock, 1994, Ellickson and Been, 2000) ranging from utility service 
development fees to growth boundaries.  Growth management strategies are varied from 
market-based strategies to regulatory controls (Feiock, 1994).  Zoning is implemented 
through a comprehensive plan, which may or may not include growth management 
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strategies.  Comprehensive plans are constantly revised as the officials and citizenry 
change preferences and individual landowners seek variances to their zoning.  The ability 
of zoning laws to control development through comprehensive plans and growth 
management is not fully understood.   
Modern planners seek to use zoning and comprehensive planning to address a 
wide range of community concerns such as coordination of economic growth.  Some 
planners, however, argue that the minor modifications of most local zoning ordinances 
are not enough to handle contemporary land use concerns.  In 1992, the American 
Planning Association wrote that "although amended from time to time, the basic legal 
constructs found in state enabling legislation have changed very little over the past 50 
years. . . .As a result, the planning and growth management mechanisms in force in most 
states in the 1990s are woefully out-of-step with the times” (Diamond and Noonan, 
1996).  This concern has led many planners to argue for some regional, state, or federal 
control of planning.   
Zoning and planning arose in the early 1900s to prevent problems between 
conflicting land use and to reduce the mounting nuisance litigation in the United States 
due to these incompatible uses.  Since the 1970s zoning laws have evolved as 
mechanisms to control and focus development, as well as promote a myriad of 
community goals from historic preservation to environmental regulation (Diamond and 
Noonan, 1996).  Zoning restricts particular land uses on the parcels included in a 
particular zoning classification.  Historically, planners grouped similar uses together to 
prevent conflicts, isolating industrial, commercial, and residential ventures.  Planning 
today often attempts to create neighborhoods with compatible mixed uses.  This type of 
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“mixed-use” zoning is more complicated than the original single use zones.  It can be 
difficult to implement, as well as difficult to control. 
Planning and zoning regulations may not lead to the intended consequences in one 
jurisdiction, if its regulations are not consistent with those in neighboring jurisdictions.  
Of particular concern is lack of zoning in neighboring jurisdictions, which may create 
problems with “leapfrog” development, where development leapfrogs over a jurisdiction 
with zoning to one without (Carruthers, 2001).  Policymakers are increasingly concerned 
about the effects of zoning laws from neighboring jurisdictions on their county, as well as 
their county’s rules on others.   
Within each jurisdiction, there also may be competing pro and anti-growth 
policies, such as tax abatements, which encourage economic development, lot size 
requirements that promote spread, and historic preservation standards, which limit new 
building.  These policies lead to mixed planning results with respect to land use change.  
Planning has been identified as a potential solution to contemporary environmental issues 
such as urban sprawl and habitat fragmentation, although frequently there has been mixed 
results with respect to these goals.   Carruthers (2003) identifies inconsistent local land 
use regulation as a contributing factor to urban sprawl because counties, in most states, 
are unable to regulate land use in the same manner as incorporated municipalities.  Rudel 
(1989) notes that community characteristics play an important role in their economic 
development stance.  One might expect that urban/suburban municipalities have tighter 
growth policies limiting development, whereas areas beyond the municipality have 
limited land use regulations or pro-growth policies, again creating the potential for the 
leapfrog phenomenon (Carruthers, 2001).   
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As discussed in City Limits, Peterson  (1981) argues that cities will compete to 
limit regulation and taxation in order to attract businesses into the local economy.  Thus, I 
expect that cities competing for economic development will be less likely to enforce or 
adopt local land use regulations that may be perceived as costly by the business 
community.  More recent research indicates that local politicians may also seek to 
maintain the community resources, such as parks and aesthetics, in order to attract 
businesses.  Zoning takes away some property rights for landowners, limiting the 
potential economic gains from the land, so it is often cited as a limit to economic 
development and growth (Fischel, 1985).   
The impetus for this study is the apparent dissatisfaction of planners and 
communities with traditional zoning coupled with zoning’s distinction of being the 
mostly widely used local land use control.  Property rights advocates argue that planners 
are overstepping zoning’s original purpose, as a use of police power to abate nuisances. 
On the other hand, planners frequently lament that zoning tools are not adequate as a 
means to create livable communities, which emphasize greenspace, reduce reliance on 
automobiles, and preserve a sense of place.   
Thus, I seek to address several different concerns in this dissertation.  The main 
thrust of the analysis evaluates the relationship of zoning to land use, especially forest 
use, in an urbanizing landscape.  Forest resources are of particular concern for many 
areas of the country, including southern Indiana, because they provide environmental 
services, gorgeous views, attract tourists, especially in autumn, and generate significant 
income from hardwood products.   
 5
The second thrust of the dissertation generally investigates zoning’s relationship 
to the community.  I explore the mismatches between rules and citizen preferences, 
especially when this mismatch leads entrepreneurial citizens to create alternative 
institutions, such as land trusts and property owners’ associations.  Within the zoning 
arena, I explore citizens’ role as a watchdog for zoning violations, aiding inspector’s 
efforts in zoning enforcement.  The majority of the dissertation is focused on zoning, 
although I explore alternatives in two chapters. 
These two main directions fill gaps within the zoning literature by focusing on the 
impact of zoning in primarily traditional jurisdictions, not innovative cases such as 
Portland, Oregon.  In order to address several issues, I use of alternative methods of 
analysis, such as computer modeling, as well as use of traditional econometric methods.  
This dissertation is unique in that it explores traditional zoning rules, in comparison to 
innovations occurring in progressive states.  It is important that researchers address 
traditional zoning because it is so widely used.  Furthermore, I also explore 
nongovernment alternatives to zoning, which may be better suited than zoning for small 
scale preservation and land management initiatives. 
1.1  Relationship to Literature  
Previous studies of zoning have included case studies of individual jurisdictions 
(for example, Rudel, 1989, Babcock and Siemon, 1985, Babcock, 1966), historical 
analyses of land use regulation (Diamond and Noonan, 1996, Platt, 1996), analyses of 
zoning rule implementation (Feiock, 1994, Fleischmann and Pierannunzi, 1990, Ellison, 
2001, Thorson, 1997), and studies of zoning’s impact on local economies (Fischel, 1985, 
Thorson, 1997, Fleming, 1999, Hanushek and Quigley, 1990, Harrison, 1977). Recently, 
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some work has evaluated the relationships between zoning and land cover fragmentation 
(Brabec and Smith, 2002) or land cover change (Hsieh, et al. 2000, Kline and Alig, 
1999).  These studies provide valuable information about the impact of zoning on 
economic development in the abstract or in a particular study area, assessment of the 
context of rule changes, and describe classic battles between officials and citizens.   
Many studies of zoning have focused on “progressive” states such as Florida, 
Oregon, and Vermont with statewide planning rules and regulations.  The statewide 
efforts have been hailed as means to reduce uncontrolled development (Platt, 1996), yet 
few studies have evaluated development and land cover change in states with variation in 
land use controls.  As discussed earlier, Indiana is a prime location for an analysis of 
inconsistent land use controls across counties because some counties do not employ any 
countywide zoning ordinances (York, 2002, Worgan, et al., 2001).  None of these studies 
have evaluated zoning at the parcel, neighborhood, and county scale.   
These multiple methods at multiple scales will allow investigation of zoning from 
macrolevel regional change at the county level to microbehavior between neighboring 
landowners.  This combination of approaches improves our understanding of the 
complicated relationships between bureaucracy, citizenry, and politicians at the local 
level within the land use control arena.  General lessons may be learned regarding local 
governance that could be applied to other municipal problems. Furthermore, this study 
will help policymakers understand how zoning can impact land use across large areas of 
land, as well as within a small neighborhood, in order to address concerns about urban 
sprawl, economic development, and uneven zoning enforcement. 
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1.2  Overview of Dissertation 
My dissertation brings together several studies into a hybrid “book-article” 
dissertation style.  This dissertation focuses on one topic, zoning in an urbanizing 
landscape, similar to a traditional book style dissertation.  The strength of this style of 
dissertation is that all of the chapters work together to inform a single topic.  Yet, the 
dissertation chapters, especially chapters 3-7, are studies that can stand alone as articles.  
In fact, versions of five of these chapters are currently under review or forthcoming in 
journals.  This dissertation is also similar to an article format dissertation because earlier 
versions of chapters 3, 4, and 7 were coauthored.  There are several strengths of article 
dissertation including strong chapters that can be disseminated through journals, use of 
multiple methods, and ability to collaborate with other scholars.  By using a hybrid book-
article format, I was able to incorporate the strengths of the two formats in one 
dissertation.  I united strong studies using multiple methods to inform a study of zoning 
in the urbanizing landscape. 
In my dissertation, I first explore the nature of zoning and planning through an 
institutional analysis, briefly exploring the variation in zoning rules in southern Indiana in 
Chapter 2, “The Zoning Arena.”  Next, I address how zoning impacts county level land 
use change, through an econometric study of land use change in southern Indiana in 
Chapter 3, “Regional Impact of Zoning.”  This particular issue is important because 
zoning is often implemented at the county level.  Zoning is used to protect open space 
land cover, so I investigate zoning’s impact open space land cover fragmentation within a 
county in Chapter 4, “Fragmentation and Zoning in an Urbanizing Area.”  Evaluation of 
zoning’s impact on fragmentation is significant because fragmentation can be an 
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important indicator of the ability of a landscape to support certain types of species, 
especially mega fauna (Wang and Moskovits, 2001), as well as the economic value of 
timber and agricultural production, and perhaps the value of property for residential 
purposes.  The ability of zoning to impact land use is limited by zoning enforcement, so 
in Chapter 5, “Citizen Reporting and Zoning,” I explore how citizen monitoring may be 
hampered or helped through recent use of online Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 
maps by planning departments.  Zoning is not the only institutional option for land use 
management, so I explore other legal mechanisms in Chapter 6, “Alternatives to Zoning: 
Means to Cooperative Management.”  There has been an explosion of growth of one of 
these alternatives, gated communities, so in Chapter 7 “Growth of Private Governance in 
the Land Use Arena,” I investigate conditions which may promote this expansion of 
private sector options.  Finally in Chapter 8, “Land Use Institutions: Conclusions and 
Policy Recommendations,” I explore future directions for research on zoning, as well as 
policy recommendations stemming from my research.    
The study evaluates zoning’s impact on land use at multiple scales using multiple 
methods. An institutional analysis in Chapter 2 provides the context for understanding the 
adoption of rules and the interrelationships between bureaucrats, politicians, and the 
citizenry.  This institutional analysis provides context for Chapter 7’s computer model, 
which highlights conditions when I expect the citizenry to create alternatives to zoning.   
Statistical analyses aid in understanding the macro relationship between adoption of 
zoning and land cover change at the county level in Chapter 3.  A spatial statistical 
analysis investigates the relationship between zoning and fragmentation at the parcel 
level in Chapter 4.  The microlevel of individual land use decisions is uncovered with a 
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game theoretic study of the relationship between neighboring landowners and inspectors 
in Chapter 5.  This game highlights conditions where neighbors will report each others 
zoning violations, especially when GIS reduces information costs.  Institutional analysis 
is used again in Chapter 6 to investigate alternatives to zoning.  A computer model is 
used in Chapter 7 to investigate microlevel behavior that will lead to growth in private 
land use regulation.  The combination of approaches at multiple scales will allow 
policymakers to understand the impact of the most widely used land use control 
mechanism, zoning, on land use.   
1.3  Southern Indiana:  A Study in Traditional Land Use Policy 
In several chapters, I use southern Indiana as a study site, specifically Chapters 2, 
3, and 4, although insights from the Indiana case are included in all chapters.  Unlike 
many states, Indiana represents a traditional case for land use policy with limited state 
involvement, many counties with no zoning, and strong property rights organizations.  In 
Indiana, both counties and municipalities have the authority to zone creating many 
opportunities for polycentricity at the local level, whereas in many other states only 
municipalities have the right to zone and plan (Carruthers, 2001).  In more progressive 
states, it is difficult to assess the impact of zoning because of statewide policies, such as 
Oregon and Vermont, which have centralized planning organizations (Dowall, 1988).  
Several other states have enacted programs to homogenize planning regimes (Talen and 
Knaap, 2001).  In Indiana, no statewide efforts to create the same types of planning 
policies have been initiated, so we may expect greater diversity than in many other states.  
Thus, southern Indiana provides a wonderful natural experiment to investigate the impact 
of zoning, as well as evaluate opportunities for nongovernment land use policy creation. 
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Some Indiana counties do not have zoning ordinances, possibly because there is 
limited growth and development, so there is limited need to coordinate this development.  
Another reason for the lack of zoning may be that neighboring relationships are well 
established and Coasian solutions are possible.  On the other hand, these rural areas are 
not as densely populated, so there are fewer people with which to have conflicting uses, 
which may reduce the need for zoning.  Southern Indiana has been chosen as the study 
site because it has a wide range of zoning and planning regimes, including counties with 
no planning.   
The study also includes a number of rural counties that have experienced 
population decline over the past decade (Payton, 2001).  These varying levels of 
population growth and declines may lead to different patterns of zoning enforcement and 
creation, as well as the possibility for alternative land use agreements outside the zoning 
sphere.  Overall, Southern Indiana provides a dynamic and diverse environment for 
understanding the process of enacting and enforcing local level regulation, as well as the 
impact of these regulations on land use and land cover change. 
1.4  Theoretical Analysis 
There are several chapters that focus on a generalized land use policy arena, 
which is not specific to any particular jurisdiction.  These studies enable manipulation of 
various conditions in games using game theoretic analysis, or exploring parameter values 
in a computer model.  The institutional analyses in Chapters 2 and 6 focus on this 
generalized policy arena, although insights from empirical research ground the analysis.  
The theoretical studies allow investigation while controlling for some of the variation 
found within the empirical studies in Chapters 3 and 4.  
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The theoretical studies provide insight into the empirical work by allowing for 
more control of the conditions, such as citizen preference change.  This union, the 
empirical and theoretical, allows for a more comprehensive assessment of zoning and 
alternative land use institutions.  Furthermore, the assessment at several different scales 
with many methods allows me to address a number of issues that have been overlooked 
within the literature, especially in traditional land policy areas, such as land cover 
conversion, fragmentation, zoning compliance, and the growth of alternative institutions. 
1.5  Key Issues Addressed in Dissertation 
 Multiple methods and multiple scales are used to investigate land use institutions 
in an urbanizing environment.  There are almost an infinite array of different issues 
associated with land use, so I have narrowed this larger investigation into a set of smaller 
issues that I investigate because they address important policy question that have mostly 
been overlooked.   
First, I address whether zoning protects forestland and farmland.  The flip side of 
this question is whether zoning prevents development, which is a common refrain from 
communities seeking to prevent zoning adoption because of desires for economic growth, 
as well as from supporters of stricter zoning controls seeking to protect a community 
from the perceived ills of further economic development, such as strip malls and loss of 
forest and farmland.   
The second issue I investigate is whether zoning contributes to or prevents 
fragmentation of forestland.  Since large acreages of forestland are desired for wildlife 
habitat, as well as for economically viable timber harvesting, this question is of concern 
for many different types of forest stakeholders.   
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Since zoning mostly controls private landowners’ behavior, another issue is 
whether adopted and implemented institutions match the preferences of landowners, as 
well as citizens at large in the community.  If zoning does not generally match citizen 
preferences within the community, we expect that there will be difficulty in enforcement 
and compliance.  Thus, addressing the mismatch between zoning and citizen preferences 
possibly may lead to more compliance and also lead to zoning that better protects forest 
resources and promotes development, but in less land intensive manners.  Since zoning is 
typically enforced through citizen complaints, another aspect of this dissertation 
addresses when citizens will report their violating neighbors and when violators will start 
to comply.  This investigation is important because so much zoning literature has focused 
on the rules, with little emphasis on the implementation and enforcement.   
Finally, the dissertation addresses alternatives to zoning or institutions that could 
be used in conjunction with zoning to protect forestland.  To sum up the dissertation, I 
evaluate how zoning adoption relates to development, whether specific zones correlate 
with forest fragmentation, when community preferences match zoning rules, the 
conditions under which reporting will lead to zoning compliance, and evaluate 
alternatives to zoning.  
1.5.1  Does zoning protect forest and farmland? 
This dissertation investigates whether zoning protects forest and farmland in 
southern Indiana.  In Chapter 2, we create an econometric model of the land use decision-
making process founded on the utility of various types of land uses, which the landowner 
must evaluate (Plantinga and Buongiorno, 1990, Munroe and York, 2001).  With an 
econometric model I evaluate the influence of demographic characteristics, land 
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characteristics, i.e. topography, and existence and length of zoning policy enforcement on 
the land cover change for the 40 sample counties in southern Indiana.   
1.5.2  Does zoning lead to fragmentation of land cover? 
The second micro level analysis is at the parcel level within Monroe County, 
Indiana and evaluates the relationship between zoning and fragmentation for selected 
parcels outside the Bloomington city limits.  Landscape fragmentation results from the 
complex interaction between policy, biophysical characteristics, and socioeconomic 
development pressure.  Because of the negative environmental consequences of habitat 
fragmentation, policymakers need a reliable measure of the impact of zoning on 
landscape fragmentation.  Given this complexity, it is difficult to determine if zoning 
regulations have the desired impact on landscape fragmentation.   
 This research addresses the lack of understating of the impact of zoning 
regulations on landscape, especially forest, fragmentation.  In particular, we try to 
provide a better understanding of relationships between socioeconomic, locational, and 
physical characteristics and measures of landscape pattern that occur at the scale of 
individual parcels of land.    
1.5.3  When do we expect zoning compliance? 
 In Chapter 5, I use a game theoretic analysis to understand the conditions by 
which a citizen will report neighboring violators.  I explore how the emerging use of 
Geographic Information Systems technology may alter this game with the increasing ease 
of online information gathering.  Written zoning rules are only as effective as the actual 
rules that are enforced.  One of the primary mechanisms through which enforcement 
occurs is via neighbor complaints.  The game models a common problem in the zoning 
 14
arena.  Inspectors have limited resources and are unable to canvas an entire county.  
Violations can be difficult to spot from afar.  Certain types of violations may only be 
visible during a short period of time.  Therefore, like many police measures, zoning relies 
on citizen complaints to be enforced.   
1.5.4  What are the alternatives to zoning? 
 I highlight strengths and weaknesses of zoning in the first five chapters of the 
dissertation.  In the Chapter 6, I explore the alternatives to zoning, especially with regard 
to cooperative forest management.  There are several existing legal mechanisms that can 
be used to manage private land use, such as conservancy districts, property owners’ 
associations, contracts, and easements.  In this chapter, I use institutional analysis to 
explore the strengths and weaknesses of each approach.  I compare these approaches with 
traditional zoning. 
 As discussed earlier, in Chapter 7, I explore the mismatch between citizen 
preferences and government provision of zoning.  This chapter also explores the role of 
entrepreneurial citizens in the creation of new institutions, such as land trusts or gated 
communities.  This theoretical computer analysis highlights conditions in the local policy 
arena that will lead to more innovation and nongovernment institutional creation.  These 
two chapters aid in our understanding of institutions that could be used in conjunction 
with zoning, as well as institutions that could replace some of zoning’s functions.  
 
1.6  Union of Approaches 
Overall, the combination of the approaches will aid in our understanding of land 
use regulation creation, enforcement, and impact on the landscape.  Urban development 
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in rural areas is a topic of increasing concern.  Land use planning seeks to reduce 
incompatible neighboring uses.  The onslaught of criticism of zoning and requests to do 
away with traditional zoning create a need to better understand zoning’s impact on land 
use.  Before, we take away power from local governments to control land use through 
regional or statewide regulatory bodies, first we must understand how that land use 
control mechanism is working within its current context, especially in traditional land use 
policy regions.  In order to best assess the impact of zoning, I incorporate multiple scales 
to understand the institution of zoning in the southern Indiana context, at the county and 
individual landowner levels, as well as evaluate the institution in the abstract with 
insights from empirical literature. 
In this dissertation, I assess the ability of zoning to impact land use change.  I 
evaluate the strengths and limitations of a local self-governance approach to land use 
regulation through a multiple scale and multiple method approach.  Policy makers need to 
address the effectiveness of the most common United States land use control, zoning, to 
deal with land use and land cover change.   
In the United States, the population pressure in combination with changing 
preferences has caused urban sprawl through the conversion of farm and forestland to 
residential and commercial uses.  Communities frequently seek to control this process of 
land use change through a number of policies, including zoning and planning, ecosystem 
management plans, forestry policy, and private agreements.  This study of local land use 
regulations at multiple scales addresses the future viability of zoning policy within the 
United States.  Most importantly this study will evaluate the microlevel processes that 
lead to macrolevel land use and cover change.  Previous studies have evaluated zoning as 
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an independent variable in land cover change models or as a tool towards visionary 
planning goals.  Preliminary evaluation indicates that zoning is a part of a simultaneous 
relationship with land use and land cover change.  To understand the impact of a self-
governing local land use regulatory regime, one must study the institution and the land 
use and land cover change simultaneously.  In the concluding chapter, I discuss how this 
combination of approaches could aid in future policy analysis of land use policy and 
policy-making in general.  Overall, this study will provide useful information for 
modelers of land use, planning practitioners, and local citizenry, as well as the developing 
community seeking to evaluate a self-governing land use regulatory regime (Hanushek 
and Quigley, 1990).   
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 Chapter 2:  The Zoning Arena 
 Local level zoning and planning policies reflect the diversity of communities 
populating the American landscape.  Some scholars insist that American communities 
have limited or even no land policy.  “Writing about the land policy of the United States 
is a trifle presumptuous.  There is no de jure land policy (Dowall, 1988: 153).”  There is 
no one land use policy in the United States.  Rather, land use policy is created from a 
polycentric government, including local zoning and planning, as well as state and federal 
incentive and regulatory programs.  Within jurisdictions there is a wide range of goals 
and objectives in comprehensive plans and many means to achieve the land use goals 
through zoning ordinances. 
 In this chapter, I explore the zoning policy arena generally through institutional 
analysis.  Then, I explore how zoning may be impacted by community characteristics.  I 
then investigate the similarities and differences in the Southern Indiana comprehensive 
plans.  This exploration will help in the understanding of how these policies impact the 
landscape. 
 Zoning in the U.S. is created through local government units that are enabled by 
state legislation.  Zoning is the result of a myriad of local level interactions including 
public hearings, elections, conversations, and court proceedings where citizens, 
developers, officials, bureaucrats, and judges take action.  In the next section I explore 
the nature of the goods associated with land and how these goods are connected to zoning 
and planning.  I describe the major actors and their interactions in the local zoning and 
planning arena.  This institutional analysis will utilize the Institutional Analysis and 
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 Development (IAD) framework, which explicitly delineates actors, rules, institutions, and 
hierarchy. 
2.1  Nature of the Good 
 Markets produce many different types of goods, but there is often under provision 
of public goods.  In the US, the government is able to provide many public goods such as 
protection from internal and external threats, regulation of markets, and creation of 
infrastructure, which are not adequately produced by the market.  Social scientists have 
created a typology to categorize the different types of goods.  Economists have 
distinguished public and private goods on two axes, excludability and rivalrous nature.  
Four different categories have been outlined along these two axes, pure private good, 
pure public goods, toll good, and common pool resources.  How does land fit into this 
classification scheme? 
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Figure 2.1.  Typology of Goods1 
 
                                                 
1 Adapted from Figure 5.2.  A Classification of Goods: Private and Public.  
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  The study of land use regulation must begin with the question, “What is land?”  
Land, the good, is very complicated; it is an input in production functions, a place to 
recreate, a location for environmental services, a home, and many other goods.  Land 
values are linked to location, nearby employment opportunities, accessibility to markets, 
cultural opportunities, as well as the activities of nearby neighbors.  For example, does 
the parcel of land in question exist near a market for produce, or a city with demand for 
residential units and employment opportunities?  Historically, access to roads, rivers, 
trains, and canals critical for the development of a city and region, and also impacted the 
value of land that was near these transportation modes (Judd and Swanstrom, 2004).  
Accessibility is still important in the determination of land prices, although a moderate 
level of inaccessibility may not decrease the value of natural resource reach areas. 
One land use, a residence, may on the surface appear to be a single private good, 
but we can further break that down and see that goods stemming from residential land use 
potential include: a place to build a house, gain shelter from storms, have a home 
business, and perhaps grow produce in a garden.  “‘Housing’ is one of many commodities 
which, like ‘food,’ are not homogenous goods, but combinations of separate and diverse 
items.  Except that they are bought and sold together as parts of a single bundle, these 
items may have no resemblance and nothing in common (King, 1973: 5).”  If we extend 
this analogy to a parcel of land, we see that parcels differ on a variety of quality vectors 
each may be seen as a good of some sort. 
  Land has many different attributes and should be considered the origin of many 
different uses and goods.  Some of these uses generate income for the owners, whereas 
non-financial uses include recreation and shelter.  Neighbors may derive additional 
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 benefits from the beauty of certain types of land cover such as fields or forests on 
adjacent land, whereas some uses may generate unwanted smells and noises, or unsightly 
waste that results in a negative externality.   
Land is both a private and public good because of its many uses and values.  The 
local community may benefit from a landowner’s forest because of the aesthetics, while 
the global community benefits from carbon sequestration, two public goods from a 
private land use. The individual landowner will benefit from the timber in the forest, a 
private good.  Land regulation therefore, must take into account the heterogeneous nature 
of land use and value, as well as the public and private attributes of land uses. 
 Zoning restricts the ability to use land in particular ways.  One common type of 
land use restriction prevents landowners from raising livestock in urban areas, thus 
preventing unwelcome noise and smells.  This restriction generates a public good, the 
abatement of negative noise and smell externalities.  The externalities should be placed in 
the public good category or “public bad” category in Figure 2.1.  The benefactors for 
each type of land use regulation may be local or global.  For instance, the increased 
concern about protecting greenspace in and around urban areas has beneficiaries who 
enjoy the beauty, as well as beneficiaries from the protection of habitat for threatened or 
endangered species. 
 Zoning also has another type of benefit for landowners; it can stabilize property 
values within an area.  This stabilization perhaps could be viewed as a public good that 
strengthens the property rights to a private good, the house located on the land.  In a 
sense, zoning could be seen as increasing tenure for accepted uses, such as residential, 
while decreasing property rights for potential incompatible uses. 
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  Another type of public good associated with land is open space in parks, forests, 
and agricultural land.  Within a jurisdiction, a landowner may decide to develop a parcel, 
while neighbors may prefer that the land is preserved as open space.  This conflict 
sometimes crosses jurisdictions, as one community may prefer to develop a piece of land, 
which neighboring jurisdictions would prefer it preserved (Platt, 1996).  Government 
provision of public space may be necessary if it is ever to be provided because of the 
general problem of excludadability, inability of landowners to force benefactors to pay 
for open space.  Some open space may be provided by entrepreneurial landowners that 
fence off recreational open spaces and charge an entry fee.  The problem of 
underprovision is exacerbated by the inability of a jurisdiction to exclude residents from 
neighboring towns from utilizing a park without paying taxes for it.  Park provision and 
planning for open spaces affects the value of land within a jurisdiction, so there is some 
incentive to create parks that increase the wealth of taxpayers in the district. 
 Some zoning policies attempt to preserve privately held open space through zones 
for agricultural production and forest use.  These zones may have minimum lot size 
restrictions and also restrict other uses on property.  It can be difficult to use zoning to 
protect private space, especially if the local government is concerned about lawsuits from 
developers.  As developers acquire open space, they may be willing to go through 
extended legal battles in order to develop it.  Some local governments may be unwilling 
to pay for the legal fees. 
 Some argue that the government should not regulate land use because the private 
market could create Coasian solutions to land use externalities.  The land use externality 
was one of the original justifications for use of local police powers for land use regulation 
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 (Diamond and Noonan, 1996).  Private contracts or agreements do occur, especially in 
rural areas where the conflict involves parties that are well acquainted (perhaps related) 
to one another.  A farmer-developer may approach individuals within a community and 
try to establish an agreement without outside litigation or legislation (Rudel, 1989).  
Oftentimes, the transaction costs of these Coasian solutions are prohibitive and the 
property rights to land use are not well defined, which limits the general applicability of 
this type of solution.  If agreements are not attained or maintained the parties may seek 
litigators to help solve the problem.  Legal nuisance suits were the main, and only formal, 
solution to land use problems prior to zoning and planning.  The limitations of private 
agreements and litigation led to more proactive land use regulations.  Typically, zoning is 
the most frequently used land use regulation tool in the US (Platt, 1996) and is primarily 
used to prevent externalities stemming from conflicting uses on nearby parcels, i.e. 
adjoining residential and heavy industrial uses.  Planning is an overarching tool used in 
conjunction with zoning to establish long-term goals and visions for land use in the 
community. 
 Recently, planning and zoning has been identified as a potential solution, as well 
as a potential challenge, to urban sprawl and habitat fragmentation.  Carruthers (2001) 
identifies inconsistent local land use regulations as a contributing factor to urban sprawl 
because counties, in most states, are unable to regulate land use in the same manner as 
incorporated municipalities.  Since zoning in unincorporated areas is often less restrictive 
than zoning within adjacent municipalities, developers “leapfrog” to the unincorporated 
areas with fewer regulations (Carruthers 2003).  Carruthers (2003) has found that this 
leapfrog phenomenon contributes to sprawl through inconsistency in zoning.   
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 In Indiana, counties are enabled as land use regulatory bodies, so differences 
between county and city planning may have more to do with political orientation of the 
overall jurisdictions, which Rudel found in other exurban areas (Rudel, 1989).  Therefore, 
one might expect that urban/suburban municipalities have tighter growth policies limited 
development, whereas areas beyond the municipality have limited land use regulations or 
pro-growth policies, again creating the potential for the leapfrog phenomenon described 
by Carruthers (2001).   
The planning community recently has identified principles that enable 
communities to grow, but in a manner that is “smart,” typically referred to as “Smart 
Growth” principles (Talen, 2001).  Smart Growth principles include: compact urban 
form, maximizing existing infrastructure, walkable communities, and quality of life 
(Talen, 2001), principles that are supposed to allow a community to develop in a way that 
limits negative environmental impacts and promotes a community’s sense of place, its 
individuality.  The planning community’s support for Smart Growth is not always 
mirrored within the community.  Planners may find it difficult to realize Smart Growth 
principles in typical Indiana communities that prefer single family homes to multifamily 
housing (Worgan et al. 2001).  A community’s political orientation and culture is an 
important component in the effectiveness of zoning to achieve particular principles, such 
as Smart Growth. 
2.2  Zoning 
 Zoning enables the government to separate incompatible uses and may minimize 
the volume of nuisance litigation.  Zoning may be considered a “good” in its own right in 
the sense that zoning laws are a public good that an entire community benefits from and 
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 must be sustained through community monies and effort.  In this study, I am mostly 
focusing on the impact of zoning.  Zoning creates a set of limited property rights for 
particular parcels, but these rights often are not transferable (Nelson, 1980).  The property 
rights are non-transferable and may be changed, so zoning protect the value of other 
bundles of goods such as houses.  For example, a commercial use such as dry cleaner that 
was grandfathered in as an accepted use within a residential zone would not necessarily 
be permitted to continue legally if the property was sold.  Zoning could be viewed as a 
collective property right of the local government serving the collective well-being 
through the abatement of nuisance suits. 
 The need for zoning may have increased with urban growth, which has lead to an 
increased number of landowners with incompatible uses.  In Bloomington, Ind. urban 
sprawl is hot topic of debate, polarizing citizens throughout the community.  Some argue 
that economic growth in the urban-rural fringe is beneficial and increases job 
opportunities.  Others state that the strip malls, apartment complexes, and sub-divisions 
are only degrading the rural character of the region.  The value of land is tied up in its 
potential use, so zoning, by controlling the potential usage, also limits the value of the 
parcel. 
 The stabilization of property values is seen as a huge benefit for certain groups, 
such as homeowners.  Through zoning ordinances, these homeowners may fail to realize 
higher benefits from alternative uses, but their property will not lose value from 
neighbors using their land for factories, for example.  Some have argued that zoning won 
acceptance throughout the US because it strengthened property rights, especially for 
homeowners, through the prevention of nuisances (Babcock, 1966).  The establishment of 
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 zoning gave jurisdictions the power to prevent some nuisance suits through the 
establishment of usage zones. This generally held up the property values of certain areas, 
protecting the rights of some established owners.  Property owners that had planned to 
develop their property in a manner that was inconsistent with the usage zones sometimes 
faced great losses in potential income because the policies prevented the most profitable 
usage of the land.  This increased opportunity costs was typically borne by individuals 
that planned on developing their land for uses besides single family residential, such as 
manufacturing, retail, or even multi-family residential (Fischel, 1985). 
Hamilton (1978) argues that zoning is a monopoly power through the assertion of 
homeowners’ collective property rights.  The monopoly power of the local government, 
often controlled by residential interests (Babcock, 1966, Babcock and and Siemon, 1985), 
restricts the designation of zoning for nonresidential uses.  This monopoly power is 
especially important, because land use designation will impact the land’s market value, 
and the assignment could also be viewed as distributive policy.  Landowners that are able 
to attain a rezoning for commercial or retail are able to reap substantial benefits via 
increased land prices in a predominately residential area.  Similarly Babcock and Siemon 
(1985) note significant increases in land prices in Florida markets after a landowner is 
able to obtain a rezoning for residential development, especially in jurisdictions 
attempting to restrict growth.  Local governments have great control over who receives 
the economic benefits of rezoning. 
Zoning as distributive policy has also been a controversial class and racial 
conflict.  In the Mount Laurel v. NAACP case the crux of the argument against the city of 
Mount Laurel was its denial of low-income housing. The NAACP brought a suit against 
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 the township of Mount Laurel alleging discriminatory land use regulatory practices, 
which were keeping low income and minorities out (Hughes and Vandoren, 1990).  The 
NAACP v. Mount Laurel case illustrates the opportunity of nonlandowners to voice their 
opinion about the activities of the government through the judicial system.  The conflict 
between homeowners and potential apartment or condominium dwellers and developers 
is frequent in many municipalities.   
One of the justifications for zoning and planning in early court cases was its 
ability to prevent nuisance litigation through the separation of incompatible uses (Revell, 
1999). Today zoning is sometimes used as a mechanism to control and focus 
development, as well as prevent conflict between incompatible uses (Rudel, 1989, Talen, 
2001).  Within each jurisdiction, there also may be competing pro and anti-growth 
policies, such as tax abatements to promote development, lot size requirements to 
maintain a rural character, and historic preservation standards, which lead to mixed 
planning results with respect to land use change.  These competing demands and 
preferences for land use within the community set up strategic games between interest 
groups, such as environmental, development, and residential groups.  Strategic 
interactions also occur among the elected officials, planners, and citizenry, especially in 
the plan development and enforcement stages.  Furthermore, there may be strategic 
games between jurisdictions who perceive themselves as in competition for firms that 
could aid economic growth.   
Planning and zoning goals may not lead to the intended consequences as many of 
the regulations are not consistent with neighboring jurisdictions.  Carruthers (2003) 
identifies inconsistent local land use regulation as a contributing factor to urban sprawl 
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 because counties, in most states, are unable to regulate land use in the same manner as 
incorporated municipalities.  Rudel (1989) notes that community characteristics impact 
the local government unit’s stance towards economic development.  One might expect 
that urban/suburban municipalities have tighter growth policies limiting development, 
whereas areas beyond the municipality have limited land use regulations or pro-growth 
policies, again creating the potential for the leapfrog phenomenon (Carruthers, 2001).  
Therefore, this chapter will also include a brief account of general community 
characteristics that may affect the development games.  The ability of communities to 
regulate growth is complicated by the difficulty in assessing and containing sprawl. 
2.3  Action Arena 
The action arena is where rules are made, enforced, and broken (Ostrom,1999).  
The local zoning and planning action arena consists of public hearings, government 
meetings, as well as some behind-closed-doors bureaucratic planning meetings.  The 
actors in this arena compete for passage of comprehensive plans that capture their 
preferences, for examples standards and goals for aesthetics, public parks, public health, 
segregation of incompatible uses, and freedom to utilize private land.  Some groups such 
as developers may be more active in the land use regulation arena, but it is difficult for 
any one group to control the policymaking arena because of the complex hierarchy 
(Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2.  The Zoning and Planning Action Arena 
 
The actors in the community may change over time due to increased residential or 
industrial growth, which causes changes in community preferences.  Thus the action 
arena is dynamic across time with changing relationships amongst actors.   In the next 
section, I will outline the main actors in the local land use regulation arena. 
2.3.1  Actors 
 The actors in the action arena represent diverse interests and positions with 
elected officials in the local government unit, the plan commission members, professional 
planners, zoning inspectors, board of zoning appeals, and citizens routinely involved with 
land use regulation policymaking.  The state legislature and the judicial system support 
the local arena through state enabling legislation and judicial decisions on land use cases.  
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 These actors’ preferences and experiences may differ from place to place, but there are 
some general characteristics that will be discussed in the following sections.  
2.3.1.1 Local Government Unit 
The local government unit may be a township, town, village, city, or county 
depending on the enabling legislation of the state.  The local government unit is made up 
of elected citizens that vote on zoning ordinances and plan amendments.  The local 
government unit may also appoint members of the plan commission and board of zoning 
appeals.  Depending on the community characteristics, the local government unit may 
also hire a planning consultant or staff planner because of potential pressure from their 
constituents, or government officials own preferences for land regulation.  Citizens are 
able to express their land use preferences through the electoral process, as well as through 
letters, phone calls, and public hearings.  The government unit passes and amends the 
ordinances and plans, which the Plan Commission initially recommends.  Frequently, 
neighboring jurisdictions form Area Plan Commissions, which coordinate planning.  
These area commissions may complement or supplant the work of the local Plan 
Commission.   
2.3.1.2 Plan Commission 
The Plan Commission members are appointed by the local government unit.  
These members are citizens of the community with varying experiences in land use 
planning.  The plan commission makes recommendations for rezoning after a public 
hearing, but the elected government unit has the final authority to rezone the land in most 
jurisdictions (Fleischmann and Pierannunzi, 1990).   The composition of interests within 
the commission varies with the community type.  Sometimes, there may be a 
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 disproportionate representation of development or conservation interests.  For example, 
the planning commission members may be a part of the established development 
community in urban areas because regular citizens have limited information about the 
complex regulations, as well as limited personal benefit from changes to regulations, 
whereas developers may sustain substantial financial gains through policy changes in 
urban areas.   The planning commission is responsible for making recommendations to 
the local government unit regarding the comprehensive plan and any amendments to the 
plan.   
Typically, citizen preferences reach the plan commission through public hearings 
and personal relationships with commission members, or concerns expressed indirectly 
through the local government unit and the electoral process (Figure 2.2).  Since the 
planning commission is not directly accountable to the public, there may be coordination 
problems between the constituents and the plan commission recommendations.  Some 
local governments have created a forum for additional meetings in order to facilitate 
communication with the citizenry (Department of Metropolitan Development and 
Division of Planning, 1991).  The plan commission frequently works with a number of 
other local government units and related commissions, such as an environmental 
commission or the parks and recreation board, which may further complicate the 
policymaking process. 
2.3.1.3  Professional Planners 
The plan commission, or the local government unit, often hires a planning 
consultant or staff planner(s) to direct their planning activities.   Rudel indicates that 
planners may have extensive education about land use law and visionary planning goals, 
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 but not about the conditions in which various regulations should be applied (Rudel, 
1989).  The planner may be idealistic and have environmental or social goals that are 
incompatible with the nature of the community.  "We begin with the dismal fact that the 
planner, whether consultant of staff member, finds that he must spend more time working 
with zoning than with any other planning tool; zoning, the very device he has been taught 
in planning schools and professional conventions to regard as a dull, ineffective tool 
(Babcock, 1966)."  The professional planners have different education and possibly 
different personal preferences with respect to land use than the rest of the community.  
These preferences may have caused the planners to enter the planning profession, or were 
shaped during their acculturation into the planning community.  Thus, there seems to be 
inherent conflict between the planning department employees and the elected and 
appointed officials. 
This inherent conflict between the officials and the planners may be exacerbated 
in smaller communities where a consultant planner is employed because the community 
is not large enough to afford or warrant a full-time planner.  The consultant planner most 
likely has other projects in other communities.  Therefore, each community may receive a 
cookie-cutter plan established from previous projects.  Consultant behavior may be 
restricted by a desire for good recommendations from the community, but the 
consultant’s income is not as closely related to the community’s satisfaction as the 
income of a staff planner.  The outside consultant may also have more limited knowledge 
of the local area than a staff planner who probably lives in the area.  Thus, it may be 
difficult for the community to obtain a plan incorporating their preferences with a 
consulting planner. 
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 Even with staff planners, there are coordination problems with the Plan 
Commission and the local government unit.  The planners may receive directions from 
multiple political perspectives that are difficult to coordinate within a single plan.  
Babcock (1966) found in the 1960s that planners were disturbed by the political conflict 
between the plan commission members and the elected officials.  This type of conflict 
between commission members and elected officials seems to be common because 
planners cite ability to foster compromise amongst stakeholders as a valuable skill in 
creation of comprehensive plans (Ellickson and Been, 2000).  There are multiple sources 
of coordination problems with the planners because citizens, plan commission members, 
and government officials frequently have limited technical and legal knowledge of 
planning (Figure 2.2).  The limited technical information available to officials and 
citizens, or the limited information that is understandable to these layperson groups, lead 
to classic information asymmetries and managerial dilemmas (Miller, 1990).  Planners 
sometimes only interact with citizens through formal hearings (Figure 2.2).  By the time 
citizens interact with the planners at the public hearings the decision-making is usually in 
the hands of the government unit and the plan commission.  Thus, we may expect that it 
is difficult for a plan to match community preferences due to the lack of interaction 
between citizens and planners and the difficulty for officials to access the technical plans.   
2.3.1.4  Zoning Inspectors 
Inspectors are required to enforce the comprehensive plan, but typically do not 
have the resources to effectively police the entire jurisdiction.  Given the scarce 
resources, inspections often come as a result of citizen complaints, so compliance success 
is often related to neighborly policing and issues of citizen concern.  These problems are 
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 further complicated by the limited and spotty enforcement of zoning ordinances 
(Ellickson and Been, 2000).  Ellickson and Been (2000) note that inspection is often left 
to building departments who may not have sufficient knowledge of zoning ordinances, 
which leads to a principal-agent problem between the building department inspectors and 
the planning department.  This problem is exacerbated by limited planning department 
control over building inspectors’ work assignments and job performance rating.  Another 
potential issue with zoning inspection is that the comprehensive plan may have 
development goals that are not expressed in actual enforceable zoning ordinances due to 
the inability to create regulations with specific, legal language and standards that fully 
incorporate lofty, visionary goals of the comprehensive plans.  Plans are only as good as 
the supporting ordinances, which in turn are only partially enforced by the inspectors2.    
2.3.1.5  Board of Zoning Appeals 
After zoning decisions or violations are given to citizens, they may appeal to the 
Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), which is appointed by the local government.  The BZA 
often deals with the hardship variance cases, where BZA must determine whether the 
citizen has suffered undue hardship because of the zoning.  The BZA’s authority is fairly 
limited with respect to granting variances (Ellickson and Been, 2000).  The board also 
frequently handles grievances from the building permitting process, so BZA resources are 
stretched between the planning and building arenas (Ellickson and Been, 2000).   Like the 
planning commission, the BZA may or may not reflect the distribution of community 
preferences.  Therefore, there may be coordination problems between the citizens of the 
community and the decisions of the board.  Citizens mostly influence the board indirectly 
                                                 
2 The plan language may also serve to signal a change in preferences, for example an increased 
environmental concern, which may deter development or promote growth.  The plan language also may 
raise awareness within the community about the loss of greenspace or the need for industrial development. 
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 through elections of the government unit, or informally in conversation (Figure 1).  If the 
landowner or citizens are unhappy with the BZA decision they may appeal to the justice 
system.   
2.3.1.6  Citizens  
Citizens represent a diverse group in the development arena, including 
landowners and neighbors, and sometimes developers.  Citizens may appeal decisions in 
the comprehensive plan first to the BZA and then to the justice system.  Citizens may 
express their opinions at the public hearings for proposal and adoption of the 
comprehensive plan, amendments, and zoning appeals.  Finally, citizens may express 
their views through the electoral process and informally by talking with the elected and 
appointed officials.  Citizens frequently protest development at public rezoning hearings, 
but organization of an opposition force represents a collective action problem.  Some 
citizens may not want the development, but will free ride on the efforts of their 
neighbors.   
2.3.1.7  Justice System 
The justice system handles appeals after board of zoning appeals decisions.  The 
courts power to invalidate zoning regulations is mostly limited to a test to whether they 
are arbitrary and capricious (Babcock, 1966).  The court does investigate appeals on an 
individual basis, but the burden of proof is placed upon the citizen or landowner to prove 
that the comprehensive plan or amendment was unjust.  Since the trials are conducted on 
the basis of expert testimony, they are often prohibitively expensive and are frequently 
avoided through the Board of Zoning appeals process.  As will be described in the games 
section, the justice system is an essential component of the land use regulatory process.  
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 Without the justice system, there would be no higher power to aid in sanctioning 
noncomplying uses, as well as no outside referee for the highly political comprehensive 
planning process. 
2.3.1.8  State Legislatures and Congress 
State Legislatures and the U.S. Congress have enacted many land use regulations 
including local zoning enabling acts.  The state enabling acts represented a constitutional 
rule change that allowed local governments to control some private land uses.  Both 
Oregon and Vermont have enacted state-wide planning commissions that direct some 
local land use regulation.  "The Oregon legislature has attempted to support agriculture 
by minimizing instability for commercial farms.  It has done so in many ways, but the 
most important step was requiring all cities to adopt urban growth boundaries (UGBs) 
and prohibiting counties from approving urban-scale development outside them 
(Diamond and Noonan, 1996)."  State legislatures and Congress typically are involved 
only in enabling acts, except in Oregon and Vermont where the state legislatures are 
involved with specific land use legislation.  Congress has also passed legislation that 
impacts land use such as Clean Water Act, especially Section 404 that deals with 
wetlands, and the Endangered Species Act.   
2.3.1.9  Other Actors 
 There are many other actors in the local land use regulation arena including:  
lawyers, local government bureaucracy, developers, and non-governmental organizations.  
Lawyers often serve as consultants for local government units, citizens, and landowners 
in zoning appeals, but lawyers are not always part of the process.  Like planners, lawyers 
have specific technical knowledge, which leads to coordination and monitoring problems 
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 because citizens, local government officials, and landowners may have limited legal 
knowledge.  Finally, nongovernmental organizations are significant actors in local land 
use in many communities.  These organizations may express preferences for limited 
urban sprawl or increased economic growth.   
2.3.2  Community Types 
The variation among state land use legislation enabling acts is echoed in their 
application to different community types within each state.  These differences reflect the 
local community characteristics.  Urban and rural residents have different expectations 
about economic growth and different preferences for land use.  Hogs may be a nuisance 
in New York, but the rule in Iowa.  A strip mall may signal a new economic awakening 
to rural residents, but exurbanites may view the mall as damaging their country view.  In 
this section, the differences in land use regulation in various community types, city, 
suburbs, urban-rural fringe, and rural, will be discussed. 
2.3.2.1  City 
The city is often populated by a diverse community with a wide array of 
preferences.  The connection between the citizen and the government officials may be 
weak.  In comparison to smaller communities, few citizens know government officials 
personally, leading to coordination problems between the constituency and officials.  
Even with a large scale urban bureaucracy and distant elected body, some citizens have 
pressed officials to pass interesting land use legislation, which that meets their unique 
needs.  The Soho artists restricted entry to their neighborhood in 1971 by persuading “the 
New York City government to establish an Artists Certification Committee that would 
certify applicants as professional artists and then to make such a certification a zoning 
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 requirement for SoHo residency (Nelson, 1980)."  The Soho Artist Certification process 
is a unique variant of land use regulation, but often urban residents are frustrated and 
confused by the land use policy making process.  Within city government, there is also a 
problem of coordination between city departments.  The number of actors in the urban 
local land use arena is probably quite large, which may lead to elite actors, such as 
developers or wealthy commercial interests, controlling land use discussion.  "In some 
cases, boom-and-bust examples abound within one metropolitan area, leading to 
conflicting or contradictory policies, given the absence of local government coordination 
(Dowall, 1988)."  Dowall’s discussion illustrates the problem of inconsistent land use 
policy in urban areas, but this problem is also found in other community types. 
2.3.2.2  Suburbs 
In comparison to urban areas, the suburban land use debate was largely controlled 
by residential interests until quite recently.  Suburban residents often protect their quality 
of life and property values by establishing lot size restrictions.  The 1926 Supreme Court 
ruling in Euclid v. Ambler Realty voiced the widespread belief that “that an apartment 
house in a low-density neighborhood was 'a mere parasite, constructed in order to take 
advantage of open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential character 
of the district' (Hallett, 1988)."  Suburban land use is often chiefly residential with some 
commercial use districts, particularly for service industries.  In comparison to city 
residents, suburban residents are frequently more motivated and informed about local 
land use regulation (Rudel, 1989; Ellickson and Been, 2000).  Citizens and landowners 
may be more involved in the action arena balancing the power of other elite groups, like 
developers.  In a sense, the suburban homeowners are the elite group in the suburbs.  
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 They are often able to prevent the movement of poorer residents into the area through 
limitations of low-income housing, although the language of these comprehensive plans 
and zoning ordinances typically utilize vague language to avoid discrimination suits like 
NAACP v. Mt. Laurel (Hughes and Vandoren, 1990).  Recently some suburban areas 
have focused of inclusion of commercial and retail land uses in residential areas, 
especially through the New Urbanism design movement (Judd and Swanstrom, 2004), 
although many suburban areas still focus on residential interests.     
2.3.2.3  Urban-Rural Fringe 
The urban-rural fringe is distinct from the suburbs because it is populated with 
exurbanite residents and rural natives, creating a unique conflict in the action arena.  "For 
exurbanites, most of whom do not rely on land for their income, the countryside is first of 
all a park, a place valued largely for its amenities. . .Only the creation of publicly 
approved constraints on individual land users, usually in the form of zoning laws, can 
assure the preservation of the park-like atmosphere (Nelson, 1980).” The exurbanite 
residents often rely on neighboring urban or suburban communities for employment, so 
may not be sympathetic to some rural residents’ use of land for income.  Typically, there 
is a gradual shift from rural to urban-rural as through the development of agricultural land 
into single-family subdivisions, as the rural shifts to suburban there often is a shift toward 
more restrictive land-use controls (Rudel, 1989).  The urban-rural fringe often has an 
emerging developer interest and strong exurbanite interests. 
2.3.2.4  Rural 
In comparison, rural communities often experience limited economic 
development.  Rural residents may not expect a small development project to lead to 
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 extensive development.  "Because rural populations are relatively immobile, neighboring 
landowners have often known one another for long periods of time, and the nature of this 
relationship can affect the way a neighbor reacts to a proposal to develop the land (Rudel, 
1989).”  In rural areas, neighbors are often able to work out land use concerns without 
interference from the government.  Large development plans may actually lead to the 
initial zoning ordinances in rural communities.  Thus, the rural government unit could be 
characterized as reactive, rather than proactive in land use regulation. 
In rural communities, personal relations with government officials and neighbors 
are the norm.  Rudel describes a typical situation where plan commissioners talk before a 
meeting and the chairperson, a banker, mentions a meeting with developers who applied 
for a loan during the past week and “that he considered them to be 'responsible' 
developers whose application should be approved.  The pro-developer bias illustrated 
here appears common among land-use authorities in former farming communities (Rudel, 
1989)."  Former farming, and other resource-dependent, communities may evaluate 
development as a positive move toward economic growth in a relatively depressed 
farming area. 
2.3.3  Games 
 Within the land use arena as described in Figure 2.2, there are strategic 
interactions between actors.  The outcomes of these games may depend on the type of 
community where the game is played.  Most communities feature competing interests 
such as farmers and exurbanites, or low-income apartment developers and homeowners, 
although the relative strength of these interest groups may vary depending on whether the 
community is on the urban-rural fringe or in a suburban area.  These competing interests 
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 create several games in the land use regulation arena.  For all of the games the actors may 
attempt to change the forum in order to have the best chance to obtain their desired result, 
for instance obtain a rezoning or variance.  The participants may attempt to forum shop in 
order to make the process easier (The Harvard Law Review, 1990).  In order to do this, 
developers in particular may decide to pursue a development in a more lenient zoning 
jurisdiction (Babcock and Siemon, 1985).  
One general type of game is the social dilemma where participants (citizens) need 
to contribute towards a public good.  In the land use regulatory arena, there are several 
social dilemmas such as creation of greenspace through the regulation of private property 
or abatement of traffic congestion through a denial for a commercial rezoning.  Citizens 
benefit from the public good, the aesthetics and carbon sequestration from greenspace or 
the limited traffic, but individual property owners bear the burden for these public goods.  
Thus policymakers need to strike a balance between the maintenance of greenspace or the 
promotion of economic development and the citizen’s interests.  One type of social 
dilemma that is common in policymaking is the collective action problem (Rudel, 1989).  
Several common games will be outlined below that are general social dilemmas.  There is 
also discussion of a contracting game that is one strategy to cope with the uncertain 
zoning approval process. 
2.3.3.1  Creation of a Comprehensive Plan  
 The process of creating a comprehensive plan involves many different, competing 
stakeholders, including the plan commission, professional planners, citizens, and 
auxiliary committees.  As can be seen in Figure 2.2, a basic map of the stakeholders is 
already quite complicated.  The citizens represent a diverse group including the 
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 landowners, developers, and the neighbors.  They indirectly influence the creation of the 
plan through public hearings, but do not have decisionmaking authority except through 
their elected officials.  Likewise, the plan commission members and planners can make 
recommendations, but the final vote is usually with the local government.  This already 
complex arena has additional complexity when one includes the various committees that 
inform planning activities, such as the historic preservation, parks and recreation, 
utilities, and environmental committee. 
In construction of the comprehensive plan, sometimes the plan commission has a 
specific proposed development in mind.  In many small, rural jurisdictions 
comprehensive planning arises in response to large new developments (Olson, 1965).   
Rudel (1989) recognizes that increased development may lead to land use regulation, but 
only indirectly links developers’ influence to local land use decisions.  In other areas, 
there may be sweeping changes to a plan, when a large development is proposed in order 
to prevent the intrusion3.  Creation of land use regulations in the face of impending 
development is often the most controversial and litigious land use policy because these 
rules could be construed as arbitrary and capricious due to the fact that they were made in 
relation to one project.     
 The comprehensive plan may include a variety of supplementary documents and 
tools.  In Bloomington, Ind. there is a Growth Plan, which focuses on maintaining 
greenspace, coordinating infrastructure development, and reducing urban sprawl 
(Babcock and Siemon, 1985).  The Growth Plan also includes some historic preservation 
elements, such as architecture guidelines for historic buildings, which lead to heated 
                                                 
3 This occurred in Tuxedo, New York, which declared a building moratorium in order to review existing 
zoning ordinances when faced with a large development proposal   
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 debate (City of Bloomington Planning Department, 2002).  Recently, one Bloomington, 
Ind. landowner tore down several older homes that were scheduled for historic listing 
(Denny, 2002).  As might be expected, landowners may try to preemptively act by 
destroying a building or changing a land use before the regulation can affect their use 
rights.  Overall, there is a lot of strategic action involved in plan construction, as the plan 
will alter affected landowner’s property values and rights. 
2.3.3.2  Enforcement of a Plan 
 A comprehensive plan and associated regulations are only as good as the 
monitoring and sanctioning associated with it.  If residents do not witness credible land 
use policing, we may expect that there will be widespread noncompliance.  Many 
jurisdictions do not have the resources to effectively monitoring land use regulations 
violations.  Throughout the country, governments rely on citizen complaints to enforce 
the zoning ordinances (Ellickson and Been, 2000).  Therefore, land use regulatory 
enforcement probably will be concentrated in the most visible types of violations.  The 
problem with citizen enforcement is that it only works if citizens are willing to take the 
time to generally be aware of legal uses under the zoning ordinances, to watch their 
fellow citizens’ use, and report the offense.  Thus, many citizens are willing to free-ride 
on others policing, so there is the typical collective action problem associated with citizen 
lead enforcement.  Figure 2.3 illustrates the informal connection between landowners and 
inspectors.   
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Figure 2.3.  Enforcement of Comprehensive Plan 
As mentioned earlier the de jure ordinances may or may not effectively advance 
the goals of comprehensive plan due to the “legalese” used in ordinance construction.  
The difference between the plan goals and the actual regulatory goals is one potential 
source of the ineffectiveness of land use regulation.   Irregardless of whether the 
ordinances reflect the plan, the basic ordinances frequently are not upheld because of the 
lack of monitoring resources.   
Another enforcement problem is that inspectors may be building inspectors who 
are asked to enforce land use regulation ordinances without sufficient training.  Similarly, 
these building inspectors’ job security is tied to their enforcement of the building code, so 
we may expect that there is limited incentive for the inspectors to enforce the zoning 
codes, another principal-agent problem.  Since, there are repeated interactions between 
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 the planning department, building department, and inspectors, the principal-agent 
problem may be overcome as reputations are established and trust builds between the two 
departments (Johnson, 2001). Then planning department and plan commission may 
increase their ability to direct the inspectors’ actions by establishing good relationships 
with the building department.    
 Professional zoning inspectors under the direction of the planning department 
may know and understand the zoning laws, but have their own priorities with respect to 
enforcement (Figure 2.3).  In a conversation with a southern Indiana zoning inspector, he 
indicated that each inspector has a priority, such as run-off control or elimination of junk 
cars on front lawns.  These priorities focus the inspectors’ activities, but not all plan 
components and zoning ordinances may be a priority.  Therefore, if non-conforming 
landowners recognize that no one cares about compliance with a particular ordinance, the 
owner probably will continue the illegal use with limited fear of getting caught or fined.    
 In some jurisdictions there have been instances where noncompliance has lead to 
costly fines or injunctions, where the landowner was required to tear down a building or 
to remodel it to fit the zoning ordinance.  In one case in New York, an apartment 
developer was required to remove twelve stories of thirty-one story complex to conform 
to the ordinance, as an expense of $2 million (Ellickson and Been, 2000).  As mentioned 
earlier, variances are sometimes granted for landowners that experience a hardship due to 
the regulation, although frequently self-created hardships are exempt qualify for a 
variance (Ensminger, 2001).  In order for land use regulation to be effective the de jure 
rules must match the de facto.  There must be a credible threat of enforcement of the rules 
in order for the land use regulation to be effective.  
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 2.3.3.3  Property Sale for Development 
The first game in the development process is the sale of land to the developer.  In 
many cases, vacant land is owned by a farmer, especially along the urban-rural fringe.  
This farmer/landowner may evaluate the feasibility of continued production on the land, 
prior to sale, but may be unaware of the technicalities of the development process, or the 
development potential of his land.  After the developer approaches the landowner about 
developing the land, the landowner’s awareness of the investment quality of the land has 
increased and he may begin a development project on his own.   
Frequently, obtaining permits for development is a complex and risky process, so 
the landowner will enter into a contract game with the developer due to the difficulty of 
obtaining rezoning and variance approval.  Of course, there are information asymmetries 
between each party.  The landowner may be more aware of the community 
characteristics, and whether the there will be opposition to the development.  On the other 
side, the developer probably has more extensive knowledge about the legal and business 
aspects of development.   
One common type of sale arising from this contracting game is the conditional 
sale, where the landowner receives a deposit with the rest due upon rezoning approval, or 
building permit approval (Ellickson and Been, 2000).  The landowner receives a higher 
payment because he shares the risk of approval with the developer.  It is easy to see why 
such a contract would evolve out of this game, as there are information asymmetries 
amongst the parties, and the permitting process is typically risky.  Another interesting 
aspect about the conditional contract is that it creates an alliance between the developer 
and landowner, which may help in the permitting process.  If the landowner has been a 
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 longtime resident his fellow citizenry on the plan commission and in the local 
government unit may trust his judgment and proposal more than if a developer came in 
by himself with no ties to the community. 
2.3.3.4  Opposition Coordination 
In the process to rezone the property, the developer needs to notify the planning 
department that she is proposing a rezone.  Then the public is notified of the public 
hearing for the rezoning.  There is the collective action game amongst the neighboring 
landowners.  The landowners, and possibly other environmental or residential advocacy 
groups, may organize to protest the rezone.   
Babcock and Siemon describe a case in Palm Beach, Florida, where wealthy 
residents sought to prevent multi-family condominium development.  This particular case 
was interesting as many of the opponents were new Palm Beach apartment and 
condominium residents whose buildings had “slipped in before the Town could change 
rules (Ellickson and Been, 2000).”  Frequently, the opposition to development is a 
diverse coalition of homeowners, environmentalists, and competitors (Babcock and 
Siemon, 1985).   
In many communities, environmental concerns are a rallying point for opposition 
coalition formation.  In Bloomington, Indiana, environmental groups tried to prevent the 
commercial development of an apartment development in a karst area and were able to 
gain support from nearby landowners (Ellickson and Been, 2000)4.  Similarly in Sea 
Ranch, Calif., Babcock and Siemon (1985) describe a heated controversy over 
environmental protection of the coastline and a group of landowners with clearance for 
                                                 
4 Karst is a type of broken limestone terrain characterized by caves and underground streams that is prone 
to sinkholes Isaacs, Alan, John Daintith, and Elizabeth Martin (eds.)  1999.  Oxford Dictionary of Science.  
New York:  Oxford University Press.  
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 construction.  There are many different motives for the anti-development contingency in 
rezoning cases, although frequently the opposition is made up of residents seeking to 
maintain their property value.  Similar to the collective action problem with citizen 
enforcement of zoning, opposition formation and protest of rezoning proposals creates a 
free-riding problem.  Each individual opposing citizen would be happiest with the defeat 
of the proposal without having to attend meetings or expend time or effort in the process5.   
2.3.3.5  Rezoning strategy 
 The rezoning game is a complicated, risky multi-step game.  The proposal comes 
before the governing body with the plan commission’s recommendation.  The developer 
and neighbors are allowed to voice their viewpoints at the plan commission and 
government unit hearings.  The game is quite complicated with the governing officials 
balancing political considerations with the merits of the individual rezoning proposal.  
The officials need to think about the public’s reaction to their decision, especially if it is a 
high-profile rezone and they hope to retain their seat at the next election.  The officials 
may also have some interest in preventing the developer from creating a new apartment 
complex or commercial development, especially if the official is a competitor.  Many of 
the plan commission members have outside commercial or political connections to land 
use policy, and frequently are real estate agents, land use lawyers, environmental 
activists, and developers.  Some of the members may have a decidedly pro-growth stance 
considering their occupations.  Other members may need to make recommendations 
about a competitor’s or client’s proposal.  Recently, in Bloomington, Ind. a county 
commissioner, a lawyer, had to make a recommendation about a former client’s proposal 
                                                 
5 There may be a few citizens that enjoy the fight or have political ambitions who may actually get utility 
out of the zoning game. 
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 for a rural single-family home development (Hinnefeld, 2002).  The citizenry that make 
up the vocal opposition to developments often include neighbors, environmental NGOs, 
and competitors (Ellickson and Been, 2000).  Therefore, we can see that there are several 
different types of games occurring simultaneously within the rezoning process with 
actors making strategic moves that take into account the community’s well-being, the 
comprehensive plan, and more selfish, personal economic motives. 
One study found that the “best predictor of a local governing body’s decision in a 
rezoning case is the recommendation of the appointed planning commission (Van der 
Dussen, 2003).”   Interestingly, Fleischmann and Pierannunzi found that the plan 
commission’s denial recommendations for rezoning proposals were more consistently 
ratified by the local government boards in Illinois than commission’s recommendations 
for approval (1990).  Perhaps, this illustrates that during the rezoning approval process 
the local government body faces more intense political pressure than the plan commission 
members and professional planners who are not elected, thus possibly creating a higher 
threshold for plan approval.  Babcock (1965) found that the professional planners, plan 
commission members, and government officials often had very different opinions with 
respect to development approval.  In a famous case in Tuxedo, New York, Babcock and 
Siemon (1985) spoke with an official who stated he was not going to vote for rezoning 
approval for a multi-family development because of political pressure, even though he 
conceded that it may be the “right” thing for the community’s economic development. 
In some jurisdictions the approval process is so risky that developers have created 
a niche market for rezoned land.  The developers buy land zoned for less profitable use 
and take it through the approval process to rezone it multi-family or single-family 
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 residential, for example.  Then they resell the property to a builder at a premium.  These 
developers establish strong political connections to plan commission members and 
elected officials in order to reduce the rezoning risk, and in some markets they receive 
substantial profits selling rezoned land (Ellickson and Been, 2000).   These market 
incentives lead to problems of collusion and suspicion with regard to campaign financing.  
In Monroe County, Ind. there were concerns about conflict of interest when a decisive 
rezoning vote was cast by a county commissioner who was the former lawyer for the 
development proposal (Fleischmann and Pierannunzi, 1990).  The developers’ ability to 
establish a good relationship with the Plan Commission and local officials may directly 
correlate into rezoning success.  Likewise, if a developer violates zoning ordinances 
officials may reject rezoning proposals in the future due to liability concerns. 
2.3.3.6  Litigation 
 At all points in the planning process, both sides need to make a credible threat of 
litigation.  Without this crux either side will not have the bargaining power to make the 
hard choices during the development and enforcement process.  In Babcock and Siemon 
(1985), there is a description of many notable court cases where the battles were very 
heated probably because of the high court expense and long periods of time involved with 
litigation.  These court cases represent a wide range issues, ranging from discriminatory 
land use regulation to environmental protection through regulation, but all illustrate 
similar final step in the land use policy arena.  If any of the games fail, the players end up 
in court, if both are willing to make the sacrifices.  After the court battle, judges may send 
the players back to the local authority and to the bargaining table, thus they reenter some 
of the games described above.  The threat of litigation is essential in order to force the 
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actors to “hold up their end of the bargain” whether in the compliance with zoning 
ordinances or in the “legal” creation of the comprehensive plan.  Therefore, litigation 
serves as an essential and often overlooked part of the zoning and planning arena, which 
must be utilized in order to effectively implement planning policies like control of urban 
sprawl. 
2.4  Planning in Southern Indiana 
 Indiana experiences all the problems described earlier with zoning enforcement, 
plan creation, and mobilization of interest groups.  Indiana has many counties and 
municipalities that are representatives of the community types described in the previous 
sections, although rural and rural-urban fringe community types predominate in spatial 
area.  I evaluated the comprehensive plan documents for southern Indiana in order to 
assess their relationship to basic principles of Smart Growth, the new type of planning 
recommended by the American Planning Association (Talen, 2001).  This is especially 
important in order to explain future chapters that assess the impact of these institutions on 
land use and land cover change and fragmentation.   
 The basic principles were modified from those used by the Center for Urban 
Policy and the Environment in their investigation of central Indiana planning.  I included 
citizen participation, government collaboration, and zoning enforcement, in order assess 
ability of communities to achieve the principles.  The principles were gathered from 25 
county plans in southern Indiana, three plans were unavailable. 
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Principles Identifier used n %age
Planning for growth References to population growth/loss 16 64% 
Livable built environment Pedestrian uses; compatibility of uses 14 56% 
Responsible regionalism Competitive advantage; economic development; promotion of region 14 56% 
Harmony with Nature Preservation natural resources and/or agricultural land 13 52% 
Plan and fund infrastructure Use of a capital improvements plan 13 52% 
Compact urban form Infill development in areas with infrastructure in place 10 40% 
Variety of choice in housing Affordable housing; advocating different types of housing 10 40% 
Quality of life References to parks, open space, sense of identity; sense of community 9  36%
Maximizing infrastructure Using infrastructure that already exists 9  36%
Equity Affordable housing; impact fees 8  32%
Balance of multi-model transportation 
system 
Public transit and/or alternative forms of transportation like greenways, bike 
paths, and pedestrian walkways or sidewalks 8  32%
Government collaboration Reference to need for current of future government collaboration 8  32%
Infrastructure development Impact fees or requirements that developers pay 7  28%
Place-based environment Preservation of natural resources or agriculture; energy conservation 6  24%
Historic preservation References to preserving historic structures or districts 6  24%
Citizen participation Means to encourage citizen participation 6  24%
Costs of implementation Identification of how costs of plan recommendations will be paid for, strategies 
for securing funds 5  20%
Improving development review 
processes 
Allowing more ease for implementation and permitting flexibility 
4  16%
Reasonable, predictable, fair plan 
review processes 
More predictable review process for both developers and public interests 
4  16%
Zoning enforcement Mention of need to enforce existing or new codes 4  16%
Mixed-use, walkable neighborhoods Sidewalks and development with different types of uses; receptiveness to mixed 
use 3  12%
Implementation responsibility Identification of person or agency responsible for plan implementation 2  8%
Implementation schedule Time-line for implementation of plan recommendations 1  4%
Assessment of progress Identification of methods for measurement of plan's success 1  4%
Table 2.1.  Comprehensive Plan Principles in Southern Indiana 
  As can be seen in Table 2.1, planning and dealing with growth is the most 
common Smart Growth principle that these plans addressed.  The majority of plans also 
addressed a livable built environment and responsible regionalism.  Responsible 
regionalism usually was discussed in the plan as positioning the community for economic 
development.  Whereas, the livable built environment was typically addressed through 
discussion of zoning for compatible uses.  Harmony with nature and planning and 
funding infrastructure were also discussed in the majority of plans.  Harmony with nature 
usually meant a focus on agricultural preservation programs or goals.  Communities often 
discussed planning for infrastructure, but only two counties addressed funding for the 
infrastructure.  The weakest principles for these counties were implementation and 
assessment.  Only one county included quantifiable measures for assessment of plan 
progress.  Similarly, only one county included an implementation schedule, although the 
schedule focused primarily on infrastructure. 
 Thus, we see that counties in this study area include many Smart Growth 
principles in their plans, although the counties do not focus on the implementation and 
funding for these initiatives.  There are many areas that these communities could improve 
in their plans in order to better reduce urban sprawl and grow in a smart manner, 
according to the Smart Growth principles identified by the American Planning 
Association (Talen, 2001).  The majority of counties were concerned about the protection 
of their rural and agricultural resources, but were also concerned about economic 
development.  Thus, planning potential could help to aim development toward resource 
poor areas, while protecting important natural resources.  This brief analysis of principles 
illustrates that the plan for this area are quite varied. 
 53
  As discussed in previous sections, the ability of communities to achieve plan 
goals is difficult as actors most navigate the complex action arena.  Once a plan is in 
place the limited enforcement of the plan and indiscriminate granting of variances 
reduces the effectiveness of the plan to achieve its goals.  Now that we have explored the 
general zoning arena and the zoning policies in place in southern Indiana, in the next 
chapter I move into an analysis of regional analysis of zoning’s impact on land use.  
Specifically the next chapter evaluates zoning’s impact on the decision to use land for 
forest, agriculture, or urban purposes.  As noted earlier, many of these counties are 
seeking to preserve agricultural land, so the next chapter addresses whether adoption of 
zoning, over no county-wide zoning, is positively or negatively related to agricultural, 
forest, and urban land uses.  Since there are few implementation strategies or funding 
initiatives for many of the Smart Growth principles, in reality most zoning in southern 
Indiana is fairly traditional and focused mostly on separation of uses.  Thus, a simple 
study of zoning versus no zoning will give us a rough assessment of zoning’s impact and 
will provide direction for future research. 
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Chapter 3:  Zoning’s Impact on Forests, Farms and Strip Malls 
 
 The previous chapter explored the zoning policy arena and described conflicts 
that characterize the arena.  In this chapter, we explore how zoning and tax policy 
impacts land cover change in southern Indiana.  As indicated in the previous chapter, 
forestland and farmland are often targets for protection in southern Indiana.  Southern 
Indiana is an urbanizing environment, although the pressure varies throughout our study 
area.  The following study presents evidence of how zoning impacts land use 
development and protects natural resources. 
By Abigail M. York and Darla K. Munroe1 
3.1  Introduction 
 Increasingly, threatened forestland and farmland is a topic of concern for 
communities throughout the United States.  Subdivisions, strip malls, and office 
complexes spring up amid cornfields and trees in peri-urban areas.  In order to control 
urban sprawl and protect forest and agricultural space, many communities and states have 
adopted growth management policies.  Progressive cities, such as Portland, Oregon, use 
urban growth boundaries to stifle sprawl, but progressive growth controls are the 
exception, not the rule.  Frequently, county or city zoning ordinances are the primary 
growth management controls.  The ability of these local zoning ordinances to protect 
open spaces and control urban growth is not fully understood, although several scholars 
have characterized local level zoning as ineffective in the absence of a comprehensive 
regional approach (Carruthers, 2003, Diamond and Noonan, 1996, Dowall, 1988, Platt, 
                                                 
1 This chapter is a manuscript under review with the Land Use Policy, “Zoning’s Impact on Forests, Farms, 
and Strip Malls: An Investigation of Southern Indiana Counties,” by Abigail M. York and Darla K. 
Munroe.  There is an added introduction and conclusion to connect the article to the rest of the dissertation. 
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1996).  Prior analyses have focused on zoning’s impact on forest and farmland 
conversion in isolated plots, parcels, or cities (Brabec and Smith, 2002, Kline and Alig, 
1999, Stone, 2004).  Thus most analyses investigate specific zoning policies, but do not 
assess the broader impact of zoning on land-use conversion in a regional context. We 
seek to evaluate the impact of county level zoning on farmland, forestland, and urban 
uses across the southern Indiana region.   
 Southern Indiana presents a unique study area in that it has experienced 
significant forest regrowth on private land during recent decades, has varying levels of 
zoning ordinance adoption, and varying levels of population pressure.  Many counties in 
southern Indiana do not currently have zoning ordinances, or enacted them only in the 
past five years.  Unlike some states, Indiana has not passed legislation requiring county 
level zoning, as can be seen in Figure 3.1.  Thus southern Indiana provides an ideal 
location to evaluate the impact of county level zoning on urban, forest, and agricultural 
land use.  Moreover, comparing the extent of urban development across counties with 
divergent experiences in the implementation of growth management policies can be of 
great use to policy makers.  Similar to many regions throughout the United States, 
southern Indiana is increasingly experiencing urbanization in peri-urban areas (Erickson, 
2002, Deller, 2001, Phillips, 1993).  Southern Indiana’s hills, forests, and agricultural 
scenery attract residents seeking rural amenities.  Our research focuses on the effects of 
local land use controls in the context of these regional and countywide trends of 
urbanization.  Our study is an extension of earlier work (Munroe and York, 2003) that 
evaluated the impact of changes in regional economic employment patterns on county 
level land use and reforestation trends.   
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Figure 3.1.  Zoning in Southern Indiana  
 This study investigates the joint impact of land use policy and a broader set of 
economic and institutional determinants on land use patterns at the county level over the 
past three decades, from 1970 to 2000.  The 40 county study area includes three United 
States Forest Service (USFS) forestry units that have similar ecological and topographic 
features, hilly land and relatively poor soils, which were not glaciated by the Wisconsin 
glacier2 (Figure 3.1).  The 40 counties provide great variation in the issues of concern, 
                                                 
2 This 40 county study area stands in stark contrast to the flat, glaciated areas of Northern Indiana, which 
have extremely good soils for crop production. 
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including zoning policy, as can be seen in Figure 3.1, as well as population pressure, 
economic structure, and tax rates.  In the following sections we discuss the importance of 
nonindustrial private forests, discuss the theoretical foundation for the model, construct 
the econometric model, provide results, and conclude with discussion and directions for 
future research. 
3.2  Nonindustrial Private Forestry in Indiana 
This study focuses on nonindustrial private forests (NIPFs), as well as agricultural 
and urban land uses.  NIPF land use is of particular importance because NIPF lands make 
up the vast majority of forest in Indiana.  These forests provide valuable timber, 
especially hardwoods such as oak and walnut, as well as ecological services, recreation 
opportunities, and aesthetic benefits.  We evaluate whether zoning protects NIPFs, as 
well as how larger regional economic trends impact NIPF extent.  NIPFs are particularly 
important in Indiana, but are also of great importance throughout the United States where 
in 2001 NIPFs constituted over 474 million acres, almost two-thirds of the all forestland 
(Hibbard, et al., 2003).  In some regions, NIPFs are the primary source for wood products 
such as, pulp, lumber, plywood, and other wood productions (Rickenbach, 2002). The 
Natural Research Council Committee on Prospects and Opportunities for Sustainable 
Management of America's Nonfederal Forests found that "NIPFs also provide a wealth of 
nontimber benefits that extend from tangible benefits of clean water, wildlife, and 
biodiversity to less tangible but equally valuable benefits of recreational enjoyment, 
scenic beauty, and cultural ideas of place (National Research Council, 1998).”   In many 
areas throughout the United States there has been an increase in the extent and age of the 
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forests since World War II (Birch, 1996), but how is this reforestation impacted by local 
land use controls? 
Within Indiana there have been both afforestation and deforestation trends, as can 
be seen in Table 3.1, from 1968 to 1998 counties in Indiana have both gained and lost 
NIPF land.  Some counties experienced regrowth in the first period, 1968 to 1986, 
whereas others gained in second.  In Figure 3.1, existence of zoning ordinances at the 
county level can be seen.  Two of the five counties, highlighted in Table 3.1, that have 
gained forest cover over the 1968 to 1998 period, Crawford and Sullivan County, do not 
have county level zoning controls.  Three counties, Franklin, Perry, and Union County, 
gained forest cover and have had zoning controls at the county level since at least 1970.  
In our study we attempt to evaluate afforestation and deforestation trends that are due to 
agricultural abandonment and residential development, while accounting for institutional 
impacts from zoning and taxation.  Thus, we seek to uncover the complicated relationship 
between zoning and forest cover, as well as other important local economic and 
demographic variables that will help us understand NIPF regrowth and decline. The 
econometric analysis allows us to evaluate the impact of zoning on NIPF, relative to 
other uses.   
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Table 3.1. Trends in Area of Forest Cover on Private Land, Thousand Acres 
1967 1986 1998 
County 1,000 Acres 1,000 Acres 1,000 Acres
Percent Change 
1967-86 
Percent Change 
1986-98 
Percent 
Change 
1967-98 
Brown 68.73 76.2 64.71 11% -15% -6% 
Clark  78.53 59.9 65.81 -24% 10% -16% 
Clay 71.31 35.3 36.69 -50% 4% -49% 
Crawford 89.15 96.2 97.14 8% 1% 9% 
Daviess 34.65 38.0 21.95 10% -42% -37% 
Dearborn  102.18 105.4 83.41 3% -21% -18% 
Dubois 61.2 58.8 51.29 -4% -13% -16% 
Fayette 37.98 30.9 21.75 -19% -30% -43% 
Floyd 35.59 28.5 23.38 -20% -18% -34% 
Franklin  101.66 91.2 107.68 -10% 18% 6% 
Gibson 38.32 27.2 28.64 -29% 5% -25% 
Greene 127.51 118.4 100.21 -7% -15% -21% 
Harrison  96.68 102.3 89.44 6% -13% -7% 
Jackson  86.86 85.4 69.31 -2% -19% -20% 
Jefferson  104.01 84.3 80.14 -19% -5% -23% 
Jennings  63.38 64.6 48.16 2% -25% -24% 
Knox 59.52 31.4 17.73 -47% -44% -70% 
Lawrence  125.6 96.9 98.63 -23% 2% -21% 
Martin 57.63 57.2 54.75 -1% -4% -5% 
Monroe  112.22 78.7 86.24 -30% 10% -23% 
Morgan 86.11 67.9 63.76 -21% -6% -26% 
Ohio  31.56 22.3 18.64 -29% -16% -41% 
Orange  95.3 76.9 91.5 -19% 19% -4% 
Owen 97.88 92.3 87.42 -6% -5% -11% 
Parke 88.75 79.8 75.61 -10% -5% -15% 
Perry 83.09 88.6 89.11 7% 1% 7% 
Pike 26.49 35.1 24.12 32% -31% -9% 
Posey 42.77 40.2 42.59 -6% 6% 0% 
Putnam 101.6 77.0 76.69 -24% 0% -25% 
Ripley 63.04 61.7 60.88 -2% -1% -3% 
Scott 34.18 42.4 30.47 24% -28% -11% 
Spencer 74.62 57.0 50.13 -24% -12% -33% 
Sullivan 31.59 38.7 37.09 22% -4% 17% 
Switzerland  92.5 59.7 80.22 -35% 34% -13% 
Union  12.65 14.9 13.49 18% -9% 7% 
Vanderburgh 34.57 15.9 6.31 -54% -60% -82% 
Vermillion 36.85 27.1 27.75 -26% 2% -25% 
Vigo  69.54 42.1 42.07 -39% 0% -40% 
Warrick 62.23 63.9 48.47 3% -24% -22% 
Washington  108.65 111.4 107.95 3% -3% -1% 
Counties with forest regrowth from 1968 to 1986 are highlighted. 
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 3.3  Theoretical Foundation 
The theoretical foundation of our model was developed in Parks and Murray 
(1994) and Ahn et al. (2000) who postulate that land-use shares at the county level are the 
collective result of underlying benefit-maximizing behavior of landowners over an 
infinite time horizon. Land use profitability, or the expected return from all possible land 
uses, is influenced by market accessibility, soil fertility, topography, and other factors. 
Land use change occurs when there are significant changes in prices, economic 
conditions, policies, or infrastructure development. Changes in zoning policies represent 
changes in the institutions, the formal and informal rules (Ostrom, 1999), that govern 
landowner behavior through incentives and disincentives.  In our previous study  
(Munroe and York, 2003), we found that, in addition to variations in topography and soil 
quality, regional economic structure was an important determinant of county-level land 
use patterns. In this study we explicitly account for local policies such as zoning and tax 
rates, along with economic structure and physical landscape characteristics. 
We assume that observed land use at the county level is a function of unobserved 
net benefits to those uses (Ahn, et al., 2000, Parks and Murray, 1994, Plantinga and 
Buongiorno, 1990, Plantinga, et al., 1999). A price-taking risk neutral landowner will 
maximize his/her discounted expected net returns by allocating portions of his/her land to 
different activities, such as agriculture, forest, or development.  The landowner attempts 
to maximize the net present value of an infinite stream of returns from the prospective 
land use, or mixture of land uses, without loss of generality.  Thus, the shares of land use 
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are modeled as a function of the benefits to be gained from forest, agricultural, and 
developed land uses given the institutional constraints in each county.   
The expected shares of land use, derived from the aggregation of individual 
decision-making at the county level, are represented as a logistic function linear in the 
decision variables, X, and the unknown parameters, βk: 
 
 ( ) ( )
( )
,
k 3
,
1
p ,
k
k
X i t
X i t
k
et i
e
β
β
=
=
∑
, (3.1) 
 
where pk is the probability that land use k is chosen relative to an exhaustive set of 
possible uses: agriculture, forest, and urban; for individual i at time t. Within each county 
land was assigned to three categories: forest (private, non-industrial forest area), 
agriculture, and urban/residual. The last class is defined as the total land area minus land 
devoted to agriculture and forestry, less water and public land. In each time period, the 
total shares of land sum to 1.  We iteratively compared each land use to the other two 
possible categories via the semi-log formulation: 
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where yk is the area in land use k, y1 is the base land use for comparison, and ε is the error 
term. This model is identified if we constrain β1 to equal zero (Ahn, et al., 2000).  The 
ratios of agriculture to forest, urban to forest, and agricultural to urban, thus represent the 
trade-offs between these uses as a dependent variable. This framework is useful in the 
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identification of the relative effect of land use profitability and suitability on the observed 
shares of land use (Mauldin, et al., 1999). 
Equation (3.2) can be expressed as: 
 ln(yag/yfor)=βagf0+βagf1x1it+βagf2x2it+…+εit 
 
ln(yurb/yfor)=βurbf0+βurbf1x1it+βurbf2x2it+…+εit  , (3.3) 
 
ln(yurb/yag)=βurba0+βurba1x1it+βurba2x2it+…+εit 
 
for all i and t, where yag represents the share of agricultural land use, yfor is the share of 
private non-industrial forest land use, and yurb represents the urban/residual land use 
class, and X is the vector of independent variables described below, and also listed in 
Table 3.2.  
Table 3.2.  Descriptive Statistics
Type Variable, units Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum
Rent Livestock Revenue, head x price, $1,000+ 17.364 20.765 0.726 136.63
Crop Revenue, bushels x price, $1,000 15.93 12.388 1.107 70.408
Farm Profits, $1,000/farms 3.926 7.811 -12.714 32.681
Forest Rent, $100 17.484 75.46 0 809.344
Population Density (population/mile2) 162.388 196.893 41.317 1124.37
Policy Average Net Property Tax Rate, % 6.319 1.45 2.912 14.627
Economic Structure LQ Tertiary and Higher Sectors 0.669 0.122 0.22 0.9
Median House Value, $1,000 52.174 12.616 30.28 87.916
Accessibility *Accessibility to Indianapolis, pop/dij 13.825 11.189 5.225 54.867
Accessibility to Cincinnati, pop/dij 8.815 1.787 6.338 14.453
Accessibility to Evansville, pop/dij 12.213 15.843 4.095 82.003
Accessibility to Bloomington, pop/dij 8.042 34.012 0.87 229.059
Accessibility to Terre Haute, pop/dij 11.364 5.316 5.057 35.258
Accessibility to Louisville, pop/dij 171.905 1377.982 0.637 13712.2  
+All prices are in 1997 dollars, 1982=100; *Population is total number of people and distance is in meters 
3.3.1  Land Rents 
Forest rent is generally represented as the net present value of an infinite series of 
timber rotations, which are determined by stumpage prices and yield by species. A 
bareland forest rent calculation for each county in the study area was derived using 
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growth and yield models calibrated for southern Indiana (Carmean, et al., 1989, 
Schroering, 1982). The ideal forest rotation length was calculated using an assumed 
interest rate of 5%. Combining the optimal rotation forest length and deflated prime 
lumber prices found in Hoover (2000), the net present value of an infinite series of 
rotations on bareland for the major forest species groups was calculated.  A county-level 
average was derived by weighting this measure by the area of total forestland in each 
forest species group for each county3.  The net present value of returns to timber in 
forestland use does not reflect the full spectrum of utility, such as aesthetic value, 
received by private non-industrial owners. The effect of non-market forestland uses such 
as aesthetics was proxied with population density and residential housing values.  
Agricultural rent is represented by the net present value of a perpetual stream of 
annual crop and livestock revenues, assuming that the current and historical revenue 
streams can provide an indication for the likely future revenue stream. Land quality is a 
critical factor in farm production (Parks and Murray 1994). Agricultural rent is measured 
using deflated output prices, average yields, and slope and soil type. Farm profits and 
government transfer payments may indicate the financial solvency of a farm.  
Agricultural rent was defined as livestock and crop revenues from the US Agricultural 
Census (US Department of Agriculture, 1969, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1987, US Department of 
Agriculture, 1992, 1997).  Farm profits were also included from the Regional Economic 
Information System (REIS) data (US Department of Commerce, 2001).   
Urban land use, in our model, is by definition non-agricultural or non-forest uses, 
including industry and residential land.  In past studies, urban land use pressure was 
                                                 
3 Total forestland was used, not just NIPF area, under the assumption that timber sales by NIPF 
landowners, timber industry, and national and state parks collectively determine the price paid to mills. The 
species groups included poplar, elm-ash, beech, red and white oak, and maple. 
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proxied by population density (Ahn, et al., 2000, Mauldin, et al., 1999, Parks and Murray, 
1994, Plantinga and Buongiorno, 1990). As in prior studies, we include population as an 
important measure of non-agricultural and non-forest use. Population data was obtained 
from the United States Population Census 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000.  There is 
substantial variability in population density in the region, with a mean value of 162, and a 
range from 41 to 1,234 people per square mile (Table 3.2).  We extend this simple model 
of urban, agricultural, and forest land rents with policy, economic structure, accessibility, 
and interaction terms.    
3.3.2  Policy 
We include two policy variables, zoning and average property tax rates.  The 
impact of zoning on land use decision-making is not straightforward, although some 
theoretical work indicates that zoning may inhibit development of land for urban uses 
(Fischel, 1985).  Others argue that zoning does not impede growth, but rather may cause 
sprawl through large lot requirements that are common in traditional ordinances (Dowall, 
1988).  Zoning restricts the ability of landowners to use their property through rules such 
as limits on construction, timber harvesting, and use of riparian areas.  Local 
governments often face tough choices in determining the tradeoffs between ideal land use 
policy, and socioeconomic and political contingencies.  Unfortunately, some regulations 
often have unintended impacts, particularly in peri-urban areas.   
Rural regions may have limited experience with the negative impacts of 
uncontrolled development (Esparza & Carruthers, 2000), and their wish to stimulate 
economic development can lead to a pro-growth orientation (Rudel, 1989; Marcouiller, 
1996; Henry et al., 1997).  Therefore, the impact of zoning may not be unidirectional 
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with respect to land use change; some institutions may push urbanization outward, while 
other rules will restrict urbanization.  Some have theorized that local communities may 
not adopt restrictive zoning, or may not adopt zoning at all, in order to attract new 
industries (Peterson, 1981, Rudel 1989).   
Adoption of restrictive zoning and increasing property taxes are two hypothesized 
means to control growth.  Property taxes influence the cost of holding land, and zoning 
influences the transaction costs of development.  Ideally one would like to ascertain the 
impact of zoning with inclusion of variation of rules and enforcement, but it is especially 
difficult to quantify differences in enforcement and plans, especially over time (Feiock 
and Taveras, 2002).  The zoning dummy variables are equal to 1 for existence of zoning 
and 0 for no zoning at each time point. The existence of zoning was measured at three 
points in time: in the year 2000, and 15 and 30 years prior to that point.  Zoning data was 
obtained from the county level comprehensive plans and ordinances, as well as 
conversations with local planning department staff, experts, and outside sources, such as 
the I-69 Environmental Impact Study (Bernardin Lochmueller & Associates, 2000).  In 
Indiana, counties and municipalities are both able to zone, but the county level zoning 
variable was chosen because of the interest in peri-urban development; i.e., the county-
level plan is thus the greatest restriction on overall development within each county.  The 
zoning dummy variables indicate whether there is review of development at the county 
level.  Average property tax rates were constructed from Indiana State Auditor records 
with assessed property value and total current taxes. 
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3.3.3  Economic Structure 
Economic structure, such as the residential land market, can also impact the land 
use decision-making.  The value of residential land at the county level is also likely to be 
positively correlated with the percentage of urban land (Munroe and York 2003), which 
found that more urban conversion happens in those areas with higher benefits to be 
gained from urban uses, ceteris paribus.  Median housing value, obtained from the United 
States Department of Commerce Census of Population, was included to signify general 
county level trends in the value of residential property. 
To represent heterogeneous preferences for land use mixtures endogenous to the 
county, the location quotient (or relative concentration) of secondary and higher sectors 
(all sectors excluding agriculture, forestry and fishing; mining; construction; and 
manufacturing), is included using county employment data (US Department of 
Commerce, 2001).  Munroe and York (2003) found that the location quotient, a measure 
of a region’s comparative advantage for particular products, for the relative employment 
concentration in the more extractive sectors (agriculture, fishing and forestry) versus 
employment concentration in the service sectors of the economy provide an indicator of 
heterogeneous preferences for forest recreation and aesthetics.  As a county shifts from 
extractive employment to service employment, we expect a resulting shift in valuation of 
nontimber forest benefits. 
3.3.4  Accessibility 
A gravity measure for ratio of city population to travel distance from the center of 
population in 1970, 1990 and 2000 of each southern Indiana county captures the effect of 
an increasing pull to urban or suburban lifestyles. For each county, the weighted distance 
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to nearby cities with a population greater than 50,000: Bloomington, Cincinnati, 
Evanston, Indianapolis, and Louisville was calculated, to represent employment 
opportunities, cultural influence, suburban pressures, and tourist populations, which 
affect the land use throughout the region.  Overall the rent, policy, economic structure, 
and interaction variables extend the simple rent models that are common throughout the 
land use literature (Ahn, et al., 2000, Parks and Murray, 1994, Plantinga and Buongiorno, 
1990, Plantinga, et al., 1999). 
3.4  Model Selection 
 The overarching goal in the econometric estimation was to begin with a 
parsimonious model of land use shares; i.e., that land use is simply a function of relative 
profitability, or land rent.  If these returns at the county level are somehow shaped by 
land use policies, then the inclusion of a broader set of variables that reflect other 
incentives should improve the explanatory power of the model.  We move from a simple 
land rent Model 1 adding in policy variables in Model 2, then economic structure 
variables in Model 3, and accessibility and interaction variables in Model 4 (Tables 3.3, 
3.4, and 3.5). 
We employed panel techniques to account for structural differences among 
individual observations.  Comparisons were made between group dummy variables (fixed 
effects), and error component (random effects) models.   The fixed-effect model includes 
a set of county-specific dummy parameters or intercept terms. The fixed-effects model is 
most appropriate when the differences across units (in this case, counties), are known or 
hypothesized structural differences, or parametric shifts in the regression function 
(Greene, 2001). Random-effects formulations also account for variation across units, but 
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as an individual disturbance, similar to the error term, for each county. In this case, the 
county-specific differences are thus randomly distributed across counties (Greene, 2001). 
This formulation is most appropriate when the unmeasured or unmodeled variation across 
counties is due to exogenous, random shocks (such as climate or business cycle 
fluctuations).  
All regressions were estimated using LIMDEP software v 7.0. Estimation results 
are presented in Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5. LIMDEP calculates two sets of diagnostics for 
the significance of group effects4. There was no evidence for serial autocorrelation in the 
error terms, probably due to the time gap between each period. There was no significant 
evidence of spatial dependence in the land use ratios for any time period.  Specification 
testing indicated that a random-effects formulation was most appropriate for the urban to 
forest and urban to agriculture models (Tables 3.4 and 3.5), while a fixed-effects 
formulation was most appropriate for the agriculture to forest model (Table 3.3), similar 
to the results in our previous analysis (Munroe and York, 2003). 
We constructed a nested set of four models to test the necessity of incorporating 
measures of policy, economic structure, accessibility to proximate urban regions, and 
interaction terms. The base model included only population density as a measure of the 
profitability of urban land use, and we progressively added in the remaining variables. 
Comparisons across models were made via likelihood ratio tests and nonlinear F statistic 
tests, subject to a χ-squared distribution (Greene, 2001). These likelihood ratio tests 
                                                 
4 There is a trade-off between fixed and random-effects models in practice. Fixed effects models do not 
require the limiting assumption that the county-specific effects are uncorrelated with the regressors, as the 
random-effects model does. On the other hand, the consistency of the fixed-effects estimator depends on t, 
or the number of time periods, and thus may be more unreliable for fewer temporal observations  
Greene, W. H. Econometric Analysis. 4th ed. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001. In some cases, one may 
have theoretical reasons to justify fixed or random effects, but these reasons may not always conform to the 
data.  
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indicate that all models did not benefit by the inclusion of additional variables, at the 95% 
confidence level, but the agricultural to forest land share did yield better results when the 
zoning and tax policy variables, measures of housing values and the location quotient for 
tertiary/higher sectors, accessibility and interaction terms were included at the 90% 
confidence level. 
3.4.1  Results for Share of Agriculture to Forest Land 
For this formulation, a fixed effects model was shown to be the most appropriate 
formulation via a Hausmann test (Greene, 2001). Most variables were insignificant, 
indicating that the county dummy variables in the fixed effects formulation captured 
much of the underlying variation in the observed agriculture to forest ratios in these 
counties (Table 3.3).  The amount of explained variation was high, with a constant 
adjusted R2 value of approximately 0.89 across all models. A likelihood ratio test 
indicated that the simple Model 1, which only included agricultural and forest rent 
variables, yielded the best overall fit. 
The variables related to the profitability of agricultural land use, farm profits and 
crop revenue, were not significant across all the models.  Forest rent was positively 
related to agricultural use, although not significant, while the interaction between forest 
rent and slope had a negative impact on agricultural use.  The agricultural rents, farm 
profits and crop revenue, were positively related to agricultural use, as was the population 
density variable, across all the models. 
The policy variables were insignificant across Models 2, 3, and 4.  Zoning in the 
current period and 15 years prior was insignificant and positive in the complex Models 2, 
3, and 4.  Zoning 30 years prior was insignificant and negative.  The average tax rate 
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variable was not significant, but was negative in Models 2, 3, and 4, indicating that areas 
with high property tax rates have less agricultural land.   
Table 3.3. Estimated Results for Agriculture to Forest Share
Fixed Effects Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Forest Rent 0.0004 0.002 0.0009 0.002 0.0009 0.002  0.0015 0.003
Forest Rent * Slope 0.0023 0.017 -0.0017 0.017 -0.0013 0.018 -0.0091 0.018
Farm Profits 0.0063 0.007 0.0064 0.007 0.0062 0.008  0.0045 0.010
Crop Revenue 0.0122 0.013 0.0105 0.013 0.0115 0.014  0.0178 0.015
Population Density 0.0051 0.002 0.0010 0.002 0.0014 0.002  0.0017 0.006
Zoning 0.1096 0.142 0.1283 0.146  0.2539 0.158
Zoning 15 Years Prior 0.0207 0.122 0.0182 0.124  0.1302 0.131
Zoning 30 Years Prior -0.1068 0.15 -0.0848 0.151 -0.0467 0.154
Average Property Tax Rate -0.0165 0.036 -0.0087 0.041 -0.0039 0.161
Median House Value 0.0019 0.005  0.0008 0.018
LQ Tertiary/Higher Sector -0.3539 0.545 -1.0984 0.776
Accessibility to Cincinnati  0.0215 0.195
Accessibility to Indianapolis -0.0917 0.078
Accessibility to Terre Haute -0.0329 0.223
Accessibility to Evansville  0.0011 0.079
Accessibility to Bloomington  0.0533 0.076
Population Density*Tax -0.0003  0.0003
Population Density*House     -0.00005*    0.00003
Population Density*LQ  0.0053 0.005
House*Tax  0.0015 0.003
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Log-Likelihood Ratio -10.04 -8.32 -7.87 2.134
Model 1 vs. 4 24.35
* Indicates significance at the 90% level
Dependent variable ln(agriculture/forest)
 
The economic structure variables were not statistically significant across Models 
3 and 4.  The location quotient (LQ) variable was not significant, but negative indicating 
that areas with a greater concentration of tertiary and higher sectoral employment have 
less agricultural land. None of the accessibility variables were significant.  The median 
house value was positive, indicating that areas with a stronger residential land market 
have more farmland relative to forestland. 
There were no significant accessibility variables.  Accessibility to Cincinnati, 
Evansville, and Bloomington were positively related to agricultural land relative to 
forestland, while areas closer to Indianapolis and Terre Haute were negatively correlated 
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with farmland. The interaction variable of population density and median house value 
was negative and significant indicating that increasing median home values coupled with 
increasing population density decreases agricultural land use.  Overall the rent variables 
explained much of the variation in the sample.  Model 1 is the most appropriate with a 
log-likelihood test and threshold of 95% confidence level, although Model 4 is most 
appropriate is the threshold is relaxed to 90%.  Thus, policy, economic structure, 
accessibility, and interaction variables do capture some of the variation in the decision to 
farm land relative to hold land as forest. 
3.4.2  Results Share of Urban to Forest Land 
The random effects model was most appropriate for the urban to forest, indicating 
that there were structural changes throughout the period that were not captured by a 
county dummy.  The estimated coefficients from the regression on the share ratios of 
urban/residual to forest land uses are found in Table 3.4. Overall, these models explained 
less of the variation in the dependent variables than in the agriculture/forest share model, 
as evidenced by the R2 ranging from 0.23 to 0.40.  As evidenced by the value of the F 
statistic, Model 1 was superior to the more complex Models 2, 3, and 4, at the 95% 
confidence level. Thus, the addition of zoning, tax rate, median value, the location 
quotient for tertiary/higher sector, and accessibility variables did not greatly improve the 
model. The simple model superiority indicates that the choice between urban and forest 
land is not easily related to political and socioeconomic factors beyond population 
pressure, forest and agricultural price information, and slope, although this may be due to 
aggregate scale of this analysis.    
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Among the rent variables, forest rent was not statistically significant in any of the 
models and was positively related to urban uses.  Interestingly the crop revenue variable 
was statistically significant in all models and positively related to urban uses.  Population 
density was positive and statistically significant in Models 1, 2, and 3.   
Table 3.4. Estimated Results for Generalized Least Squares of Urban/Residual to Forest Share
Random Effects Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Constant -0.7781 0.1947 -1.0706 0.375 -0.3521 0.723 -1.7010 1.893
Forest Rent  0.0043 0.004  0.0043 0.004  0.0041 0.004  0.0030 0.004
Forest Rent * Slope -0.0233 0.026 -0.2491 0.026 -0.0221 0.027 -0.0178 0.026
Farm Profits   0.0052 0.008  0.0060 0.009  0.0043 0.010  0.0037 0.012
Crop Revenue    0.0141* 0.008   0.0140* 0.008   0.0150* 0.008    0.0184** 0.008
Population Density       0.0019*** 0.001      0.0017*** 0.001      0.0020*** 0.001 0.0055 0.006
Zoning  0.1493 0.185  0.1897 0.190 0.1037 0.189
Zoning 15 Years Prior -0.0095 0.193 -0.0083 0.196 0.0140 0.195
Zoning 30 Years Prior -0.0934 0.201 -0.0909 0.208 -0.1786 0.209
Average Property Tax Rate   0.0402 0.053  0.0243 0.060  0.0976 0.240
Median House Value -0.0055 0.007  0.0073 0.026
LQ Tertiary/Higher Sector -0.6031 0.712 -0.8087 0.935
Accessibility to Cincinnati 0.0576 0.072
Accessibility to Indianapolis    0.0239** 0.010
Accessibility to Terre Haute -0.0289 0.024
Accessibility to Evansville -0.0067 0.009
Accessibility to Bloomington -0.0042 0.006
Population Density*Tax -0.0003   0.0003
Population Density*House -0.0001    0.00004
Population Density*LQ  0.0040 0.004
House*Tax -0.0006 0.004
R2 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.40
Sum of Squares 68.93 68.4 66.51 54.72
Model 1 vs. 4 1.97
* Indicates significance at the 90% level, ** at 95%, and *** at 99%
Dependent variable ln(urban-residual/forest)
 
None of the policy variables were significant.  In this model zoning in the current 
period was positive, although insignificant, whereas zoning 15 years prior was negative 
for Models 2 and 3, and zoning 30 years prior was negative and insignificant for Models 
2, 3, and 4.  The average property tax rate was positive and insignificant for Models 2, 3, 
and 4.  Similarly none of the economic structure variables were statistically significant.  
Median house value was negative in Model 3 and positive in the more complex Model 4.  
The location quotient was negative in Models 3 and 4.  
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There was one significant accessibility variable, accessibility to Indianapolis, 
which was positive.  All else equal, areas that are closer to Cincinnati and Indianapolis 
have more urban land, while those closer to Bloomington, Terre Haute, and Evansville 
have less urban land.  None of the interaction terms were statistically significant.  It is 
fairly clear that the simple rent model is most appropriate for the urban to forest models. 
3.4.3  Results Share of Urban to Agricultural Land 
 Results for the regressions of share ratios of urban to agricultural land are found 
in Table 3.5.  This random-effects model explained less of the variation than the previous 
models, approximately 0.09 to 0.34 across the models.  The most appropriate model was 
the simple rent model as determined by an F statistic test of the explained variation 
between the restricted and unrestricted models. 
 Forest rents were not significant in any of the models and had a positive impact 
on urban relative to farmland in Models 1, 2, and 3, but forest rent was negative in Model 
4.  Farm profits were negative and significant in Model 1, while crop revenue was 
negative and significant in Models 3 and 4.  Interestingly population density was not 
significant in any of the models, although was positively related to urban use relative to 
farmland. 
None of the policy variables were significant in Models 2, 3, and 4.  Zoning in the 
current period and zoning 15 years prior were positively related to urban use in Models 2, 
3, and 4, while zoning 30 years prior was negative in all models.  The property tax rate 
was negative and insignificant in Models 2 and 3 and positive and insignificant in Model 
4.  None of the economic structure variables were significant in Models 3 and 4.  Median 
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house value was negative in Model 3 and positive in 4, while the location quotient was 
positive in both Models 3 and 4.   
Table 3.5. Estimated Results Generalized Least Squares of Urban to Agriculture Share
Random Effects Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Constant 0.7548 0.338  0.5700 0.664  0.0957 1.268 -0.8106 3.284
Forest Rent  0.0067 0.006  0.0076 0.006  0.0071 0.007  0.0059 0.006
Forest Rent * Slope -0.0465 0.046 -0.0546 0.046 -0.0537 0.047 -0.0470 0.045
Farm Profits  -0.0263* 0.014 -0.0183 0.017 -0.0093 0.018  0.0092 0.020
Crop Revenue -0.0190 0.014 -0.0195 0.014  -0.0258* 0.014     -0.0392*** 0.015
Population Density  0.0010 0.001  0.0008 0.001  0.0008 0.001  0.0165 0.010
Zoning  0.3002 0.327  0.2726 0.335  0.3547 0.329
Zoning 15 Years Prior  0.2627 0.342  0.2811 0.346  0.3525 0.330
Zoning 30 Years Prior -0.1789 0.356 -0.2997 0.367 -0.3903 0.359
Average Property Tax Rate -0.0078 0.094 -0.0481 0.105  0.2201 0.406
Median House Value -0.0090 0.013  0.0313 0.045
LQ Tertiary/Higher Sector  1.9356 1.251  1.7153 1.631
Accessibility to Cincinnati  -0.2326* 0.132
Accessibility to Indianapolis  -0.0254 0.019
Accessibility to Terre Haute  0.0192 0.045
Accessibility to Evansville  -0.0098 0.017
Accessibility to Bloomington  0.0156 0.011
Population Density*Tax  -0.0009* 0.001
Population Density*House     -0.0002***  0.0001
Population Density*LQ  0.0021 0.007
House Value*Tax -0.0008 0.007
R2      0.09     0.10     0.15     0.34
Sum of Squares 213.91 214.25 202.78 161.00
Model 2 vs. Model 1 2.50
* Indicates significance at the 90% level, ** at 95% level, and *** 99% level
Dependent variable ln(urban-residual/agriculture)
 
The accessibility to Cincinnati was negative and positive in Model 4, indicating 
that those communities closer to Cincinnati had less urban land relative to agriculture, all 
else equal.  Accessibility to Indianapolis and Evansville were not significant, but were 
also negative, while accessibility to Bloomington and Terre Haute were positive.  Among 
the interaction terms, the population density and property tax rate interaction variable was 
negative and significant.  The population density and median house value interaction 
variable was negative and highly significant, at the 99% confidence level.  Overall the 
simple rent model of urban to agricultural land was the best fit using an F statistic test. 
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All of the models of land use were most efficiently modeled with a simple land 
rent model.  The agriculture to forest ratio model could be the one exception if we relax 
the efficiency threshold to 90% for the log-likelihood ratio.  Random effects models were 
the most appropriate for both urban land use models, indicating that there are larger 
structural changes throughout the time period that cannot be captured by county dummy 
variables.  The fixed effects model was most appropriate for the agriculture to forest 
model, which indicates that there are not significant structural changes in the way people 
make decisions about whether to farm or hold land in forest.  There was one persistent 
outlier county in all models of land use, Brown County.  Brown County includes a 
significant amount of public forestland and is a vacation and tourist area.  The area is 
extremely hilly with poor soils.  Thus, we might expect that the local tourism based 
economy generates a higher demand for private forestry that extends beyond the forest 
rents.  Brown County neighbors Monroe County, where Indiana University is located, 
and is a popular housing location for both primary and secondary vacation homes.  There 
were no other counties that were persistent outliers, outliers at all time points, in any of 
the models.  Thus, the models produce consistent outcomes across most of the 40 county 
region. 
3.5  Discussion  
Research into non-industrial private forestry has demonstrated that to preserve 
forestland in the Midwestern U.S., we need to target these landowners.  These 
landowners may be especially hard to target in the face of urban growth pressure as they 
hold on to land in order to gain from future sales to developers (Hardie, et al., 2001).  As 
illustrated in our models, forest rent is not a significant explanatory variable for amount 
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of forestland.  Other land rents, agricultural and residential, proxied by population 
density, are significant determinants of the competing agricultural and urban land uses.  It 
is important that we understand the profitability of competing land uses relative to 
changes in NIPF extent.  On a local, individual landowner level, policies such a tax 
incentives may be effective, although were not significant in our study, but policy makers 
must also have a mechanism to account for the broader opportunity cost of NIPF land use 
relative to other land rents.   
 Our study provides support for continued research into NIPFs competing land 
uses, but also presents the puzzle, why are policy, economic structure, and accessibility 
factors insignificant in land use decision-making.  Part of the answer may be evidenced 
by the random-effects formulation for the urban to forest and urban to agriculture models.  
A random-effects specification indicates that there are structural changes that are not 
explained by group dummy variables.  The structural changes during this time period, 
1970 to 2000, include increased exurbanization and suburbanization, decreased 
competitiveness of the American small agriculturalist, and changing cultural preferences, 
such as increased appreciation for environmental services of forests, as well as larger 
national economic downturns and upturns.   
Furthermore, zoning policy implementation also could be considered a random 
effect, as a dummy variable does not capture much of the variation in zoning 
implementation.  The insignificant relationship between land use ratios and zoning 
variables may be due to several factors including the multicollineraity between the zoning 
variables.  Most counties keep their zoning in place once adopted, so a county with 1970 
zoning typically also has 2000 zoning.  There is one exception to this rule, Morgan 
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County, repealed its zoning in the 1990s.  As can be seen in the Figure 3.1, there is 
variation in the periods that counties adopted zoning, which allows for some variation in 
all of the zoning variables.  In a future study, we plan to incorporate more sensitive 
measures of zoning, which will enable us to better model counties that are actively 
planning to protect open spaces and forests, specifically NIPFs.   
We also believe that policy decisions are not made in a vacuum.  Counties may 
not adopt zoning until there is a relatively high level of urban development, which could 
lead to insignificant results in our models.  In his study of New England communities, 
Rudel found that there was a threshold of development that needed to occur before a 
town was receptive to land use regulation (Rudel, 1989).  Although none of our zoning 
variables were significant, we see lagged effect of zoning policy in many of the models, 
where zoning in the current period, while zoning 30 years prior has a negative impact 
(Table 3.4).  Again, although not statistically significant, it appears that zoning in the 
current period is causing deforestation relative to the level of urbanization indicated by 
the Models 2, 3, and 4 in Table 3.4  We believe that this lagged effect indicates that 
urbanization impact zoning adoption.  Our results are not inconsistent with the theorists 
who argue that zoning may accelerate urbanization and sprawl, through ordinances such 
as minimum lot requirements.   
  In none of the models was the forest rent variable significant. This finding is 
consistent with our previous study (Munroe and York, 2003). Other studies such as Ahn 
et al. (2000) have found significantly positive results for this variable but NIPF land use 
in the Midwest is much less likely to be for profit (Best, 2002, Birch, 1996, Erickson, et 
al., 2002). Other non-timber benefits of forestland use are more important than the 
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profitability of the timber for non-industrial private forest landowners, especially for the 
relatively small parcels common in Indiana.  Agricultural rent variables was not 
significant in the agriculture to forest share model (Table 3.3), which may be due to the 
fact that agriculture and forest land generally are not in competition with each other, as 
agricultural lands are relatively flat, while forested land is often fairly sloped.  Some of 
the agricultural rent variables are significant in the urban to agriculture models (Table 
3.5), which may be due to the fact that urban and agricultural uses are often in direct 
conflict, both requiring relatively flat lands.  Interestingly the agricultural rent variables 
were also significant in urban to forest models (Table 3.4), which may reflect this flat, 
valued for both agricultural and development uses, versus sloped, best for forest and 
some exurban development, relationship. 
3.6  Future Directions 
 This study did not uncover a significant relationship between zoning adoption.  In 
future research we should address the apparent threshold effect uncovered in this study, 
which may have limited the significance of the dummy variables.  Many communities 
will not adopt zoning until there is a significant amount of land that has urbanized.  A 
system of equations approach should include zoning, percent developed land, and 
housing starts and address the simultaneous relationship between zoning, economic 
development, and land cover change.  The econometric research may also be extended to 
the entire state of Indiana, which may allow further investigation into the relationship 
between agricultural use and zoning.  It may be possible to represent the variation in 
implementation and enforcement via a zoning index, which may further our 
understanding of the relationship between zoning and land use.  Furthermore, a study of 
 79
areas employing more modern zoning laws, such as use of impact fees and urban growth 
boundaries, may uncover a different impact on land use decision-making. 
Our models indicate that the impact of zoning on forestland decision-making is 
complicated with differing impacts of historic and current policy.  Our findings illustrate 
a need for further research on the relationship between land use and policymaking 
because of the apparent interactions between land use changes and local policymaking.  
The purpose of this study was to assess the broad impacts of zoning instead of focusing 
on isolated impacts within particular jurisdictions.  Our results at the regional scale do not 
refute the claim that zoning, through policies like minimum lot requirements, accelerates 
peri-urban development, but neither do we find conclusive evidence that zoning causes 
sprawl.  Rather we found clear evidence of the importance of land rents in land use 
decision-making, as well as evidence of structural changes in urbanization processes. 
3.7  Conclusion 
 As can be seen the impact of zoning on land cover change is unclear, especially at 
a regional level.  The muddy relationship between land cover and land policy may be due 
to the conflict filled, complex land policy arena that we discussed in the previous chapter.  
It is difficult for communities to adopt and implement a plan with clear objectives for 
forestland and farmland protection, as indicated by the limited number of counties with 
clear, objective goals included in their plans.  At the regional level in our 40 county study 
area it appears unclear whether zoning, as currently implemented, is protecting natural 
resources.  In the next chapter, we explore the relationship between zoning and parcel 
level fragmentation of forestland.  Forest fragmentation limits the ability of parcels to 
offer environmental services, such as providing habitat for wildlife or being economically 
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viable timber stand.  It is important to understand how zoning rules impact one measure 
of environmental soundness.  This analysis is within one zoning regime, Monroe County, 
so some there may be a clearer relationship between land policy and impact on land. 
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Chapter 4:  Fragmentation and Zoning in an Urbanizing County 
 
 We explored zoning’s impact on land use and land cover change in the previous 
chapter.  We were unable to uncover significant effects on land cover of zoning 
implementation.  Possibly this may be an urbanization threshold for zoning policy 
adoption.  There was an insignificant lagged effect of zoning indicating zoning may 
protect conversion of forested land under some conditions.  The pattern of land use 
conversion is important, as well as the aggregate level of conversion within a county, as a 
more compact and connected pattern of development will limit impacts on agricultural 
and forestland uses.  In this chapter, we explore these patterns and assess the impact of 
zoning at the parcel level with respect to fragmentation.   
Darla K. Munroe, Cynthia Crossaint, and Abigail M. York1 
4.1  Introduction 
Urban and suburban development, or the conversion of rural agricultural and 
forested lands to mostly residential uses, is now the greatest source of landscape and 
forest fragmentation in the United States, as in many other regions.  Because much of the 
landscape is privately owned, effective land use policy must target private landowners.  
The degree of fragmentation of forest land cover is of particular importance due to the 
environmental benefits of forests: habitat provision, prevention of erosion, and their role 
in the global carbon cycle.  Land managers have attempted to lessen landscape 
fragmentation by regulating land uses on private lands and by preserving forests and open 
                                                 
1 A version of this chapter is an article forthcoming in Applied Geography, “Land Use Policy and 
Landscape Fragmentation in an Urbanizing Region: Assessing the Impact of Zoning,” by Darla K. Munroe, 
Cynthia Crossiant, and Abigail M. York.  There is an added introduction and conclusion to connect the 
article to the rest of the dissertation, as well as some editing within the text. 
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 spaces (Karasov, 1997). Land use policy shapes land use patterns, which are in turn 
influenced by the biophysical and socioeconomic environment.  To identify the ultimate 
influence of policies such as zoning in mitigating landscape fragmentation, the complex 
relationships among all these factors must be better understood. 
In the United States, as in other areas, local governments combat landscape 
fragmentation by controlling the type and location of land uses through planning and 
zoning regulations (Feiock & Taveras, 2002; Razin, 1998).  Zoning is not a panacea, 
however, and zoning has not always been used to minimize fragmentation (Platt, 1996; 
Feiock, 1994).  Zoning plans generally reflect a variety of political interests and 
stakeholders.  Local governments also face a balancing act in attempting to maintain 
broad political support, keep service costs low, and maximize the residential tax base.  
Rural areas proximate to urban centers have an incentive to keep their policies less 
restrictive in order to capture new residents perhaps moving out of the urban areas.  In 
fact, inconsistent zoning across jurisdictions may contribute to fragmentation by pushing 
residential development into rural areas (Carruthers, 2003). 
Landscape fragmentation results from the complex interaction between policy, 
biophysical characteristics, and socioeconomic development pressure.  Residential land 
use is shaped and influenced by many factors relating to land use returns, including 
parcel characteristics, accessibility to cultural and employment centers, and policy 
restrictions governing use. If the amount and spatial configuration of agricultural and 
forest lands are to be effectively preserved, an improved understanding of the 
relationships between landscape fragmentation, location, and topographic characteristics 
is essential (Ward et al., 2000).  Spatial analytical techniques can be of great value to 
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 policy makers in determining the spatially explicit implications of current and future 
development.   
This research attempts to frame geospatial analytical approaches with insights 
from land use planning theory, as means to provide guidance and support for the planning 
process, as well as a greater understanding of the relative impact of various determinants 
of land use in an urbanizing county with diverse land uses, including large areas of 
forested land and some agricultural production.  In particular, it provides a better 
understanding of relationships among land-use policy, socioeconomic characteristics, 
locational attributes, physical characteristics and measures of landscape fragmentation.  
Landscape fragmentation is measured using the tools of remote sensing and  Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS), and relationships are determined by using statistical tests for 
multivariate independence. 
In this analysis, we test the hypotheses that landscape fragmentation varies across 
areas with different zoning policies, and that this relationship still holds when accounting 
for topographical and socioeconomic differences.  To answer these questions, we 
examine the statistical relationship between zoning policy and landscape fragmentation 
both at the scale of the county and on individual parcels.  Two measures of configuration 
are used to indicate the degree of fragmentation.  Interspersion of land cover types 
provides one indicator of land fragmentation.  The largest patch index for forest land 
cover suggests the relative concentration of forest cover and provides a second indicator 
of forest fragmentation.  Several measures of parcel characteristics (parcel area, percent 
land area with slopes greater than twelve degrees), landowner characteristics (gross 
income), and parcel accessibility (proximity to major roads and towns) are also 
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 considered.  The statistical relationships between the ranked distribution of each of the 
above variables and the two measures of landscape fragmentation are found using a 
contingency table analysis.  Correlations among all variables are calculated, and changes 
in the magnitude of these correlations with or without controlling explicitly for zoning 
are determined.  We find that the diversity of land uses is much higher, at the aggregate 
level and at the parcel level, in areas that are zoned to allow for the highest housing 
density and smallest lot sizes.  These results are still robust after accounting for key 
geophysical and accessibility characteristics of the individual parcels. 
4.2  Relevant Literature 
 
For an integrated, comprehensive overview of the forces that shape land use in a 
spatially-explicit manner, researchers must consider the interacting influences of 
socioeconomic drivers of land use, local policy, and the environment within which this 
land use occurs.   
It is well established that landscape fragmentation has profound implications for 
the health and viability of ecosystems.  It has also been noted that landscape 
fragmentation is often costly from a socioeconomic perspective (Entwisle, et al., 1998; 
Civco et al., 2000). An area in which sprawl is occurring may be characterized by 
spatially heterogeneous land cover particularly along the urban-rural interface or 
boundary.  Development may lead to a loss of farmland or forest land, increased 
commuting time for the new residents, and increased public expenditures for education, 
roads, and sewer, as well as perpetuating the problem of sprawl. 
Sprawl can arise both from private sector activity and public policy failures.  
Urban and suburban developments often occur in former agricultural and forest areas 
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 because residents are drawn to the rural character, leisure opportunities, and ecosystem 
services of these areas.  This process is then reinforced when subsequent multiple 
employment centers are created through commercial development (Anderson & Bogart, 
2001), driving further residential development outside of the traditional suburban areas 
(Vias et al., 2002).  Residential land users in peri-urban or ex-urban areas often place a 
great premium on the aesthetic value of their property.  Unfortunately, residential growth 
in rural areas threatens the very resources that exurbanites were attracted to in the first 
place.   
4.2.1  Land Use Policy 
Local governments often face tough choices in determining the tradeoffs between 
ideal land use policy and socioeconomic and political contingencies.  The primary tool 
for community land managers to lessen or prevent landscape fragmentation is the zoning 
ordinance, which is based upon a comprehensive land use plan, and is designed to 
regulate allowable uses especially on agricultural, forest, and conservation reserve lands. 
Unfortunately, some regulations often have unintended impacts, particularly in peri-urban 
areas.  First movers often attempt to regulate further growth through zoning and land use 
planning policy, which can decrease social welfare as the supply of suburban lands is 
constrained within a jurisdiction, but the demand for suburban lifestyle is not curbed 
(Feiock, 1994; Fischel, 1982).  Minimum lot size restrictions, as found within the 
agricultural reserve zones, may actually lead to residential development on larger parcels 
than would be found without this requirement (Esparza & Carruthers, 2000).  Rural 
regions may have limited experience with the negative impacts of uncontrolled 
development (Esparza & Carruthers, 2000), and their wish to stimulate economic 
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 development can lead to a pro-growth orientation (Rudel, 1989; Marcouiller, 1996; 
Henry et al., 1997).  Thus, to prevent land fragmentation at the level of individual parcels, 
better knowledge and study of how zoning actually shapes land use is required.  The next 
section formally discusses fragmentation, relating this issue to variations in land policy, 
topography and access to economic and cultural amenities. 
4.2.2  Landscape fragmentation 
 
The observed spatial configuration of land uses is the collective result of myriad 
factors that influence the returns, or benefits, to land use (Munroe & York, 2003).  The 
term “benefit” encompasses both formal profit as well as non-pecuniary factors, such as 
aesthetic value.  Landscape ecological techniques can directly link the observed spatial 
configuration of land uses to drivers of land use returns. 
The study of landscape fragmentation grew out of conservation biology and 
evolved into the field of landscape ecology.  To quantify the degree of fragmentation in a 
landscape, both composition and configuration of the components of the landscape are 
considered, as measured by the number and distribution of patches or distinct (non-
adjacent) areas of the same land cover type (O’Neill & Hunsaker, 1997).  Patterns evident 
in spatial metrics can be used to infer ecological functions.  For example, habitat 
fragmentation may lead to a decline in biological diversity and the ability of ecosystems 
to recover from disturbance.  Differences in forest fragmentation have also been 
associated with human impacts on the landscape.  For example, significant differences in 
forest fragmentation are associated with differences in zoning policies (Croissant and 
Munroe, 2002) and the urbanization pressure gradient (Wickham et al., 2000). 
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4.3  Site Description 
 
Prior research has pointed to several factors to consider in explaining a particular 
spatial configuration of land use.  Levia (1998) found distance to city center, nearby 
highways, and parcel size to be related to the probability of conversion of farmland to 
residential use in Massachusetts.  LaGro and Degloria (1992) identified population 
density and proximity to highways as being related to urban development probabilities in 
a land-use study in New York state.  Although it is clear that human impacts affect spatial 
landscape patterns, aspects of the relationships between differences in zoning policies and 
differences in patterns remains unclear.  Previous research (Croissant and Munroe, 2002) 
demonstrated a correlation between land policy and fragmentation.  This analysis delves 
further into the relationship between zoning and fragmentation by specifically examining 
the cross-correlation between fragmentation and other relevant factors.  First, we examine 
the correlations among measures of landscape fragmentation , parcel characteristics, 
accessibility, and zone type.  Secondly, we test whether the correlations among 
biophysical characteristics, accessibility, and landscape fragmentation, become stronger 
after accounting for the mediating influence of zoning. 
 
 
88
Monroe County, Indiana, typifies a growing debate regarding the tradeoffs to 
socioeconomic growth and development, and its impact on the landscape. Within Monroe 
County, Indiana, a wide range of land uses and land covers coexist.  The city of 
Bloomington, which is the economic, cultural, and governmental center of Monroe 
County seat, is located in approximately the middle of the county (Figure 4.1).   
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Figure 4.1.  Public and Private Land Holdings in Monroe County, Indiana 
 
 Bloomington is somewhat unique in the region of southern Indiana in that it is 
experiencing relatively rapid urban growth.  Over the last five decades, Bloomington 
grew at one of the fastest rates in Indiana, moving from the 19th to the eighth largest city 
in the state (Monroe County Environmental Commission, 2001). 
Forests are an important component of the landscape of southern Indiana.  In 
contrast to the glacially impacted northern portion of the state, southern Indiana is 
composed of hilly terrain with relatively thin, poor soils.  The hills and steep topography 
have made some lands unattractive for modern agricultural use and secondary forests 
have been allowed to re-grow.  In general, the secondary forests in southern Indiana are 
viewed as the last “natural” landscape surrounded by disturbances such as urban and 
agricultural lands. Approximately 87% of the Indiana’s forest cover is on private land.  
Part of the difficulty in managing the forests of southern Indiana is the large number of 
private forest land owners and fragmentation of management.  Fragmentation of forest 
habitat and ownership comprise one of the largest threats for sustainable use of the forest 
resources (Petersen, 1998).   
A comprehensive plan may include the guiding principles for the application of 
various types of zones, as well as the overall goals of the community land use planning 
(Ellickson & Been, 2000).  In Monroe County, the local legislative body, the County 
Council, votes on the comprehensive plan and zoning ordinances while appointed 
officials implement and enforce the plan in conjunction with the Planning Department.  
The comprehensive plan guides the implementation of the zoning ordinances.  The 
allowable uses for each zone frequently are related to parcel characteristics such as the 
degree of slope, the size and shape of parcels, and soil type, which may indicate whether 
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 agriculture, residential development, or forestry is viable.  Residential development is 
highly compatible with agriculturally viable land, thus communities often face choices 
regarding the preferred use of home development or agricultural land preservation within 
comprehensive plans.  Within Monroe County, there are four separate land use regulatory 
bodies, Monroe County, the city of Bloomington, the town of Stinesville, and the town of 
Ellettsville.  Ellettsville has recently become a “bedroom community” for people who 
work in the city of Bloomington due to substantially cheaper land values.  The 251 
parcels selected for this study are residential parcels that are located in a “no-man’s 
land”, outside the boundaries of any city or town.  It is precisely in these areas where one 
would expect to see effects on the landscape of incomplete or inconsistent land use 
policies.  All of the parcels are located in areas that fall under the zoning regulations of 
either the county or the city of Bloomington.  As shown in Table 4.1, the zones differ in 
terms of the housing density and minimum lot sizes that are permitted.  Figure 4.2 
illustrates where these zones are in effect. 
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 Table 4.1. Monroe County Zoning Categories and Summary of Metrics by Zone 
 
Name 
Primary Intended 
Purpose 
Gross 
Density 
Minimum 
Lot Area 
(acres) 
Area, 
km2 
LPI_F 
(1-100) 
IJI_L 
(1-100) 
Agriculture/ 
Rural 
Reserve 
(AG/RR)  
To provide areas 
for single-family 
residences 
associated with 
agriculture uses. 0.20-0.40 2.5 474.25 3.49 68.93 
Conservation 
Residential 
(CR) 
To provide a 
residential option at 
environmentally 
sound locations 
while protecting the 
environmentally 
sensitive areas. 0.40 2.5 17.44 12.45 68.01 
Forest 
Reserve (FR) 
To preserve forests, 
recreational areas, 
parks and 
greenways; limit 
agricultural uses 
and low-density 
single-family 
residential uses. 0.20 5.0 300.77 27.39 49.76 
Estate 
Residential 
and Suburban 
Residential 
(ER/SR) 
To allow low 
density, single-
family residential 
development on 
relatively flat land 
in areas that have 
some, but not full, 
public services. 1.00 1.0 32.55 1.89 81.83 
Bloomington 
Fringe 
Residential 
(Fringe) 
To provide a 
transition zone: this 
zone is similar to 
the estate 
residential and 
suburban 
residential except it 
was created under 
the jurisdiction of 
the city of 
Bloomington. 
Most of 
this area 
1.00-6.00 
Lots 
described 
as “large”  39.18 10.62 78.16 
County Total   
  
1,064.41 23.22 73.10 
Source: Monroe County Planning Commission, Chapter 804: Zoning Ordinance: Height, 
Bulk, Area, And Density Provisions 1995; and authors’ calculations using PatchAnalyst. 
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Figure 4.2. Monroe County Zoning Boundaries 
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4.4  Data and Methods 
 
A map of land use and land cover was produced from a supervised classification 
of a remotely sensed Landsat Thematic Mapper image from September 1997 (Figure 4.3). 
The resulting classes are ones that are intuitive and easily understood (following 
Anderson et al. 1976).  The classification contains some classes that refer to a type of 
land cover such as forest and other classes that encompass aspects of land use such as 
agriculture.  Although land use and land cover are often considered together and are 
closely related, there are distinctions between the two terms.  Land cover refers to the 
surface cover on the ground such as forest, urban infrastructure, or water.  Land use refers 
to the purpose the land serves, for example, recreation, wildlife habitat, or agriculture 
(Brown et al., 2000). The classes derived from remote sensing techniques usually relate 
to land cover, from which land use can be inferred, particularly with ancillary data.  
Information obtained from interviews and field work enables the identification of general 
types of land use such as agriculture. 
A limitation of this analysis is the spatial resolution of the remotely sensed 
imagery data used to create the map of land use and land cover. Because the minimum 
cell size of the data was 900 m2, it was not possible to distinguish very fine variations in 
land use and land cover, but general trends in broadly defined classes can be identified.  
The classification used consists of: 1) all forest including secondary succession, 2) 
developed areas including areas of residential and commercial land use, quarries, and 
concrete, 3) agricultural areas including row crops and pasture, and 4) water (Croissant, 
2001).   
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Figure 4.3.  Land Use/Land Cover Classes for Monroe County, 1997 
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 In the classification, pixels are assigned to one class although in reality the land may be a 
mix of several classes.  For example, there exist agricultural lands that contain trees and 
land that was formerly used for agriculture that is becoming reforested.  Several steps 
were taken to provide the most accurate separation of areas of agriculture from areas of 
forest.  Advanced secondary succession (the most mature forest or SS3) were derived 
from the Ecological Classification System of Van Kley (1993).  Initial secondary 
successional forests were obtained from forest plot data spatially reference using global 
positioning (GPS) receivers.  These initial successional forest sites were formerly timber 
clear-cuts or abandoned agricultural fields.  Because of the degree of confusion between 
initial and advanced secondary successional forest, these two classes were combined. 
Agricultural areas including row crops and pasture were identified based on 
information obtained during interviews with private landowners conducted during the 
summer of 1998 and ground truthing using GPS receivers.  The resulting classification 
had an overall accuracy of 95% with a Kappa Statistic of 0.92.  The Kappa Statistic 
measures the observed agreement between the classification and the reference data verses 
the agreement that might be attained solely by chance matching (Campbell, 1996).  Some 
degree of confusion between classes is inherent when assigning pixels to a limited 
number of classes.  This problem is here minimized because of the relatively high degree 
of accuracy in the classification and the rigorous methods used in its creation.  
Landscape fragmentation was measured at the aggregate level within each zone 
type, and then at the scale of individual parcels using the sample of 251 parcels.  Two 
indicators of landscape configuration were used.  First, the largest patch index for forest 
land cover (LPI_F) measures the relative concentration of forest cover, or the percentage 
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 of total area covered by the largest patch of forest.  The concentration of forest cover is 
particularly relevant for species richness (MacArthur & Wilson, 1967; McGarigal & 
Marks, 1994).  This measure focuses exclusively on the spatial configuration of forest 
rather than all types of patches and it has been shown to be an important indicator of 
forest fragmentation (Wear et al., 1996; Wickham et al., 1999).   
The second indicator of configuration measures the degree to which patches of 
one type (forest, agriculture/pasture, and developed) are juxtaposed with patches of other 
types of land use and land cover in the landscape.  This measure is calculated using the 
interspersion-juxtaposition index for all land cover types across the entire landscape 
(IJI_L).  The IJI_L index is useful in measuring the degree to which all patch types 
within a landscape are adjacent or interspersed with each other.  It is the observed 
interspersion divided by the maximum interspersion for the number of patch types, 
defined as: 
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Where: 
m′  =  Number of patch types or classes present in the landscape, including the 
landscape border if present 
i = 1, . . ., m or m’ patch types or classes 
k = 1, . . ., m or m’ patch types or classes 
ike  =  Total length (m) of edge in landscape between patch types or classes 
(distinguished by i and k) 
E = Total length (m) of edge in landscape 
 
Each patch is evaluated for adjacency with all other patch types.  For the raster 
cells on the perimeter of patches, the total length of each unique edge type is determined.  
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 It approaches zero when the distribution of unique patch adjacencies becomes uneven and 
100 when all patch types are equally adjacent. Higher values result from landscapes in 
which patch types are well interspersed or are equally adjacent to each other.  Low values 
characterize landscapes in which the patch types are poorly interspersed with 
discorporate distribution of patch type adjacencies.  IJI_L is not affected by the size, 
contiguity or dispersion of patches. 
The IJI_L measures interspersion only, not dispersion (or the extent of isolation of 
patches of like type), which can be quantified using a contagion index.  However, the 
IJI_L is able to construct patch-level (rather than cell-level) analysis, which is most 
appropriate given the resolution of the land cover data.  A higher value typically indicates 
greater fragmentation.   
4.4.1  Landscape Configuration by Zone 
Table 4.1 presents a summary of policies regarding each zone type, as well as the 
two metrics calculated for each measure.  At the county level, interspersion is high, and 
the largest patch index for forest is low, and the results by zone are not surprising.  The 
estate/suburban residential has the highest interspersion and the lowest value for the 
largest patch index for forest.  The agricultural/rural reserve zone has lower than average 
interspersion, but also second to lowest values for LPI_F.  The “fringe” zone has both 
higher than average IJI_L and lower than average LPI_F.    As shown in Table 4.1, the 
estate/suburban residential and fringe zones allow for relatively high density housing 
development on relatively small lots.  These results indicate a connection between 
housing density or lot size and landscape fragmentation and support the findings of 
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 Marzluff and Ewing (2001) who proposed that dispersed development is better for 
protecting bird populations. 
4.4.2  Landscape Configuration by Parcel 
 In analyzing land use and land cover fragmentation from a socioeconomic 
perspective, the use of landscapes corresponding to individual parcel boundaries is 
preferred over the use of more biophysically based boundaries (Irwin & Geoghegan, 
2001). Given this preference, a sample of 251 privately owned parcels that have non-
industrial uses was chosen for this analysis based on a stratified random sample of parcels 
over five acres (about two hectares) in size within Monroe County.  The size of the 
parcels in the sample range from roughly 5 to 150 acres (or 2.02 to 60.7 hectares).  The 
values of the metrics at the individual parcel level were correlated with other, 
hypothesized drivers of landscape pattern.   
 A measure of the degree of slope is included in this analysis because it can have a 
great impact on the land use and land cover in an area (Evans et al., 2001).  Steep slopes 
can greatly limit both development in areas not served by municipal sewer systems and 
decrease suitability for agricultural uses.  In an effort to reduce erosion, secondary forests 
have been planted in some areas with steep slopes.  Parcel size was also included in 
analysis.  Parcel size is related to zoning in that certain types of zones require larger lots 
and development tends to follow parcel subdivision (Levia, 1998; Walker, 2001). In 
addition, parcel size may indicate a wealth effect; individuals with larger parcels may be 
more likely to depend on the land for income (from agriculture or forestry) (Koontz, 
2001), affecting the observed configuration of land uses. 
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 Data on zoning, slope, and parcel size were entered into Arc/Info GIS. Slope data 
were obtained from a 1:10,000 scale digital elevation model, obtained from the USDA 
Forest Service.  Zoning within the county jurisdiction (Figure 4.2) and parcel boundaries 
from approximately 1998 were obtained from maps produced by the Monroe County 
Planning Office (Camiron, 1991; Monroe County Plan Commission, 1995).  The distance 
between the centroid of each parcel to downtown Bloomington and Ellettsville was 
calculated using the GIS and is included as a measure of access to cultural and economic 
amenities.  Landowner income was included as a proxy for the likelihood of owners to 
depend on their land for productive purposes (agriculture or non-industrial forestry).  
Table 4.2 presents a description of all variables considered.  Measures of the degree of 
landscape fragmentation on the parcels were calculated using Patch Analyst (Rempel and 
Carr, 2003) at both the parcel and the county level.  The largest patch index value for 
forest cover (LPI_F) and the interspersion/juxtaposition index for the entire landscape 
(IJI_L) were calculated for all 251 parcels included in the sample.  The parcel level 
analysis proceeded in two stages: (1) examining whether the indices of landscape 
fragmentation and geophysical, socioeconomic, and policy variations were statistically 
related in terms of their ranking from low to high; and (2) for those factors that were 
significantly related to the indices, measuring the magnitude of the correlation among 
these interrelated factors and the indices of fragmentation. 
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Variables Units Source, Description 
Parcel Size square meters Monroe County Auditor 
Percent Slope > 12 percent area 
Derived from a Digital Elevation Model with 10m 
resolution 
Landowner Income dollars Landowner survey 
Distance to Bloomington City Center meters 
Euclidean distance between parcel centroid and 
city center 
Distance to Ellettsville City Center meters 
Euclidean distance between parcel centroid and 
city center 
Distance to I-37 meters 
Euclidean distance between parcel centroid and 
nearest point on road network 
Distance to I-46 meters 
Euclidean distance between parcel centroid and 
nearest point on road network 
Zone Type nominal Monroe County Planning Commission 
Largest Patch Index, Forest Cover index 1 - 100 
Derived from 1997 classification of Landsat TM 
image using PatchAnalyst© 
Interspersion/Juxtaposition Index, All 
Land Cover index 1 - 100 
Derived from 1997 classification of Landsat TM 
image using PatchAnalyst© 
Table 4.2. Description of Data 
Hypothesis 1: Landscape fragmentation and configuration are significantly 
correlated with parcel characteristics, accessibility, and zone type. 
 Each variable was ranked from lowest to highest.  This method avoids issues of 
non-linearities and statistical outliers in the underlying distributions of these variables.  
The rankings for each variable were grouped, by percentiles, into three categories (low 
[0-33%], medium [33-66%], and high [66-100%]). 
4.4.3  Contingency Table Analysis 
 The categories (low, medium, and high) for two variables are cross-tabulated, and 
then the frequency of occurrences in all possible categories for each variable were 
determined.  These contingency tables were subjected to a χ2 test on observed versus 
expected frequencies.  The expected frequency is defined as: 
 i jij
R C
F
n
= ,                    (4.2)  
where Ri is the sum over row i, and Cj is the sum over column j.  The test statistic is: 
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where fij represents the observed frequencies (Burt & Barber, 1996). 
 The two landscape metrics (LPI_F or the largest patch index for forest, and IJI_L 
or the interspersion/juxtaposition for all classes in the landscape) were compared to zone 
type, distance to Bloomington city center, distance to Ellettsville city center, parcel size, 
income, and the percentage of the parcel with slope greater than 12 degrees.  These 
results are reported in Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5.  A p-value of less than 0.05 indicates 
significance at the 95% confidence level.   
        Zone Type       
   AG/RR CR FR ER Fringe Total 
LPI_F Low 63 3 2 3 12 83 
  Med. 62 4 9 1 8 84 
  High 32 6 37 1 8 84 
  Total 157 13 48 5 28 251 
p = 0.00         
   AG/RR CR FR ER Fringe Total 
IJI_L Low 40 5 31 1 6 83 
  Med 59 2 9 2 12 84 
  High 58 6 8 2 10 84 
  Total 157 13 48 5 28 251 
p = 0.00               
 
Table 4.3. Contingency Table for Landscape Metrics by Zone Type 
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     Distance to Bloomington   
   Low Med. High Total 
LPI_F Low 30 29 24 83 
  Med. 33 29 22 84 
  High 20 26 38 84 
  Total 83 84 84 251 
p = 0.06       
   Low Med. High Total 
IJI_L Low 25 28 30 83 
  Med. 31 31 22 84 
  High 27 25 32 84 
  Total 83 84 84 251 
p = 0.51       
        
    Distance to Ellettsville    
   Low Med. High Total 
LPI_F Low 42 25 16 83 
  Med. 29 25 30 84 
  High 12 34 38 84 
  Total 83 84 84 251 
p = 0.00       
        
   Low Med. High Total 
IJI_L Low 15 27 41 83 
  Med. 36 27 21 84 
  High 32 30 22 84 
  Total 83 84 84 251 
p = 0.00           
Table 4.4. Contingency Table for Landscape Metrics by Distance to City Centers 
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     Income     
   Low Med. High Total 
LPI_F Low 24 20 12 56 
  Med. 23 22 18 63 
  High 19 25 21 65 
  Total 66 67 51 184 
p = 0.56       
   Low Med. High Total 
IJI_L Low 22 20 20 62 
  Med. 18 23 17 58 
  High 26 24 14 64 
  Total 66 67 51 184 
p = 0.62       
        
   Parcel Size    
   Low Med. High Total 
LPI_F Low 27 30 26 83 
  Med. 25 24 35 84 
  High 31 30 23 84 
  Total 83 84 84 251 
p = 0.37       
   Low Med. High Total 
IJI_L Low 26 27 30 83 
  Med. 20 25 39 84 
  High 37 32 15 84 
  Total 83 84 84 251 
p = 0.00       
        
   Area of Slope > 12 Degrees    
   Low Med. High Total 
LPI_F Low 53 27 3 83 
  Med. 23 41 20 84 
  High 7 16 61 84 
  Total 83 84 84 251 
p = 0.00       
   Low Med. High Total 
IJI_L Low 8 25 50 83 
  Med. 31 37 16 84 
  High 44 22 18 84 
  Total 83 84 84 251 
p = 0.00           
 
Table 4.5. Contingency Table Test for Landscape Metrics by Parcel Characteristics 
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 The results show that the distribution of the landscape metrics by zone type was highly 
significant.  The range of LPI_F was low to medium in parcels zoned as 
Agriculture/Rural Reserve, and also low in the urban fringe area around the city of 
Bloomington (Fringe).  Not surprisingly, the greatest number of high values of LPI_F 
were found in parcels zoned as Forest Reserve.  Conversely, parcels zoned as Forest 
Reserve had low values of IJI_L (or landscape interspersion), and Fringe parcels had high 
levels of IJI_L.  Therefore, those parcels with the least restrictive zoning policies – that is 
the highest housing densities and smallest lot sizes or those in the Fringe – were seen to 
have the most diverse land use mixtures. 
 There was no statistically significant relationship between the values (low to high) 
of LPI_F and IJI_L for the ranges of distance to Bloomington or landowner income.  The 
range of distances to Ellettsville and the ranges of LPI_F and IJI_L were strongly 
correlated, however.  LPI_F was high farthest from Ellettsville and low closest to 
Ellettsville For IJI_L, nearly the opposite was true (though there was not as clear a trend 
for low values).  The range of parcel sizes was not significantly related to the range of 
LPI_F, but IJI_L tended to be higher on smaller parcels and lower on larger parcels.  This 
finding makes intuitive sense, because one might expect to see a wider variety of uses on 
smaller suburban parcels, or parcels on the urban fringe, especially if deriving income 
(through say agricultural production) was not a major activity of most of the landowners 
(Koontz, 2001).  
The clearest trend overall was the relationship between the percentage of area 
covered by greater than 12 degrees slope and the two landscape metrics.  Steeper areas 
had higher values of LPI_F and lower values of IJI_L, and vice versa.  Therefore, it 
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2 The zoning for each parcel was ranked according to the restrictiveness of permitted uses in that zone type, 
i.e., fringe areas are assumed to be least restrictive, while forest and conservation reserves most restrictive, 
and estate/suburban residential falling in between. 
 First, Pearson’s correlation coefficients (Burt & Barber, 1996) were calculated for 
all continuous variables, with and without controlling for the restrictiveness of zone 
type2.  Results are reported in Tables 4.6 and 4.7.   
 The above analysis indicates that indices of landscape configuration are not 
statistically independent of zone type, parcel characteristics, and access to regional 
centers.  To determine the strength of the correlation between these indices and the most 
statistically significant factors from the last section, a statistical test for the equality of 
dependent correlation coefficients was performed (Dunn & Clark, 1971). 
Hypothesis 2: To understand the relationship between biophysical characteristics, 
accessibility, and landscape fragmentation, one must specifically account for the 
effect of zoning. 
appears that topography, zoning, and distance to Ellettsville are all related to the degree 
of landscape fragmentation.  However, given the history of land use in Monroe County, 
particularly the relationship between urban growth and development around Ellettsville, 
further investigation of the interrelationship among these three factors was warranted.  
Topography and ease of development are clearly related. Because Ellettsville is situated 
on some of the flattest land in the county, it is also then the most easily developed.  It is 
also an important bedroom community for Bloomington due to easy access and cheap 
land Therefore, topography is not the sole explanatory factor for this finding. 
 1
0
7
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Table 4.6. Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients, 1 = Raw; 2 = Controlling for Zone Type* 
  Parcel Size 
Percent 
Slope > 12 Income 
Dist. to 
Bloomington
Dist. to 
Ellettsville Dist. to I-37 Dist. to I-46 LPI_F IJI_L 
1. Parcel Size 1.00         
2. Parcel Size 1.00         
           
1. Percent Slope > 12 -0.1034 1.00        
2. Percent Slope > 12 -0.0860 1.00        
           
1. Income -0.0328 0.1005 1.00       
2. Income -0.0317 0.1247 1.00       
           
1. Dist. to Bloomington -0.2296 0.0744   0.0652 1.00      
2. Dist. to Bloomington -0.2255    0.1657 0.0608 1.00      
           
1. Dist. to Ellettsville -0.0067 0.3833 -0.0250   -0.0502 1.00     
2. Dist. to Ellettsville -0.0438 0.2672 -0.0113   -0.0303 1.00     
           
1. Dist. to I-37 0.2035 -0.0449   -0.0617 -0.0858 0.2144 1.00    
2. Dist. to I-37 0.1101 -0.0866 -0.0568 -0.0019 0.1853 1.00    
           
1. Dist. to I-46 -0.0260 -0.0395 0.0509 0.0426 0.1420 -0.1148 1.00   
2. Dist. to I-46 -0.0194 -0.1987 0.0614     0.0403 0.0981 -0.1180 1.00   
           
1. LPI_F -0.0097 0.6032 0.0810     0.0617 0.3219 0.0698 -0.0280 1.00  
2. LPI_F -0.0061 0.5290 0.1030  0.0934 0.1716 -0.0347 -0.1559 1.00  
           
1. IJI_L -0.0629 -0.3686 -0.0734    -0.0123 -0.2432 -0.0641 -0.1651 -0.4360 1.00 
2. IJI_L -0.0700 -0.3049 -0.0932    -0.0377 -0.1439 0.0114 -0.0716 -0.3147 1.00 
*Values significant at the 95% level are in bold. 
 
   Raw 
Controlling for Zone 
Type 
Correl(Slope, Dist. to Ellettsville) 0.383 0.2672 
  
Correl(Slope, LPI_F) 0.6032 0.5290 
Correl(Dist. to Ellettsville, LPI_F) 0.3219 0.1716 
t-statistic 2.78 3.10 
  
Correl(Slope, IJI_L) -0.3686 -0.3049 
Correl(Dist. to Ellettsville, IJI_L) -0.2432 -0.1439 
t-statistic -1.19 -1.57 
Table 4.7.  Hotelling’s Test of the Equality of Dependent Correlation Coefficients 
Note that values significantly different at the 95% level (one-tailed t-test) in bold.  
 
Several of the variables were significantly correlated with the two indices of 
fragmentation, LPI_F and IJI_L.  LPI_F was higher at greater slopes and farther from 
Ellettsville, and IJI_L was lower.  Parcels located on flatter areas closer to the city center 
were more fragmented and possessed fewer, more concentrated patches of forest cover.  
These findings did not change when the effect of zoning was controlled for, though the 
magnitude of each effect was diminished.  The two indices were significantly negatively 
correlated with each other (the higher the interspersion of land cover types, the lower the 
concentration of forest cover). 
 Some variables were also significantly correlated with each other.  In particular, 
the percentage of steep slopes was strongly correlated with the distance to Ellettsville city 
center.  Parcels also tended to be bigger closer to Bloomington and further from I-37, the 
main north-south highway leading to Indianapolis.  Because both steep slopes and 
distance to Ellettsville were correlated with both our fragmentation indices, the 
qualitative rank of their effect with and without controlling for zoning was calculated. 
 We follow the work of Dunn and Clark (1971) who provided a detailed analysis 
of four statistics designed to test for the equality of correlation coefficients when these 
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 coefficients themselves are correlated.  In other words, we wanted to measure the 
magnitude of the effect on our fragmentation indices of slope and distance to Ellettsville, 
given that the two former variables are significantly correlated.  The test statistic we 
chose is Hotelling’s (1940) statistic: 
 ( ) ( )( )
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where r12 and r13 are the correlations between one variable (1) and two other variables (2 
and 3),  r23 is the correlation between them, and  D3 is the determinant of the sample 
correlation matrix.  The null hypothesis is that these two correlations are equal, or slope 
and distance to Ellettsville are equally important, whereas the alternative hypothesis is 
that one is greater than the other.  Table 4.7 presents the result of this analysis.  The 
correlations between slope and LPI_F and IJI_L as well as distance to Ellettsville and 
LPI_F and IJI_L were tested with and without controlling for zoning. 
 All three factors, slope, distance to Ellettsville, and both indicators of 
fragmentation, were significantly correlated, but all correlations were weaker once one 
controls for the restrictiveness of zoning.  For example, the correlation between the 
degree of slope and LPI_F is 0.60 raw, and it is 0.52 after controlling for zoning.  Once 
one controls for zoning, the correlation between LPI_F and both slope and distance to 
Ellettsville decreases, but it decreases to a much greater extent for the latter.  In other 
words, the effect of slope seems relatively stronger after controlling for zoning.  Similar 
results occur in comparing the relationship between IJI_L and both slope and distance to 
Ellettsville, but these results are not statistically significant.  This finding implies that one 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the impact of either slope or distance Ellettsville are 
equal, with or without controlling for zoning.  Therefore, we can conclude that 
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 topographical and socioeconomic variables are significantly related to the extent and 
distribution of landscape pattern in Monroe County, Indiana, and that the impact of both 
factors is mediated by zoning restrictions on individual, rural and suburban parcels.  We 
also find that slope is qualitatively more strongly correlated with the concentration of 
forest patches relative to market accessibility, but for overall landscape patch 
interspersion, there is no significant difference between the two factors. 
4.5  Policy Relevance and Directions for Future Research 
The northwestern portion of Monroe County is facing some opposing land use 
pressures because development is encouraged close to Ellettsville’s infrastructure, but the 
area also is relatively good agricultural land.  Because the topography of this area is 
relatively flat, slope plays less of a role, so zoning policy may be more important.  The 
portion of the county that lies west of Bloomington and near State Highway 37 has 
experienced unprecedented urban development in the last decade, as the city sought to 
alleviate depressed economic conditions.  However, improvements in infrastructure have 
not kept up with growth.  Relatively unrestricted growth in this region of the county may 
be associated with the relatively high measures of forest fragmentation, and therefore it 
should be of concern to planners.  The results indicate that the other measure of 
configuration, landscape interspersion/juxtaposition, is relatively high in the fringe area 
surrounding Bloomington.  Although this finding is not robust to a simple measure of 
distance to Bloomington city center, it indicates that the urban fringe area around 
Bloomington is the most likely place for negative externalities to develop which may 
need to be addressed through zoning policies. It also suggests that zoning policy in this 
region is relatively more important than distance to the city, and therefore the relative 
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 laxness of the “Fringe” designation, in the area right outside the Bloomington city limits, 
may not be socially optimal.  In general, the results indicate that zoning policies have a 
greater impact on landscape and forest fragmentation in some areas of the county than 
other areas, i.e., in those areas where both the cost of development due to topography is 
lowest and development pressures (in terms of city access) are highest, as in areas near 
Ellettsville. 
Many planners have advocated the consolidation of planning power at the state 
level.  It may be effective to establish multiple layers of regulation that deal with large 
ecological or topographic features stretching across political boundaries.  However, this 
study indicates that fine-scale, parcel level characteristics may also play an important role 
in the success of zoning policy.  Perhaps, a polycentric political structure that 
incorporates several levels including federal, state, and local policymakers may solve 
more of the problems associated with urbanization than approaches that focus on any one 
particular level exclusively. 
Academic research into this issue could inform policy, particularly in a peri-urban 
region, before a dire amount of landscape fragmentation has occurred.  However, there 
are complicated relationships between parcel characteristics, zoning, and landscape 
fragmentation, which indicates that planners should be especially careful in evaluating 
the interrelationships among these factors when making an assessment of the 
effectiveness of planning and zoning policies.  This initial study illustrates the complexity 
in a simple analysis and demonstrates the need for further work examining other 
complicating factors such as larger regional effects from major metropolitan regions, and 
the effectiveness of implementing policies over larger biogeophysical areas. 
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 4.6  Conclusion 
We have found that zoning’s impact on fragmentation is mitigated by 
biogeophysical factors.  In areas of high development pressure, there is great potential for 
zoning to regulate growth, although in the case of Monroe County we find that lax zoning 
has lead to fragmentation in a high pressure area.  Zoning impact on land use 
management is a result of the rules and context, as we have demonstrated in this case, but 
also is a result of enforcement.  In the next chapter, we explore citizen monitoring of 
zoning, which is especially important given the inspector’s difficult task of monitoring 
large regions.  As we discussed in the Chapter 2, there are many instances of 
development occurring without the required variances or rezoning.  Thus, there is 
potential for development to occur because of lack of official capacity for enforcement.  
Citizens provide inspectors with information about potential violations varying from junk 
cars left in an urban front yard to development of an exurban property. 
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Chapter 5:  Citizen Reporting and Zoning 
By Abigail M. York1 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, some zoning rules appear to have an impact 
on parcel level land use management.  The impact of zoning on individual landowner 
behavior results from the actual rules, as well as the enforcement of these rules.  In this 
chapter, I explore how zoning enforcement is related to citizen monitoring through a 
game theoretic analysis of the interactions of neighbors, citizens, and zoning inspectors.  
The general games were developed in conjunction with Becky Nesbit to generally 
explore the zoning enforcement arena.  In our general analysis, Nesbit and I found that 
zoning compliance depended on the reporting costs and consist fining of violations.  In 
this chapter, I expand this analysis in order to address how the innovation of online 
searchable parcel level zoning ordinance databases alters the basic zoning enforcement 
game.   
It is important to understand how online information impacts the game, as many 
county governments throughout the country have been going online.  Some of these 
websites provide phone numbers and contact information, but a few sites provide citizens 
with extensive information.  Some websites focus on plan creation and visions, while 
others seek to promote development opportunities in the area.  A subset of these 
government websites provide information about zoning laws.  This chapter explores how 
this online information alters citizen monitoring in the zoning and planning game.  I 
discuss the state of online zoning in Indiana, as well as provide some exemplary 
examples from other jurisdictions in the US. 
                                                 
1 This chapter draws on work coauthored with Becky Nesbit, “The Neighborhood Game,” presented at the 
Urban Affairs Conference, Washington, DC, March 31-April 2, 2004.  Becky Nesbit was instrumental in 
the development of the games. 
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E-governance has been touted as a means to improve public service provision at 
all levels of government and for all types of services (Brown and Brudney, 1998).  Local 
governments increasingly are providing Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to 
citizens on their websites.  GIS enables the government to share spatially explicit 
information such as school district boundaries, park locations, crime data, and zoning 
ordinances.  GIS may be a means to improve citizens’ ability to monitor illegal behavior, 
such as zoning ordinance violations, vandalism, and other types of crime.   
Many laws rely on citizen monitoring and reporting in order to be effective.  For 
example, initiatives to stop drunk driving encourage citizens to call emergency personnel 
when observing erratic driving.  Other laws, such as violation of environmental 
regulations, are difficult for inspectors to monitor, so enforcement depends heavily on 
neighbor complaints.  Whitaker (1980) argues that citizen coproduction of local 
ordinances is essential for compliance through reporting of violations to local authorities.  
As citizens serve as watchdogs, they may be more invested in the law, so possibly likely 
to violate themselves, or at least the additional citizen policing may increase the risk for 
those already violating. 
In order to report violations and obey zoning laws, citizens must be aware of local 
ordinances.  Zoning ordinances can be particularly confusing because zones may be fairly 
localized and parcels are commonly subject to variances, which alter the allowable uses.  
Thus, citizens may be unaware of the zoning rules on a neighbor’s property.  Online 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) that allow citizens to access information about 
zones on specific parcels improve the citizens’ ability to accurately report a zoning 
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violation.  Furthermore, citizens will be less likely to inadvertently violate an ordinance if 
it is easier for them to check the zoning rules for their own parcel. 
Given scarce resources in many areas of law enforcement, citizen reporting can be 
essential for compliance.  In one example from private government, Weissing and 
Ostrom (1991) argue that citizen irrigation monitors will report others if there is a 
probability of violation and if the cost of monitoring is relatively low.  Nesbit and I 
extended their analysis to a different resource problem where a citizen may report 
another’s violation of land use laws to a government inspector.  The typical neighborhood 
is an interesting place to investigate citizen willingness to monitor others, as well as the 
ability of zoning to reduce nuisances.  The common suburban or peri-urban neighborhood 
is the environment that Putnam (2000) observed as a place of relative seclusion and 
limited interaction, which may indicate unwillingness of neighbors to informally deal 
with nuisance causing neighbors.  Rather neighbors may opt to contact an official zoning 
inspector instead of confronting an unfamiliar neighbor.  GIS technology may be an 
important innovation an important technological innovation in enforcement of zoning 
laws because these laws cover specific spatially explicit areas within a community.   
In the next section, I briefly describe the neighborhood environment and zoning in 
the United States.  Then I describe different types of GIS applications in the zoning 
arena, which may impact enforcement.  This is followed by a game theoretic analysis of 
the zoning arena prior to GIS technology and with GIS.  The game theoretic analysis 
examines the costs and benefits to the three main players in this game: the potential 
violator, the reporter, and the inspector.  I conclude with a discussion of the impact of 
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GIS on the zoning arena providing some policy recommendations and directions for 
further research. 
5.1  The Neighborhood and Zoning 
Neighborhoods throughout the world are full of examples of neighboring 
landowners annoying each other through inconsiderate actions, as well as landowners that 
continually lend a helping hand to each other.  Neighbor fights frequently result from 
disagreements over negative externalities generated by private land uses, such as trees 
that leave debris on a neighbor’s land or obnoxious smells or noises, like the pigsty in the 
classic Aldred’s Case (Dukeminier and Krier, 2002).  Many contentious battles have also 
been fought over adverse possession of neighboring land, like in Mannillo v. Gorski 
(1969) where a neighbor claimed a few inches or in Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz (1952)  
where an entire parcel was adversely possessed (Dukeminier and Krier, 2002).  
Neighborhoods across the country contain stories of relationships that have soured over 
land use.   
As I discussed in Chapter 2, zoning in the United States was created in the 1920s 
in order to reduce externalities associated with noncompatible neighboring land use and 
reduce these neighborhood battles (Revell, 1999). Early zoning sought to separate 
incompatible uses through zones for residential, commercial, and manufacturing uses.  
Modern zoning often includes mixed-use zones, which integrate residential, commercial, 
and light manufacturing.  Environmental regulations, such as installation of runoff 
barriers during home construction, are now included in zoning codes (e.g.Monroe County 
Plan Commission, 1995).  Zoning codes are a mechanism to reduce nuisances, but are 
only effective if the laws are enforced and followed. 
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Zoning ordinances often include restrictions that are difficult to monitor on 
private property, such as limits on numbers of nonfunctioning automobiles, length of 
grass on lawns, or restrictions on home businesses.  Inspectors driving by a property may 
not notice the violation, especially those that are not permanent, unless they pass by at the 
time that a violation occurs.  Furthermore, some violations may not be easy to identify 
during a drive-by inspection.  In Chapter 2, I discussed how enforcement of zoning 
occurs through zoning inspection and fines, injunctions, and sometimes lawsuits against 
violators.  Inspectors typically cover large land areas.  The inspector may be both a 
building code and zoning inspector, which may lead to inexperience with zoning codes or 
building code inspection and enforcement taking priority over zoning enforcement.  
Thus, inspectors are asked to cover a large land area with many different responsibilities. 
Inspectors are required to enforce the zoning ordinances, but typically do not have 
the resources to effectively police the entire jurisdiction.  Given the scarce resources 
inspections often come as a result of citizen complaints, so compliance success is often 
related to neighborly policing and issues of citizen concern.  Ellickson and Been (2000) 
note that inspection is often left to building departments while may not have sufficient 
knowledge of zoning ordinances, which leads to a principal-agent problem between the 
building department inspectors and the planning department.  Monitoring the inspector’s 
behavior is similar to the classic dilemma in bureaucratic management where the elected 
officials, principal, have limited ability to monitor the bureaucracy, agent (Weimer and 
Vining 1999, and Wintrobe 1997), as well as the challenges in the private sector, where 
an employer, principal who has limited knowledge, skill, or resources to monitor to the 
employee, agent (Miller 1994).  The building inspectors’ job security is tied to their 
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enforcement of the building code, so we may expect that there is limited incentive for the 
inspectors to enforce the zoning codes, creating the principal-agent problem that was 
discussed in Chapter 2.  This problem is exacerbated by limited planning department 
control over building inspectors’ work assignments and job performance rating.   
Professional zoning inspectors under the direction of the planning department 
may know and understand the zoning laws, but have their own priorities with respect to 
enforcement.  In a conversation with a zoning inspector in Monroe County, Ind. he 
indicated that each inspector has a priority, such as run-off control or elimination of junk 
cars on front lawns.  These priorities focus the inspectors’ activities, but not all plan 
components and zoning ordinances may be a priority, as we discussed in Chapter 2.  
Therefore, if non-conforming landowners recognize that no one cares about compliance 
with a particular ordinance, the owner may continue the illegal use with limited fear of 
getting caught or fined.   In some communities with junk car ordinances, violators are not 
a priority, so cars pile up in yards, while in more affluent communities junk cars will be 
removed quickly in order to prevent an “eyesore.” 
Zoning relies on neighbor complaints to aid in enforcement and compliance.  
Neighbors may be more willing to report illegal land use that they find offensive.  If two 
neighbors have a history of disagreement, one may be more willing to report a minor 
offense to authorities.  In comparison, neighbors with friendly relations may be willing to 
overlook each other’s violations.  Thus uneven zoning code enforcement is typical within 
a jurisdiction (Babcock and Siemon, 1985, Rudel, 1989).  Certain types of communities 
may be prone to informal land use agreements outside of zoning code enforcement.  
Rudel (1989) argues that residents of rural communities frequently create informal 
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agreements concerning land use.  On the other hand long time neighbors also have the 
potential for long-term feuds over land use.  Homeowners are often more motivated and 
informed about local land use than renters, so areas with high homeownership may 
experience more neighbors policing of zoning code violations (Rudel, 1989, Ellickson 
and Been 2000).   
In the urban-rural fringe exurbanite residents and rural natives create a hotbed of 
land use conflict, as many exurbanites are willing to call the authorities prior to talking 
with their rural neighbors about offensive land use (Rudel, 1989).  In particular, long time 
rural residents may have limited exposure to and experience with zoning code 
enforcement, so may be unaware or unconcerned with going through the rezoning or 
variance process.  New rural residents may perceive nuisances from existing rural 
residents, such as farmers, from commonplace agricultural activities such as spreading 
manure, spraying fields with pesticides, or creation of noxious odors in lagoons or animal 
barns.  These conflicts can lead to attempts to change or adopt zoning codes that restrict 
agricultural practices, although many states Right to Farm Acts limit local enforcement of 
laws perceived as anti-agricultural.   
Given the challenges that local governments face enforcing particular zoning 
laws, the zoning ordinances and comprehensive plan ideals are only as good as the 
monitoring and sanctioning associated with it.  If residents do not witness credible land 
use policing, we may expect that there will be widespread noncompliance.  Many 
jurisdictions do not have the resources to effectively monitor land use regulations 
violations.  Throughout the country, governments rely on citizen complaints to enforce 
the zoning ordinances (Ellickson and Been 2000).  Therefore, land use regulatory 
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enforcement probably will be concentrated in the most visible types of violations.  The 
problem with citizen enforcement is that it only works if citizens are willing to take the 
time to be aware of legal uses under the zoning ordinances, to watch their fellow citizens’ 
use, and report the offense.  Thus, many citizens are willing to free ride on others 
policing, so there is the typical collective action problem associated with citizen lead 
enforcement.   
On the other hand, in some jurisdictions there have been instances where 
noncompliance has lead to costly fines or injunctions, where the landowner was required 
to tear down a building or to remodel it to fit the zoning ordinance.  As we discussed 
earlier, in one case in New York, an apartment developer was required to remove twelve 
stories of thirty-one story complex to conform to the ordinance, as an expense of $2 
million (Ellickson and Been 2000).  Variances are sometimes granted for landowners that 
experience a hardship due to the regulation, although frequently self-created hardships do 
not qualify for a variance (Ellickson and Been, 2000).  In order for land use regulation to 
be effective the de jure rules must match the de facto.  There must be a credible threat of 
enforcement of the rules in order for the land use regulation to be effective.  
This chapter identifies the strategic activities of neighbors and inspectors in the 
land use arena in order to understand under what conditions landowners will comply with 
zoning codes.  The importance of this chapter is that it outlines conditions where zoning 
violations will be rampant and where neighbor reporting and inspection will lead to 
compliance.  I explore how GIS technology affects the land use policy enforcement arena 
through lower cost access to information.  In the next section, I describe the increased use 
 120
of GIS in the zoning arena throughout the country.  Then I explore the use of GIS within 
southern Indiana.   
5.2  GIS and Zoning 
 GIS has been used by small towns, cities, and counties throughout the country to 
store information about zoning codes and variances, as well as property tax information 
(Brown and Brudney, 1998).  These communities often seek to improve communication 
with citizens, as well as potential developers.  Many of these communities post some of 
the GIS information online, allowing citizens to access zoning codes and variance 
information.  In this section I explore several exemplary examples of online GIS 
technology used by three different cities.  Then I focus my attention on southern Indiana 
county government’s use of online GIS technology, in order to provide context for this 
analysis.  Information was obtained through an online search of city and county websites. 
5.2.1  Three Stellar Examples of Online GIS Adoption 
In Reno, Nevada, the city allows access to zoning ordinances, as well zoning 
maps and comprehensive plans (City of Reno, 2004).  The city has automated zoning 
code enforcement by allowing citizens to view existing complaints on properties within 
the city (City of Reno, 2004).  GIS allows citizens to determine the zoning ordinances 
that apply to neighboring properties, while the interactive complaint website provides 
another convenient means to contact inspectors.  The website also provides contact 
information for the inspector’s office, if citizens prefer to contact an official directly. 
 In Bloomington, Indiana, the mid-size city home to Indiana University, the city 
has posted general information regarding zoning codes, but does not allow searches for 
particular parcels.  The website includes large scale zoning maps, but no means to check 
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specific parcels (City of Bloomington, 2004).  Currently there is not a means for citizens 
to electronically report or check on complaints.  The city does provide extensive 
information about the zoning ordinances and permitting.  Thus, citizens may access 
information about the code online, but it would be difficult to determine whether these 
codes applied to particular parcels. 
 On the other hand, the City of Chicago provides extensive GIS information to 
citizens through its website http://w27.cityofchicago.org/website/zoning/index.html.  
Similar to Reno, Chicago provides parcel level zoning information, as well as contact 
information for zoning concerns.  Unlike Reno, Chicago does not allow citizens to 
electronically file zoning complaints.  Thus, Chicago represents a middle ground between 
Bloomington and Reno with individual parcel information, but limited access options.  
There are several problems with Chicago’s interactive map, especially the limited 
information updates and computer requirements to upload information.  The map was last 
updated in February 20042, so may not have accurate information about current building 
projects making it difficult for citizens to report violations occurring in construction areas 
(City of Chicago, 2004).  For zoning ordinances regarding general property upkeep, this 
delay in information relay to the public website may not be important, but in areas 
experiencing extensive development this delay reduces the ability of citizens to access 
information about the parcel and file complaints.  The quality of information on 
Chicago’s map is exceptional and detailed, which is impressive given the large scale of 
their GIS project. 
 There are many cities that have not invested in GIS technology because of the 
high costs to implement and maintain the database (Brown and Brudney, 1998).  The 
                                                 
2 The website was last checked on August 10, 2004. 
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three examples provided illustrate different levels of zoning GIS information from 
general maps in Bloomington, interactive maps in Chicago, and ability to check 
complaints in Reno.  Many cities and counties still do not have up-to-date websites, let 
alone interactive zoning maps.  In Indiana, there are many local governments with only 
one copy of a comprehensive plan3, so Bloomington, Ind. city government provides much 
more information to residents than most Indiana cities. 
5.2.2  County Use of Online GIS Technology in Southern Indiana 
 In southern Indiana, the majority of counties with planning and zoning ordinances 
do have an online presence, but this is typically a listing of phone number and official 
names.  I evaluated the each county’s online presence through extensive internet searches 
for each county’s site.  As can be seen in Table 5.1, only 7% of the counties put their 
comprehensive plan on the department or county government website.  Interestingly, 
18% of counties put the zoning ordinance, or at least portions of the ordinance, online.  
This may enable citizens to better understand what is typically allowed in residential, 
mixed-use, commercial, industrial, or other types of zones, although citizens are unable to 
access information about their neighbor’s zone online.  Only two counties have land use 
maps online.  One county has maps at a township level, so it is difficult to determine 
parcel boundaries in order to assess whether a neighbor is in violation.  Monroe County, 
home to Bloomington, Indiana, has similar information as the City of Bloomington, but 
also includes, a searchable online database, which enables landowners to quickly access 
information about potential violators. 
                                                 
3 This information was obtained when trying to gather comprehensive plans for analysis.  Several counties 
reported that the plan could not be copied or evaluated because there was only one copy.  Jamie Palmer of 
the Center for Urban Policy and the Environment, Indianapolis, Ind. reported that this was commonplace in 
small Indiana cities as well. 
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  Count 
Percentage of Counties in 
Study Area 
Percentage of Counties 
with Planning 
Total Counties 40 100%   
County level Planning 28 70% 100% 
Website 15 38% 54% 
Plan on Website 2 5% 7% 
Zoning Ordinance on Website 5 13% 18% 
Land Use Maps on Website 2 5% 7% 
Searchable Maps on Website 1 3% 4% 
Table 5.1. County Planning Technology  
 
 The ability of online GIS to be an effective technology depends on the abilities 
and internet access of citizens (Brown and Brudney, 1998).  Thus, in rural Indiana, online 
GIS may not be an option to improve zoning enforcement and compliance because of 
limited community access to the internet.  Whereas in relatively cosmopolitan locations, 
such as Chicago and Reno, citizens may prefer to access government information online 
because of time constraints and difficulty contacting bureaucrats via phone or in person.  
Within southern Indiana, it appears that online technology is increasingly used to provide 
citizens information, although most citizens will still need to make a potentially time 
consuming phone call to the county offices in order to determine whether to file a 
compliant.  In the following section, I explore the impact of online GIS information on 
zoning enforcement and compliance through citizen reporting.  As more southern Indiana 
counties adopt this technology the game will become more common, although at this 
point in time only two counties have zoning maps online.  In the next section, I describe 
the general game that Nesbit and I developed to investigate citizen reporting of zoning 
violations. 
5.3  General Game  
Within Nesbit and York’s generalized neighborhood zoning game there are three 
main players in the violator/neighbor game: the violator, the neighbor, and the inspector.  
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The violator is the first player to move in the game because a violator’s action will 
determine if a citizen makes a complaint.  The violator lives in close proximity to the 
neighbor.  We assume that the neighbor can easily observe violations taking place on the 
violator’s property.  The violator wants to use his property in some way that is 
inconsistent with zoning laws.  As discussed in Chapter 2, there are many types of 
property rights restrictions in zoning codes addressing aesthetics, environmental and 
health concerns, impact on public infrastructure, and traffic patterns.  The violator wants 
to violate zoning restrictions because it will either bring him benefit, through aesthetic 
pleasure or additional revenue, or reduce his costs, for clean-up or prevention of runoff.  
In this simple game the violator initially has two choices, either to do nothing or to 
violate the zoning law.     
If the violator chooses to violate, this action has negative externalities for the 
neighbor, the second player.  The nature of these externalities can be a decrease in 
property values or health concerns from illegal runoff, annoyance at all the junk cars 
parked on the lawn, or increased traffic from an illegal home business.  With GIS 
technology it is less likely that a violator will unintentionally violate a zoning ordinance 
because parcel level rules are easily available. 
After observing the action of the violator, the neighbor has two possible actions to 
take, he can either do nothing or report the violation to the zoning inspector.  If the 
neighbor chooses to report the violation, there are costs for reporting such as gathering 
information about whether there neighbor has actually violated, making a phone call to a 
zoning inspector, as well as possible repercussions from the violator, such as a decrease 
in neighborly relations.  Again with online GIS technology, the reporting cost for the 
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neighbor is lower because it is easier to determine if a complaint will result in fine.  
Instead of several phone calls and possible trips to the planning department, the neighbor 
can quickly determine whether the violator has violated the zoning code with an online 
GIS searchable parcel level database.  With this sort of technology, the neighbor can use 
go to a website with a map of the parcels in the county.  The neighbor then enters the 
address of the violator and may determine the zoning laws and variances that apply to the 
parcel.   As I discussed in the case of Reno, with online technology, the neighbor may 
also be able to file a compliant online without ever having to play phone tag with an 
inspector. 
The final player in this game is the zoning inspector who begins to act after 
receipt of a citizen compliant about a zoning violation.  The inspector can either ignore 
the compliant, doing nothing, or inspect the violation.  We assume that when the 
inspector goes out to inspect the violation that he or she will impose some kind of fine on 
the violator, in order to simplify the game. 
5.3.1  Game Payoffs 
 The neighbor begins with a certain property value, listed as PN (Table 5.2).  If the 
violator does not violate the zoning regulations, then the neighbor’s property value 
remains the same.  If the violator does violate zoning, then the neighbor’s property value 
decreases by the amount γ.  If the neighbor decides to report the zoning violation to the 
city, the neighbor incurs a reporting cost, CR, which includes an information gathering 
cost.  This cost can just be the hassle of reporting the violation, or more tangible costs 
like driving to the local planning or building department to talk with the zoning inspector 
or the inspector’s supervisor.  Again, I expect that this cost will be lower if there is GIS 
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technology because the neighbor can more easily determine whether there was a zoning 
code violation by the violator.  
 
Table 5.2.  Game Payoff Parameters 
Symbol Description 
PN Neighbor’s property value 
γ Cost of violation to neighbor 
CR Neighbor’s cost of reporting violation 
PV Violator’s property value 
Β Value of violation to violator 
F Fine imposed on violator for zoning violation 
CF Inspector’s cost of inspecting when giving a fine 
CH Inspector’s hassle cost when choosing to do nothing 
W Inspector’s payment for inspecting 
 
 The violator also begins with a certain property value, PV.  We assume that the 
violator also derives some benefit from the violation, and this is represented as β.  This 
benefit, for example, may come in the form of income from an at home business or a cost 
reduction during building construction for failure to use runoff barriers.  The violator also 
faces a cost when the inspector inspects the property and gives a fine, say F.   
 The inspector is salaried, so does not receive any compensation for an increase in 
the number of inspections that he makes.  No matter which strategy the inspector 
chooses, to inspect or not, he will receive his payment of W.  If the inspector does not go 
to inspect the violation, then the inspector will incur a cost for not inspecting, say CH.  
This cost can be incurred through the citizen complaining or receiving a reprimand from 
a supervisor.  There is also a cost associated with going to inspect the violation because 
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inspections are not necessarily easy, as inspections take time to drive out to the violator’s 
property and inspect the violation.  If the violator is belligerent and confrontational, then 
this cost is even higher.  The cost of doing the inspection and giving a fine is CF.       
5.2.2  One Shot Zoning Game 
 The basic Nesbit and York games are a one-shot zoning game with the violator, 
neighbor and inspector as the three players and same zoning game with a longer time 
horizon.  In this chapter, I add to our previous analysis a lower reporting and information 
gathering cost for the neighbor with the addition of GIS technology in the jurisdiction. 
 As in our general game, players move sequentially, so we present the game first in 
extended form.  Figure 5.1 depicts the neighbor/violator/inspector zoning game.   
The first player to move is the violator.  The violator decides whether or not to violate the 
zoning regulations.  If the violator decides not to violate the zoning laws, then the game 
ends.  In this instance, both the violator and the neighbor received payoffs equal to their 
property values and the inspector receives a payoff equal to his salary.     
 If the violator does decide to violate the zoning laws, then the neighbor has an 
opportunity to move.  The neighbor can either report the violation or choose not to report 
it.  If the neighbor does not report the violation, then the game ends, with the neighbor 
receiving a payoff of a decreased property value and the violator receiving increased 
payoffs from the violation.  In this instance, the inspector will again receive a payoff 
consisting of his salary.   
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 If the neighbor reports the violation, then it is the inspector’s turn to move.  There 
are two alternatives.  The inspector can either choose not to inspect the violation or to 
inspect the property and fine the violator.  If the inspector chooses not to inspect the 
violation, then the inspector receives a payoff equal to the wage, W, minus the hassle 
cost, or CH.  The hassle cost is the cost to the inspector of dealing with a citizen 
complaint, such as listening to that person on the phone or setting aside time to have a 
audience with him.  And if the inspector goes and gives a fine, then he receives W – CF, 
where CF is the cost to the inspector of giving a fine to the violator.  This cost is incurred 
just by the time and effort it takes to go inspect the violation along with possible 
harassment from the violator.       
ViolateNot Violate
 
NEIGHBOR 
Not Report Report
INSPECTOR 
Fine 
(PV, PN,W) 
(PV + β , PN – γ, W) No Inspection
VIOLATOR
(PV + β, PN – γ - CR , W – CH) (PV - F, PN - CR, W – CF ) 
Figure 5.1.  Neighbor/Violator/Inspector Zoning Game, Extended Form 
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 Solving the tree backwards, we look first at the inspector’s choices.  The choice 
about whether or not to inspect and what kind of sanction to impose is based mainly on 
what costs the three options present to the inspector.   
5.3.2.1  Case 1: Low Cost of Doing Nothing 
 Suppose that the lowest of the two cost parameters is the hassle cost, or the cost of 
doing nothing, CH.  This would mean that doing the inspection would take just too much 
time and energy and that the inspector expects a difficult visit.  In this case, the inspector 
will chose to do nothing because that option gives him the highest payoff.  If the 
inspector chooses to do nothing, then the neighbor will choose not to report the violation 
because the cost of reporting will just add to the neighbor’s losses.  And since the violator 
knows that the neighbor will not report the violation, his optimal strategy is to violate.  
Therefore, the equilibrium in this case will be (violate, not report, do nothing).     
5.3.2.2 Case 2: Low Cost of Fining  
 If the cost of fining the violator for the violation is the lower cost to the inspector, 
then the inspector will choose to fine.  This could happen when the inspector knows that 
there will be a lot of trouble and hassle for not doing the inspection.  There could also be 
a lot of hassle if a warning is given instead of a fine and the violation isn’t stopped.  This 
could bring more complaints and problems.  If the inspector fines the violator, then the 
neighbor is faced with a choice.  If the cost of reporting is greater than the decrease in 
property value from the violation, then the neighbor will choose not to report the 
violation because his payoffs will decrease.  And in that case, the violator will choose to 
violate and the equilibrium is (violate, not report, fine).    
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5.3.2.3  Case 3:  Low Cost of Reporting 
If the cost of reporting is smaller than the property value decrease, then the 
neighbor will choose to report the violation.  If the neighbor reports the violation, then 
the violator’s best strategy is to not violate the zoning rules in the first place.  In this 
instance, the equilibrium will be (not violate, report, fine).    Thus with online GIS 
technology, where I expect that the reporting costs are low for neighbors, there should be 
an equilibrium strategy of zoning code compliance.  This equilibrium depends upon the 
property value decrease, if the particular violation is of limited concern to the neighbor, 
even with a low reporting cost, we should not expect reporting or compliance. 
The only equilibrium where the violator’s dominant strategy is not to violate the zoning 
rules happens when the inspector’s cost structure makes fining profitable and when the 
cost of reporting is small enough to induce the neighbor to report the violation.  Thus, we 
should expect that there are many instances of zoning code violation in the real world. 
5.3.3  Multiple Neighbor Game 
 Nesbit and I also extend game two to allow for more neighbors in order to make 
the zoning game more realistic.  Solving the extended game is not nearly as simple as 
solving the previous game.  In this instance, the inspector’s decision whether or not to 
inspect depends on the decision of both of the neighbors.  For purposes of ease, we will 
assume that the neighbors are symmetrical, meaning that their costs and payoffs are the 
same.  In future analysis, we will examine the case of asymmetric neighbors.   
 The inspector’s decision of whether or not to inspect the zoning violation depends 
on the relative costs of doing nothing, CH, and the cost of inspecting, CF.  If the cost of 
doing nothing is less than the cost of inspecting, then the inspector will always choose to 
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do nothing.  If the cost of inspecting is less than the cost of doing nothing, then the 
inspector will always inspect the violation and fine the violator.  However, there is 
another important case to consider.  Remember that the cost of doing nothing, CH, 
represents a hassle cost to the inspector of dealing with the complaining citizen.  When 
more than one citizen complains, we assume that this cost is doubled.  The third 
interesting case is when CH < CF, but CF < 2CH.  In this instance, the inspector will not 
inspect if only one neighbor complains, but will inspect if more than one neighbor 
complains.  Thus there may be a collective action problem in generating enough 
complaining neighbors in order to induce a inspector to actually check out a potential 
violation. 
Case 1: CF > CH, Inspector Never Inspects 
 Decision of Violator 
Decisions of Neighbors Violate Not Violate 
Neighbor 1 Reports PN – γ- CR PN - CR 
Both Neighbors Report PN – γ- CR PN 
Neither Neighbor Reports PN – γ PN 
Neighbor 2 Reports PN – γ PN 
Case 2: CF < CH, Inspector Always Inspects 
 Decision of Violator 
Decisions of Neighbors Violate Not Violate 
Neighbor 1 Reports PN - CR PN - CR 
Both Neighbors Report PN - CR PN 
Neither Neighbor Reports PN – γ PN 
Neighbor 2 Reports PN PN 
Case 3: CF < CH < 2 CF, Inspector Inspects When More Than One Neighbor Reports 
 Decision of Violator 
Decisions of Neighbors Violate Not Violate 
Neighbor 1 Reports PN – γ- CR PN - CR 
Both Neighbors Report PN - CR PN 
Neither Neighbor Reports PN – γ PN 
Neighbor 2 Reports PN – γ PN 
Table 5.3.  Payoffs to Neighbor 1 in Extended Zoning Game, Inspector as Player 
As seen in Table 5.3, in Case 1 when the inspector never inspects the violation, then 
Neighbor 1’s best response is never to report the zoning violation because it will never be 
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inspected.  In this instance, the violator will always choose to violate the zoning 
regulations.   
 In Case 2, then Neighbor 1’s best response to a zoning violation depends on the 
relationship between the costs of reporting, CR, and the cost of the violation to the 
Neighbor, or γ.  If the cost of reporting is relatively small, then the neighbor should report 
the violation.  If the cost of reporting is relatively large, then the neighbor is better off not 
reporting the violation.  Even if the cost of reporting is small, the neighbor is better off 
not reporting the violation if the probability that another neighbor will report it is very 
high.  In this case the neighbor receives all the benefit of having the violation reported 
and fined without bearing any of the costs of such an action, presenting a classic free-
rider problem. 
 And finally, Case 3 is even more complicated.  In this case, the neighbor’s best 
response to a zoning violation depends very heavily on the probability of another 
neighbor also reporting the violation and the relative cost of reporting compared to the 
cost of the violation.  If the probability of another neighbor reporting the violation is 
small, then the neighbor should not report the violation because only if both neighbors 
report will the inspector choose to inspect the violation.  If this probability is high, 
however, then the neighbor should report the violation only if the cost of reporting is 
smaller than the cost of the violation to the neighbor.  Thus with online GIS technology 
we may expect an increase in reporting through a reduction in the reporting costs.  We 
may especially expect this in cases such as Reno with its online compliant filing option.  
In all cases, whenever the violator chooses not to violate, then the neighbor’s best 
response is not to report the violation.     
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 In summary, this extended game illustrates the importance of several sets of costs.  
First of all, the relative costs to the inspector of doing nothing and inspecting the 
violation are important determinants in the inspector’s decision.  The relative cost of 
reporting and the cost of the violation to the neighbor are important in determining 
whether or not the neighbor should report the violation.  And this game also shows that 
the probability of another neighbor reporting the violation can also be a pivotal parameter 
in the neighbor’s decision of whether or not to report the violation.  Thus, in 
neighborhoods where neighbors talk, we might expect some coordination of reporting 
that overcomes the free-ride problem.  
5.3.4  Repeated Zoning Violation Game 
 To better approximate the zoning game, we will now look at the zoning game as a 
game with a longer time horizon.  In the real world, violators are often repeat offenders, 
especially if the violation is due to something like runoff or junk cars.  In this game, the 
inspector is again modeled as a third player who receives payoffs from the different 
outcomes of the game.  The big difference between this game and game two is that in this 
game the inspector’s actions do not end the game.  For example, if the inspector does not 
inspect the violation, the neighbor can repeatedly call in to report the violation.  And if 
the inspector does go to inspect the violation and give a fine, the violator would not 
necessarily cease the violation.  In this way, this game is the more realistic than the 
previous games.  The payoffs associated with each of these end notes is shown in Table 
5.4.   
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 Node Violator (V) Neighbor (N) Inspector (I) Who Ends Game 
Number 
of Times 
Played 
(V, N, I) 
A PV PN W Violator (1,0,0) 
B PV + β PN – γ W Neighbor (1,1,0) 
C PV + β PN – γ – CR W - CH Neighbor (1,2,1) 
D PV – F PN – CR W – CF Violator (2,1,1) 
E PV + β – F PN – CR W – CF Neighbor (2,2,1) 
F PV + β PN – 2CR W – 2CH Neighbor (1,3,2) 
G PV – F PN – 2CR W – CH – CF Violator (2,2,2) 
H PV + β – F PN – γ – 2CR W – CH – CF Neighbor (2,3,2) 
I PV + β – F PN – γ – 2CR W – CH – CF Neighbor (2,3,2) 
J PV  – 2F PN – 2CR W – 2CF Violator (3,2,2) 
K PV + β PN – γ – 3CR W – 3CH  Neighbor (1,4,3) 
L PV – F PN  – 3CR W – 2CH – CF Violator (2,3,3) 
M PV + β -2F PN – γ - 2CR W – 2CF Neighbor (3,3,2) 
Table 5.4.  Payoffs Associated with Extended Game 
   
As seen in Table 5.4, the inspector’s decisions never end the game.  Only the 
neighbor or the violator can choose to end the game by ceasing to reporting the violation 
or ceasing the violation, respectively.  The violator will choose to stop violating 
whenever the fine associated with the violation is greater than the benefit that the violator 
receives from the violation.   Otherwise, the violator will continue to violate.  Notice that 
if the inspector fines the violator more than once, then the size of the fine increases 
linearly.  Therefore, the relative size of β and the accumulated fine are important in 
determining the strategies of the violator.       
 A similar line of reasoning applies to the neighbor as well.  The neighbor will 
continue to report the violation as long as the accumulated cost of reporting is less than 
the cost of the violation to the neighbor.  The neighbor’s cost of reporting also increases 
linearly with the number of times that the neighbor reports the violation.   So the most 
important parameters for the neighbor are the cost of the violation, γ, and the 
accumulated cost of reporting.  Again, in the neighbor is able to report online this may 
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reduce the cost of reporting by allowing complaints to be filed at any point in time.  The 
neighbor has more opportunities to play in the long-time horizon game, therefore, her 
costs could accumulate more rapidly.           
Although the inspector does not end the game, the inspector can influence which 
of these two players will choose to end the game.  The inspector does this by choosing 
whether or not to inspect the violation and fine the violator.  As long as the inspector 
refrains from inspecting, the neighbor’s cost of reporting will be accumulating.  As long 
as the inspector chooses to fine, then the violator’s fine will be increasing.  The inspector 
makes his choice depending on the relative costs of doing nothing and of fining, just as it 
was in the previous game.  So the relative size of these two costs will determine the 
inspector’s strategies in the game.     
In fact, the structure of the long-time horizon game can be simplified into certain 
classes of equilibria.  These classes and the associated payoffs are shown in Table 5.5.  
All the generic payoffs shown in Table 5.5 cover all of the possible payoff combinations 
that will happen in the long time horizon game.  Basically, there are three types of 
situations that arise.  First, the inspector and the neighbor can get involved in a situation 
where the neighbor keeps reporting the violation and the inspector does not inspect.  This 
subgame ends either when the neighbor’s cost of reporting has accumulated to the point 
that it is greater than the cost of the violation and the neighbor ends the game by ceasing 
to report the violation or when the inspector’s cost of doing nothing increases relative to 
the cost of fining and the inspector chooses to fine.  
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 CYCLE AND RESOLUTION PLAYER PAYOFFS 
Class #1 (violate, report, do nothing) 
Neighbor PN –  γ  – δ CR 
Neighbor ends game 
Inspector W –  θ  CH 
  
Violator PV + β 
Class #2 (violate, report, fine) 
Neighbor PN – γ – δ CR 
Neighbor ends game 
Inspector W –  θ CH – σ CIF 
  
Violator PV + β –  σ F 
Class #3 (violate, report, fine) 
Neighbor PN  – δ CR 
Violator ends game 
Inspector W – θ CH – σ CIF 
  
Violator PV  –  σ  F 
Where θ = number of times the inspector does nothing, σ = number of times the 
inspector fines the violator, and δ = number of times the neighbor reports the violation 
Table 5.5.  Classification of Subgames in Long Time Horizon Game 
 At that point, the game jumps into another subgame that involves the inspector 
inspecting the violation and giving a fine but the violator continues to violate and the 
neighbor continues to report the violation.  This subgame continues until either (a) the 
cost of the fine to the violator accumulates to the point that it exceeds the benefit of the 
violation and the violator ends the game, (b) the neighbor’s cost of reporting accumulates 
to the point that it exceeds the cost of the violation, or (c) the inspector’s cost of fining 
increases relative to the cost of doing nothing and the inspector chooses to stop fining the 
violator and returns the game to class #1, the first subgame discussed.  Thus, the 
inspector’s choice of whether or not to inspect determines which subgame we are in.  If 
the inspector repeatedly chooses to do nothing, then the game continues a subgame where 
only the neighbor can end the game, not the violator.   
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In summary, the game with the long-time horizon reinforces the importance of the 
same relative costs as the previous games.  For the inspector, the relative cost of doing 
nothing and fining are important.  For the neighbor, the relative costs of reporting and of 
the violation are important.  And for the violator, the relative size of the benefit of 
violating and the cost of the fine are important.  This corroborates the implications of the 
previous games.  In addition, the long-time horizon game shows that the costs to all three 
players accumulate with the number of times that they play in the game.  As soon as one 
player’s costs reach a critical threshold, become large relative to the other critical 
parameter, then that player will end the game.  Because the inspector cannot end the 
game, the relative size of the accumulated costs determines whether or not the inspector 
will do nothing or inspect.       
5.4  Discussion 
As can be seen in the simple games illustrated above, one of the most important 
factors is the fine levied on the violator.  Some jurisdictions increase fines for repeat 
offenders (Ellickson and Been, 2000), which will aid in stopping the illegal land use.  
Another aspect of the zoning game, is that some violators are developers that frequently 
face the Board of Zoning Appeals and Plan Commission.  These developers may be 
concerned about their reputation inspectors and the local planning community (Ellickson 
and Been, 2000).  Thus the type of violator, developer or homeowner, may be an 
important factor in the how quickly a violator complies with local zoning ordinances. 
Another important factor is the cost of reporting for the neighbor.  If the neighbor 
expects to have a hard time reaching inspectors and inducing an inspector to inspect the 
violation, we may expect that the violation will continue.  In the repeated game, we 
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expect that a neighbor who has faced a high reporting cost because of a struggle may look 
the other way and not report if the inspector does nothing after the first report.  On the 
other hand, we expect that neighbors who are well connected with local government will 
report often, because of the low cost and high probability of response from the inspector. 
An extension of these simple games is the possibility of legal action through the 
court system, which takes the game and costs to another level.  The violator and the city 
or the neighbor most accept large legal fees in order to go to court, as discussed in 
Chapter 2.  Therefore, many of these disagreements remain outside the court system and 
only cease when the neighbor stops violating or the landowner stops reporting similar to 
our games.  I expect that the previous simple games represent a great number of local 
land use enforcement cases throughout the country. 
Our study investigates a common problem in zoning arena, as well as other types 
of local enforcement, how do you effectively enforce a rule when official inspectors have 
limited resources and are unable to canvas an entire jurisdiction?  As discussed earlier, 
violations can be difficult to spot from afar and certain types of violations may only be 
visible during a short period of time.  Therefore, like many police measures, zoning relies 
on citizen complaints to be enforced.  One impetus for zoning within a community is to 
reduce nuisance violations, which impose costs on neighbors and the community.  The 
neighbor games allow us to better understand the impact of zoning on the ground, as the 
institution is only as good as its enforcement.  The games indicate that neighbor reporting 
is an important element in local land use enforcement, and neighbors can be effective 
monitors, if supported by fines and fairly responsive inspectors.   
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Neighbors also need to be aware of the zoning ordinances and zones that surround 
them to be effective monitors.  Recently many communities have created electronic 
copies of zoning ordinances that are available online.  We anticipate that access to 
ordinances through the convenience of the internet may increase the numbers of citizen 
reports.  Furthermore, some communities have created parcel level zoning maps that are 
available online.  These maps enable neighbors to determine whether a possible violation 
is actually an allowable use.  Thus, we may see some changes in the number of reports 
and accuracy of citizen reports with the increased access to zoning ordinance 
information. 
Overall this study indicates that citizen monitoring of zoning laws may be 
increased or decreased through the reduction of reporting costs.  Thus, online GIS maps 
enable citizens to easily determine if a neighbor is violating the zoning ordinance will 
significantly decrease reporting costs for the neighbor.  If a community only has phone 
numbers listed, I do not expect this to be any more effective than communities without 
online information.  As demonstrated in the games, making online GIS technology 
accessible does not guarantee an increase in compliance if inspection depends on multiple 
citizen complaints, creating a free-rider problem in neighborhoods.  Thus online GIS use 
by communities may improve compliance through the zoning game, but adoption is only 
one part of game. 
Online information can be costly for communities to create and maintain.  
Furthermore, many communities rely on outside consultants to maintain GIS data, which 
may create information and contracting problems.  Communities may find that they 
technically do not “own” the GIS information, so cannot allow citizens to access the 
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information.  Some communities may be uncomfortable with releasing parcel level data, 
even though this information is public.  There is also the classic problem of the digital 
divide in that citizen must have online access and some fairly sophisticated computer 
skills to navigate the internet and access information about their neighbors.  Thus, we 
may find that online GIS parcel maps reinforce the divide in enforcement with wealthier, 
higher computer skilled neighborhoods receiving even more zoning code enforcement 
resources. 
  Another policy change that could improve compliance in some communities 
would be incremental increases in zoning fines enable communities to reduce the game 
cycling with repeat offenders by decreasing the relative benefit of violating.  Future 
extensions of these games will examine the informal negotiations that frequently take 
place between neighbors regarding land use.  Nesbit and I investigated the formal 
reporting route with our general games, but this is not the only means for neighborly 
resolution.  Another extension of the game will evaluate the importance of reputation in 
long term interactions between inspectors and violators who are developers.  The current 
simple games improve our understanding of the relationship between important variables 
in citizen monitoring of zoning ordinances.  These games indicate that citizen monitoring 
may be viable in many communities where reporting neighbors expect that investigation 
and fines will occur with reports.  It is important for policymakers to understand these 
games when creating laws will be monitored and enforced that rely on citizen complaints. 
As has been demonstrated in the previous chapters, zoning is complicated and can 
be ineffective across some measures of land use conversion and fragmentation.  
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Reporting and enforcement can be costly and ineffective at reducing violations, which is 
causing many communities to evaluate alternative to zoning. 
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Chapter 6: Alternatives to Zoning: Means to Cooperative Management 
By Abigail M. York  
Zoning may protect some types of land cover or direct economic development 
within a county, but it is difficult to protect specific natural resources or community 
“treasures,” with zoning.   Zoning works primarily by taking away rights to specific uses 
not through the promotion of particular types of uses and land management.  Throughout 
the country a desire to manage land collaboratively for economic development, 
ecosystem management, and forest conservation has emerged.  In this chapter, I explore 
the legal mechanisms that are available for collaborative management of forestland.   
One of the major threats to the ecosystems of the Midwest is loss of habitat and 
how remaining forests are managed.  As discussed in chapter 3, most counties in Indiana 
are experiencing forest loss, while some counties have experienced moderate forest 
regrowth.  Collaborative approaches to forest protection and management could be used 
to protect large areas of forest on private land.  Collaborative management of forest is an 
extremely difficult process, especially if cooperators are only bound through education 
and social norms.   Landowners who voluntarily seek to create long-term collaborative 
management arrangements need formal institutions to guide the process, especially when 
property changes owners.  In this study, I consider institutions that can be used to achieve 
landowners’ goals for land-use regulation and management.   
My research is partially motivated by a group of Indiana landowners and 
conservationists who desire to collaboratively manage forestland.  This group contacted 
the Indiana Department of Natural Resources to request state aid and guidance in the 
creation of what in effect would be a privately held “public” forest.  This unconventional 
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request is echoed throughout the country by communities that wish to preserve natural 
resources and community characteristics through collaborative management .  These 
landowners wanted to do more than preserve land as a state park or working state forest.  
They wanted to maintain private ownership, but keep this land forested in perpetuity.  A 
group of Indiana landowners recently approached the Indiana Department of Natural 
Resources with a request for assistance in the creation of a “virtual state forest (Fisher, 
2004).”  What is a virtual state forest that landowners hope to create?  Dr. Fisher, the 
State Forester of Indiana in 2004, indicated that the landowners were unsure about their 
goals for collaboration, but did have a broad goal of forest conservation. 
If this Indiana community hopes to collaboratively manage their forest resources, 
they must establish institutions to guide their behavior.  Communities frequently have 
limited resources to guide these collaborative efforts.  This study provides some guidance 
and insight with an institutional analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of several legal 
mechanisms available for collaborative management.  This review of legal mechanisms 
explores their breadth and places each mechanism on a spectrum of public- and private-
ness of enactment and enforcement.  I evaluate the potential use of existing government 
programs, as well as some private mechanisms, that could aid landowners’ attempts to 
collaboratively manage lands and protect natural resources.  The challenge is the lack of 
tools designed specifically to encourage cooperation.  Similarly, A number of existing 
government and private tools could be used to collaboratively manage forestland, 
although many of these tools have not previously been used in this context.   
The demand for alternatives to zoning stems from some of the weaknesses of 
zoning, such as the large-scale jurisdictions and inability of planners to address citizen 
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concerns.  Zoning, as currently implemented, is routinely criticized for it’s inability to 
protect natural resources and limit urban sprawl because government officials too readily 
grant variances and rezoning requests (Diamond and Noonan 1996).  The issue of 
flexibility is not limited to zoning.  Some tools that I discuss in this study may also be 
criticized for their malleability.  The planning community is challenged to balance 
malleability, which may encourage development, and inflexibility, which may protect 
natural or cultural treasures.   
This challenge has been identified and explored in Jane Jacob’s classic book, The 
Death and Life of the Great American Cities (Jacobs 2002).  Her criticism centered on 
planners’ inability to mimic organic processes of city evolution.  She was especially 
concerned about the segregation of uses that often resulted in less vibrant cities.  Her 
critique led many planners to adopt more realistic short-term plans, but there is still an 
inherent conflict between the organic nature of city growth and planners’ attempts to 
“plan” for the future city (Ellickson and Been 2000).  Jacobs’ argues that in many 
instances, the urban citizenry is best served when planning does not take the forefront, 
but rather supports small, local initiatives.  Some of her criticism could also be useful in 
urbanizing landscapes. 
In urbanizing environments with rapidly changing citizen demands and concerns 
over loss of rural amenities, the ability of zoning tools to create a vibrant peri-urban 
community is also limited.  Furthermore, the ability of zoning to promote cooperative 
land management is also limited, as zoning functions primarily by taking away property 
rights on individual parcels.  In terms of forestland preservation, zoning by itself may be 
unable to support localized demands for increased regulation and restriction of uses, but 
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local efforts to preserve forest should not completely reject zoning and planning.  Zoning 
and planning could create a jurisdiction wide commitment to preservation, mixed-use 
development, and coordinating development with existing infrastructure that will enhance 
other efforts to preserve forests.  This type of overlapping system of government, a 
polycentric system, provides opportunities for self-governing citizens to provide 
themselves public goods (Oakerson 1999).  This may be necessary for areas with 
environmentalists that desire more stringent land use policy.  This type of self-governing 
private land use policy is not limited to forestry or environmental concerns.  A group of 
historic preservationists focused on maintenance of historic buildings and districts could 
use also use some of these private institutions.  Elected officials and bureaucrats may find 
it difficult to serve these different interests, particularly competing interests in the local 
political economy, especially when these groups desire an increase in government 
regulation.  Special use districts and governing structures with overlapping jurisdictions 
may better provide for a heterogeneous population (McGinnis 1999).  Landowners 
seeking to cooperatively manage their land need to evaluate the land use regulations that 
already impact their property and assess how best to achieve their goals.  In most locales, 
land is already under a polycentric system with many different governments and private 
servitudes governing usage rights on the same piece of land, for example the rights to 
build, conduct business, or house livestock.  Within this study I explore public and 
private mechanisms that might be used in innovative ways for land use management, 
especially cooperative management.   
I begin by describing the types of goals associated with collaborative management 
on private lands.  I explore the strengths and weaknesses of contracting, property owners’ 
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associations, conservation easements conservancy districts, and zoning. Specifically I 
evaluate the longevity, flexibility, transaction costs, and private and public benefits 
within a spectrum of public and private control over creation, alteration, monitoring, and 
enforcement.  These tools represent a range of public and private options that landowners 
may utilize, but none were created expressly to collaboratively manage private land.  I 
also evaluate the compatibility of each tool with the goal of coordinated land-use 
management on private property.  This will enable landowners and policymakers to 
determine which tools best meet their needs. 
 Different actors are involved with each of the different type of land use control 
mechanisms, specifically in the creation and passage of operating rules, as well as 
enforcement.  In zoning legislation, the landowner may be impacted by the ordinance, but 
the average landowner will not be involved in its development.  In comparison to 
servitudes, the landowners can be creators of the servitudes, as well as the monitors.  In 
the next section, I explore the goal of collaborative forest management in order to provide 
the context for the evaluations of the land-use controls. 
6.1  Goals of Collaborative Management 
In order to provide some legal mechanisms to protect forest, I must understand the 
attributes to be protected.  Private landowners seeking to conserve forestland need to 
make several choices including:  accessibility to the property by the landowners and other 
people, land-use management such as timber harvesting, and limits on development.  
Some legal mechanisms may be better suited for timber harvesting or limiting 
development than other mechanisms.  The forestland attributes that the landowners seek 
to protect may be best achieved through several different mechanisms employed together.  
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The broader community may support the landowners’ initiative by providing consistent 
planning and zoning that focuses development away from the targeted forestland, while a 
private government, such as a property owners’ association, may provide more restrictive 
regulations for the landowners that voluntarily hope to create a virtual “state forest.” 
The challenges facing these Indiana landowners are similar for all those interested 
in collaborative management.  With each particular decision regarding accessibility and 
allowable management practices, one type of legal mechanism may be more or less 
appropriate.  In the following section I illustrate the spectrum of legal mechanisms 
available.   
6.2  Spectrum of Legal Mechanisms 
There are many mechanisms available to private landowners and communities 
that wish to restrict or promote certain uses on private property.  These mechanisms 
include contracts, conservation easements, property owners’ associations (POA), and 
zoning ordinances.  Contracts are created between private parties and are the simplest 
mechanism included in this analysis.  Property owners’ associations are private 
governance organizations and include homeowner and condominium owner associations.  
Conservancy districts in Indiana primarily focus on water resources, although the 
enabling statute is quite broad (Indiana Conservancy District Act 1957).  In this section, I 
discuss in detail the differences among legal mechanisms that could be used to protect 
private forests.  There is a wide range of public- and private-ness associated with these 
legal mechanisms.  I have split the legal mechanism into two major types of actions, 
creation and enforcement.  The first is the decision to put one’s land under an easement 
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or for a county council to enable zoning, as well as the landowners’ ability to alter the 
institution after implementation.  The second is the continued enforcement of the rules. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1.  Legal Mechanism Spectrum-Publicness in Creation and Enforcement 
  
 As seen in Figure 6.1, there is a range of institutions that could be used to 
collaboratively manage land.  One noticeably absent type of institutions is a mechanism 
that is public in creation, but private in monitoring and enforcement.  It seems unlikely, 
although not impossible, that government entities would impose rules upon landowners 
and then leave monitoring and enforcement to private sector.  As discussed in Chapter 5, 
monitoring of zoning is often lead by citizens, but enforcement is usually done by zoning 
inspectors and other government officials.  One could imagine situations where creation 
of public regulations regarding land use leads to de facto private enforcement.  As 
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demonstrated in Figure 6.1, besides the absent public creation and private enforcement 
institution, there is a wide range of institutions for communities to choose from. 
6.2.1 Contracts 
Some might argue that the private market should be able to develop a solution for 
the creation of cooperative forestland management units that are mutually beneficial to all 
parties involved.  In the case of land-use disputes, private contracts or agreements do 
occur, especially in rural areas where the involved parties are acquainted.   A farmer-
developer may approach individuals within a community and try to establish an 
agreement without outside litigation or legislation (Rudel 1989).   
Contracts are the most private with individual landowners making the decision to 
initiate the agreement, as well as the monitoring, enforcement, and altering, Figure 6.1.  
Landowners could negotiate the terms impacting each others’ parcels.  In comparison to 
the other legal mechanisms, a contract is usually relatively short term.  This type of 
institution may be useful for proactive management, but of limited usefulness to long-
term protection of openspace.  The costs to negotiate mutually beneficial market 
solutions are prohibitive.  If agreements are not attained or maintained the parties may 
resort to litigation.  It may be difficult for a third party to monitor and enforce private 
contracts.  A contracting scheme could be a short-term type of easement, as the 
landowner would agree to particular services for the organization such as timber 
harvesting or preservation.  On the other hand, there would be transaction costs 
associated with each negotiation that may be prohibitive.  Furthermore, some landowners 
may be reluctant to enter the agreement because of an inability to enforce the contract if 
the property is sold to another party. 
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Figure 6.2.  Contracts 
 
One can imagine that this type of solution may be optimal for small groups of 
landowners who have strong relationships with one another.  The landowners may need 
to continually change the contracts if land is bought and sold.  Incoming landowners may 
be unwilling to restrict their land use to cooperate with the long-time residents.  The other 
landowners would be unable to compel a new landowner to comply with the contract 
from the previous owner.  Landowners could use contracts for coordinated timber 
harvests, working on watershed management, or planting species in specific locations.  In 
summary, contracts may be effective, and the best possible legal arrangement, for precise, 
short-term projects. 
6.2.2  Conservation Easements  
Private servitudes, such as conservation easements, allow individual citizens 
acting through charitable organizations to increase the restrictions on nearby land in order 
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to promote a local public good, such as conservation of openspace (Ellickson and Been 
2000).  The servitude creators are able to design the restrictions on the property and 
register it with the deed, but future owners are limited in their ability to change the 
conservation easement.  This rigidity has many benefits for neighboring property owners 
because it reduces the uncertainty associated with property use change, as well as to the 
larger community in conservation. 
These easements often reduce the value of the property significantly, so 
landowners’ may demand a substantial sum to sell the rights.  Land under a conservation 
easement may incur a property tax reduction because the easement restricts use. The 
magnitude of this tax benefit varies from state to state depending on the tax laws.  If a 
state has an ad valorem tax, a tax based on the highest and best use, the reduction most 
likely is greater than states with a flat forestry or agriculture current use tax system. 
Landowners who donate an easement will also receive a federal income tax benefit, as it 
is considered a charitable donation (York, Janssen, and Ostrom, forthcoming). 
Once created easements are fairly inflexible, as the easement is for perpetuity.  On 
the other hand, the easement is privately negotiated by the landowner and the nonprofit, 
so at the least the initial landowner should be satisfied with the institution.  Land trusts 
and government entities are the primary holders of conservation easements. 
As can be seen in Figure 6.1, conservation easements with land trusts are a legal 
mechanism that is private in creation, but more public in monitoring and enforcement.  In 
the initiation, the landowner will work with the land trust’s officials to determine the 
easement restrictions.  Afterwards, land trusts often rely on volunteers to monitor the 
easement and activity on the property.  If the land trusts fails in it’s obligation to monitor 
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the easement government officials may step in.  It can be extremely difficult for the 
landowner to alter the easement after initiation, a strong point for landowners interested 
in preservation. However, courts have forced modifications based on changes in 
circumstances and the resulting public benefits.  
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Figure 6.3.  Conservation Easements 
 
 As can be seen in Figure 6.3, the structure of conservation easements is different 
than POAs or Conservancy Districts.  With a conservation easement, a landowner 
negotiates with a nonprofit entity, such as a land trust or government entity, to restrict 
development on a property.  Then the nonprofit monitors the property after the 
agreement.  Money may exchange hands or the easement may be a result of a donation by 
a concerned landowner.  Easements are fairly inflexible, as the easement is for perpetuity.  
On the other hand, the easement is negotiated by the landowner, so at the least the initial 
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landowner should be satisfied with the institution.  Land trusts and government entities 
are the primary holders of conservation easements. 
Conservation easements with governments may be fairly private in initiation, 
although monitoring is public (Figure 6.1).  The landowner works with government 
agents, such as the Department of Natural Resources, to determine the terms of the 
easement contract, although sometimes the public or various commissions may be 
involved in the choice of properties.  The Indiana Forest Legacy Program uses an 
advisory panel for input to help determine which properties should be targeted and their 
ranking for federal funds to purchase easements.  After initiation, the monitoring process 
is public, with various groups conveying information to the government about activity on 
the property. 
In order for a land trust or government to aid in collaborative land management, 
the nonprofit entity would need to coordinate with each individual landowner, which is 
extremely difficult, especially if all the landowners are seeking compensation for the loss 
of development potential.  In Indiana, The Nature Conservancy, The Forest Legacy 
Program, and The Sycamore Land Trust have worked to enroll contiguous parcels, but it 
is an extremely difficult process. 
As the needs of future landowners and the communities change, these servitudes 
possibly could have a negative impact on the community, although the conservation of 
openspace is relatively assured with the easement.  Servitudes via land trusts can be an 
effective tool within a relatively small area, or for protection of specific types of 
properties.  The conservation easements also can be shaped to the property owner’s 
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needs, so there is some flexibility in the contract creation, but the agreements may not 
serve for the future population. 
6.2.3  Property Owner Associations 
Property owner associations take many forms, such as condominium associations 
and common interest developments.  Such developments are the fastest growing in the 
country and make up almost all residential growth in California, Florida, New York, and 
Texas (Pena 2002)  The governance of these associations can be extremely controversial.  
Resident board members are given extensive power over neighbors that can lead to 
conflict and abuse of power.  There are a number of commentators who suggest changes 
to improve the governance of property owners associations, such as court recognition of 
the fiduciary duty of board members (Grassmick; Pena 2002).   
POAs often have commonly held land such as pools, openspace, or recreational 
facilities.  Landowners’ behavior with regard to their privately held land and the 
commonly held land is restricted by property association rules.  As pseudo-government 
organizations, landowners are also required to pay fees levied by the board of directors.  
The private government structure allows POA members to restrict use, possibly for 
openspace management. 
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Figure 6.4.  Property Owner Associations 
 
There has been a cry of outrage regarding the growth of gated communities 
throughout the United States (Babcock and Siemon 1985).  In these communities, 
property owners may gain some benefit from common park areas, as well as gain security 
from a gate with a password, or actual security personnel limiting access.  Private 
planning through property owners’ associations can be problematic, most notably in 
terms of the inflexibility of the regulations.  The community may need to continually 
reference the original community plan in dispute resolution (Ellickson and Been 2000).  
POA boards may be unwilling to stray far from the original master plan for the 
community. 
The strength of the private governments is that they can provide land use control 
measures for small neighborhoods that are not feasible within the larger community.   
Some associations create rules regarding appearance and maintenance of facilities, 
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whereas other associations create restrictions for environmental protection.  These self-
governing organizations allow citizens to plan and influence their community through 
more direct means than is possible through public planning.  POAs may work well at 
providing various aesthetic controls and provision of community greenspace without 
additional restrictions via public zoning, but these private governments do not work with 
the outside neighbors to the community.  “Public” areas within the community typically 
are restricted to use only by the housing association, so neighboring community members 
are unable to use public areas.  Neighboring community members will receive some 
benefits from POA openspace protection in the form of habitat protection and 
preservation of the scenery.    
Property owners’ associations represent a middle ground in creation, as well as 
monitoring and enforcement (Figure 6.1).  Frequently, property owners’ associations are 
created by a developer, which could be considered a private action, as the developer 
holds property within the association.  Sometimes, landowners come together after a 
development is established to create an association to deal with concerns such as road 
maintenance or security.  Property owners’ associations have been used to manage parks 
and recreational areas, but could be used to collaboratively manage openspace.  Property 
owners’ associations elect boards to deal with issues concerning the management of 
property.  Thus, this may be one of the easiest mechanisms to adapt to land-use 
regulation for collaborative management.   
6.2.4  Conservancy Districts 
Conservancy districts are special purpose units of government that manage water 
resources, typically either watershed quality or maintenance of utility infrastructure.  The 
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utility districts provide services such as sewage treatment and water supply.  The 
watershed districts typically maintain lakes, including dams and the pumps that service 
the lake.  Either type of district may collect user fees, taxes, or both.  Districts are 
frequently divided into areas, which represent different interests or portions of a 
watershed.  The areas have representatives on the board.  Voters for the conservancy 
district are property owners, called freeholders, within the district.  Freeholders may be 
individuals that hold life tenancy or fee simple estates.   
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Figure 6.5.  Conservancy District 
As can be seen in Figure 6.5, the Indiana Department of Natural Resources is 
involved in the creation of the Conservancy District, as well as some general oversight.  
The Division of Water monitors the conservancy districts and focuses primarily on water 
quality in the districts with lakes and dams.  The conservancy district is governed by a 
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board of directors who have authority to restrict use within the district and also to collect 
fees to maintain the watershed.  
Landowners seeking to create a district must collect signatures from 5 to 30% of 
the freeholders (landowners) within the proposed district boundaries and petition the 
court for recognition (Indiana Conservancy District Act 1957).  Individuals who wish to 
petition against the establishment need to obtain 51% of freeholders or freeholders who 
own 667% of the property value in the proposed district in order to prevent creation.  In 
Indiana, many of the conservancy districts were created in conjunction with a POA.  At 
the beginning of the development, prior to any other freeholders buying land within the 
district, the developer is the only freeholder, so there is no difficulty in obtaining the 
required freeholder support for creation.   The Indiana Department of Natural Resources 
is involved in the creation of the Conservancy District, as well as providing general 
oversight of their operation.  The Division of Water monitors the conservancy districts 
and focuses primarily on water quality in the districts with lakes and dams.  The 
conservancy district is governed by a board of directors who have authority to restrict use 
within the district and also to collect fees to maintain the watershed.  
Since conservancy districts are government entities with the ability to restrict land 
use within the district and have the ability to collect user fees and taxes, the district may 
be a good option for openspace management with a watershed management focus.  Once 
a property is included in a conservancy district, future owners cannot remove the property 
from the district, which is both a strength and weakness.  This restriction increases the 
long-term nature of the commitment, but also may limit the property’s value.   
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On the other hand, conservancy districts can be seen as fairly flexible because the 
governing board of directors may change a district’s policy at anytime.  Conservancy 
districts require a time investment by landowners to vote in the elections and hold office, 
which has been a problem for some districts in Indiana.  Thus, some conservancy districts 
are defunct, although still technically government entities.  Property owners can vote to 
remove the district, although this is rare in Indiana1.   
Conservancy districts have used district monies to hire engineers to handle 
problems with dams, drainage, and lakes.  One could imagine that a modified district 
would be able to use monies to hire foresters and wildlife scientists to manage land.  In 
summary, the conservancy district represents an interesting government option for 
collaborative management, as the jurisdiction boundaries can be determined by the needs 
of the community and natural features, rather than existing political boundaries.  
6.2.5  Zoning 
The practice of planning and zoning was begun to deal with problems stemming 
from conflicting land uses that previously were dealt with through nuisance litigation.  
Zoning has evolved to include promotion of the public interest, such as community 
aesthetics.  Zoning is an effective means to reduce nuisances such as restricting the 
ability of residents to raise livestock in urban areas, thus preventing unwelcome noise and 
smells.  Zoning is also seen as a fairly effective means to stabilize property values within 
a residential area (Fischel 1985).  
Zoning can be detrimental to other community goals.  Carruthers has argued that 
zoning, as currently implemented, can be detrimental to the preservation of openspace, as 
it encourages the leapfrog phenomenon, i.e. pushes development into rural areas less 
                                                 
1 Information Obtained from the Indiana Association of Conservancy Districts 
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restricted by zoning (Carruthers 2003).  Similarly, Diamond and Noonan (1996) and 
Dowall (1988) see local level zoning as out of touch with modern goals, such as 
prevention of  sprawl.  As described in Chapter 3, zoning does not protect agricultural or 
forestland.  In Chapter 4, we found that zoning as currently implemented can lead to 
forest fragmentation 
The problem with zoning as currently implemented in Indiana for collaborative 
management of openspace stems not from its localized nature, but rather that zoning 
jurisdictions typically are too large.  Zoning may prohibit particular uses, but affirmative 
requirements, such as requiring landowners to undertake management activities required 
for critical habitat types can be more difficult to achieve especially without a link to 
public safety.   
Historic preservation zones have been used to maintain historically important 
areas.  Historic preservation districts have been used as a means to impose affirmative 
requirements on landowners like maintenance of historic properties.  Historic 
preservation legislation could be adapted for openspace preservation, although it may be 
difficult within a large jurisdiction. Furthermore, since only a limited number of 
landowners seek to manage and conserve not just preserve their land, the historic 
preservation similarity may be limited.  If zoning was implemented to preserve 
openspace more forcibly, restrictions could be imposed on landowners rather than relying 
solely on voluntary programs.  There would surely be legal challenges to these types of 
laws because communities are often unwilling to enforce unpopular zoning rules.  It 
seems unlikely that communities would be willing to pass or fight for these types of 
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restrictive laws on openspace.  Collaborative management assumes a desire to actively 
manage their land, which many citizens are unwilling or unable to accomplish.   
Zoning, either local or county, represents public initiation and monitoring, 
enforcement, and altering.  One could imagine that special zones could be created, similar 
to those for agricultural preservation that attempt to promote collaborative management.  
Within Monroe County, Indiana, forest preserve zones are already in place, although the 
rules within these zones do not regulate forest management activity.  The difficulty of 
using zoning for collaborative management rests in the relatively large size of the 
jurisdiction and in the public process, which may make it difficult for individuals seeking 
fairly restrictive preservation-oriented rules. 
6.3  Conclusion 
Depending on the needs of the community, all of these legal mechanisms could be 
used to promote various aspects of collaborative management.  Zoning could be used to 
help direct development away from the collaboratively managed land.  A conservancy 
district would enable more active management activities through a special use district, 
although the public hearings may make restrictive policies difficult.  More restrictive or 
active management goals could be pursued through property owners’ associations, 
conservation easements, and contracts. 
Collaborative management is an emerging objective throughout the United States, 
especially with respect to preserving large areas of forestland.  As can be seen, zoning 
can be used to promote this goal, but it may difficult to achieve preservation or active 
management solely with zoning or government mechanisms.  Sometimes citizens with 
minority policy preferences may opt for private provision or regulation (Janssen and 
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York 2004).  Thus, private or pseudo-government options may be the means to achieve 
land-use regulation. 
Collaborative forest management is not the only type of management that could 
use the mechanisms described previously.  Watershed management goals are already 
achieved through combinations of tools, especially property owners’ associations and 
conservancy districts.  Economic development and historic preservation could also be 
achieved by using some of the previous tools.  Historic preservation districts often are a 
part of comprehensive plans, although more active management and increased 
restrictions could be achieved through use of contracts and property owners’ associations.  
Economic development could be promoted through an economic type of conservancy 
district.   
Zoning can be a useful tool for land use management, but other private and semi-
private tools are often overlooked.  Public planning should not be the only option, 
similarly neither should private.  Rather a diversity of legal mechanisms can best serve 
the types of goods that are demanded by the population.  The diversity of mechanisms 
employed may also be related to the mobility of the population, government insensitivity 
to citizen demands, and minority preferences. 
}  
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Chapter 7: Growth of Private Governance in the Land Use Arena 
By Abigail M. York1 
Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 6, citizens are seeking alternatives to zoning to protect 
natural resources and manage ecosystems.  The demand for these alternatives may stem 
from a variety of sources such as the inflexibility of the zoning mechanism, which is 
designed to restrict allowable uses instead of promoting manage activities.  On the other 
hand, dissatisfaction with local government land policy, specifically zoning, maybe due 
to the disjunction between citizens’ preferences and local land use policy may be due to 
official or bureaucratic insensitivity.   
The preference distribution of the population may create a pocket of people 
desiring more restrictive zoning regulations, but are an underserved minority.  Janssen 
and I designed the following computer experiments to investigate the growth of 
nongovernment organizations in local political economies.  The experiments were not 
specifically designed for land use policy, although zoning represents one type of policy 
within a larger local political economy.  Thus in this chapter, I will use land use policy to 
highlight the empirical relevance of the experiments that Janssen and I developed for a 
more general investigation of local political economy.  In the discussion section, I will 
illuminate some of the shortcomings of the current experimental design, specifically its 
aspatial nature.  These experiments illustrate important conditions that create demand for 
nongovernment regulation or service provision, such as changing citizen preferences. 
                                                 
1 This chapter draws on work coauthored with Marco A. Janssen, “The niche of non-governmental 
organizations in a changing landscape of citizens’ preferences,” presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting of 
the American Political Science Association, September 2 - September 5, 2004.  Marco Janssen was 
instrumental in the development of the computer model. 
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In southern Indiana, Carlson et. al (2002) found a large number of nongovernment 
environmental programs.  These programs included certification, easement, and 
educational programs.  Some were similar to those discussed in Chapter 6.  In this 
chapter, I investigate the conditions under which we expect growth of nongovernment 
land use institutions.  Janssen and I model a public service provision world where citizens 
are served within the public sector by government bureaucrats or privately through 
NGOs.  We are interested in the growth of NGO service providers due to inadequacy of 
bureaucratic provision. We explore the conditions when citizen policy preference change 
leads to NGO sector growth. We are especially interested in how mismatch between 
elected officials’ party platforms and citizens preferences can create a niche for NGO 
provision.    
 It is important to understand the creation of NGOs within local jurisdictions, as 
we have seen a rise in many types of NGOs, such as common interest developments 
(Fenster 1999; Helsley and Strange 2000) and land trusts (Press et al., 1996). Within the 
USA, environmental NGOs have been an integral part of the conservation and 
preservation movement providing a means for individuals to protect their land through 
conservation easements, technical assistance, and education (York et al., in press). Within 
the education system, private schools have long provided a private option when public 
schools were not available or inadequate. Common local government services, such as 
garbage collection and policing, are often supplemented by private providers within the 
community (Lyons and Lowery 1989). Recently federal initiatives, such as the Faith 
Based Initiative, have encouraged NGOs, specifically religious organizations, to provide 
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public goods. The Janssen and York model is generally applicable to many different local 
policy issues, but I focus on its application to land use policy in this chapter. 
Within the land use policy arena, control over growth and aesthetics are typically 
contentious debates in almost every type of community, although as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, urbanizing environments are often subject to the most change in both land 
uses and citizen preferences, as exurbanites move into rural areas.  Donovan and Neiman 
(1992) investigate how citizen mobilization leads to growth control policy adoption.  
Their analysis focuses mainly on the ability of citizens to influence adoption of growth 
controls in comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances.  In our abstract model, one can 
think of government provision of growth controls and other land use restrictions, as well 
as provision of other types of land regulations and services.  
In our model, citizens may use NGO institutions to replace or supplement 
government service provision of similar services and regulations.  As I discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 6, zoning and private alternatives provide goods, such as preservation of 
historic buildings, management of forestland, and control over neighborhood aesthetics.  
Thus, a group of citizens demand zoning and private institutions to create or protect both 
public and private goods, such as aesthetics from countryside, as well as property values 
for individual landowner.  The highly mobile nature of our society frequently means that 
within a jurisdiction the policy preferences of the citizenry shift fairly quickly overtime.  
One common example of this process is when peri-urban areas are populated with 
exurbanites causing a change in the community from “rural” preferences to a citizenry 
that demands the amenities of a suburb (Rudel, 1989). There are several examples of 
preference change processes including gentrification, movement of different ethnicities 
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and races, or movement of retirement communities into jurisdictions.  This computer 
model focuses on increasing minority preference populations within a community 
creating a demand for NGO service provision.   
Tiebout (1956) argued that citizens make their location decision based on the 
package of public and private services within the community.  In the Janssen and York 
(2004) model, we assume that citizens are making their location decision because of 
goods external to the policy arena that we are modeling.  We focus on the impact of 
citizens entering the jurisdiction on elections and public good provision within their 
chosen jurisdiction.  I apply our results to the land use policy arena, to understand the 
conditions under which alternative institutions will be created. 
 We model interactions of citizens, elected officials, and bureaucrats as a 
principal-principal-agent problem. Within our model, citizens vote for officials whose 
party platform is closest to their policy preferences. After election officials balance desire 
for reelection with their party ideology in their policy adoption decisions. In between 
elections, officials are able to access polling results in order to update their platform. 
Bureaucrats implement the programs that are handed down from the elected officials, but 
they also slightly modify the programs to fit with the citizens’ preferences. Bureaucrats 
balance between the citizens and elected officials’ desires in order to maintain job 
security and limit complaints from citizens. The NGO in our model is created when there 
is a gap between public service provision and citizen desires. 
 Many researchers have explored the idea of “voting with your feet” (Lyons and 
Lowery, 1986; Ostrom et al., 1978; Ostrom et al., 1961; Schneider, 1989; Tiebout, 1956). 
Moving is one means for dissatisfied citizens to improve the mismatch in preferences 
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with public good provision, although several other means have also been explored in the 
exit, voice, and loyalty theory, including political protest and campaign contributions 
(Hirschman, 1978; Lyons and Lowery, 1986). Lyons and Lowery (1989) also discuss exit 
to alternative private service providers for specific public goods. In this paper we are 
focusing on this Lyons and Lowery type of exit to NGO provision, while allowing 
citizens to also exercise voice through voting and polling in between elections.  The 
experiment application to land use policy in an urbanizing landscape is especially 
important because of the dynamic preferences changes, as exurbanites move into rural 
and peri-urban areas. 
In our model, interactions between citizens, elected officials, and bureaucrats are 
a principal-principal-agent problem.  Within our model, citizens vote for officials whose 
party platform is closest to their policy preferences.  After election officials balance 
desire for reelection with their party ideology in their policy adoption decisions. In 
between elections, officials are able to access polling results in order to update their 
platform.  Bureaucrats implement the programs that are handed down from the elected 
officials, but they also slightly modify the programs to fit with the citizens’ preferences. 
Bureaucrats balance between the citizens and elected officials’ desires in order to 
maintain job security and limit complaints from citizens. The NGO in our model is 
created when there is a gap between public service provision and citizen desires. 
Many researchers have explored the idea of “voting with your feet” (Lyons and 
Lowery, 1986, E. Ostrom et al., 1978, V. Ostrom et al., 1999, Ostrom, Tiebout, and 
Warren, 1999, Schneider, 1989, Tiebout, 1956).  Moving is one means for dissatisfied 
citizens to improve the mismatch in preferences with public good provision, although 
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several other means have also been explored in the exit, voice, and loyalty theory, 
including political protest and campaign contributions (Hirschman, 1978, Lyons and 
Lowery, 1986).  Lyons and Lowery (1989) also discuss exit to alternative private service 
providers for specific public goods.   In this paper we are focusing on this Lyons and 
Lowery type of exit to NGO provision, while allowing citizens to also exercise voice 
through voting and polling in between elections. 
The ability of citizens to exit the political process or at least portions of the 
process, through private service providers has generated some concern.  Specifically, 
Helsley and Stronage (2000) explore exit into exclusive common interest developments 
and private schools.  They investigate the problem with the “cream” of the society lives 
in exclusive gated communities or the upper classes send their children to private schools.   
Many researchers have found that middle to upper class professionals were often 
instrumental in citizen mobility for growth control management (Babcock, 1966, 
Donovan and Neiman, 1992).   In our model citizens opt for private institutions only after 
their dissatisfaction reaches a threshold.  We model these individuals as exiters on 
particular issues, rather than exiting from the political process as whole.  We believe that 
this better reflects the nature of growth control, as well as many local political economy 
policy decisions.   Citizens typically pick and choose government and private options, 
rather than completely exiting the process as a whole.  Even citizens in gated 
communities that provide additional police protection, aesthetic controls, road 
maintenance within the gates, and recreational services typically depend on local 
governments for additional services such as police protection, fire and rescue service, and 
park provision. 
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  Overall our model brings together several streams of literature on NGO creation 
and citizens as consumers and entrepreneurs.  We are not exploring citizens’ ability to 
vote with their feet, but rather their ability to use NGO services in place of public 
services.  The Janssen and York model (2004) extends the Kollman et al. (1997) model to 
include bureaucrats, as well as citizens and elected officials, as policy adoption and 
implementation frequently may differ.  This model allows us to evaluate how evolving 
citizen preference distributions leads to NGO creation.  In the following sections, I will 
explain the model components: the adaptive parties, entrepreneurial citizens, and 
bureaucrats.  Then I discuss the results from the experiments, the general local political 
economy and the link to the land use policy arena.  I conclude by describing future 
extensions of the model that will more accurately model the land use policy arena, as well 
as future directions for empirical research.   
7.1  Model 
In urbanizing environments, new residents often demand mores stringent land use 
controls to protect their home values (Babcock and Siemon, 1985), while long term 
landowners using land for extractive uses may be less inclined to push for stricter land 
use controls .  In Chapter 2, we explored how urbanization may cause a change in the 
demand for regulation.  In the following experiment, we model how citizen mobility may 
change this demand.  Specifically, we investigate how the rate of citizen preference 
change due to mobility, or due to other external factors such as for example the 
realization that a resource is at risk, influences the local political economy.    The abstract 
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computer model relates to the empirical land use policy environment that I have 
described in the previous chapters. 
In the Janssen and York model, there are elected officials who are within an 
adaptive party, bureaucrats, and citizens.  The elected officials are primarily concerned 
with reelection and implementation of their platform.  Citizens are able to vote, express 
their opinion through polling in between elections, and create alternative nongovernment 
institutions.  Citizens also choose between nongovernment and government program 
options.  Bureaucrats focus on balancing the competing demands of citizens and elected 
officials.  In the following subsections, I describe the underlying formulas for each of the 
actors. 
7.1.2 Adaptive Parties 
Within our model, there are two parties competing for V votes in a n-dimensional 
issue space.  The preferences of each voter are represented by a vector of n integers.  The 
vector x represents the ideal positions on each issue out of k possible positions.  The 
platform of a party is defined as { }nky 1,...,1,0 −∈ .  The expected utility to a voter from 
this platform is defined as the squared weighted difference between the ideal point and 
the platform, scaled to a range between 0 and 1, and as defined as 
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As noted in Krebs (1998) many local elections are now nonpartisan, although the local 
party organization is often courted by candidates and officeholders in order to receive 
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endorsements or campaign finance in nonpartisan elections.  In our model, officials are 
officially or unofficially connected to a party with a party ideology and platform.  In line 
with Kollman et al. (1992) the parties adjust their platforms to win elections.  We assume 
that the parties have some ideologies XI and that they may adapt their program within a 
tolerable change Tmax to maximize the probability to win the elections. 
 The parties adapt their platforms by estimating the share of the votes that they 
may receive, and update the program if it increases the expected share of votes.  In an 
iterative way, the parties adapt their program.  The estimation of the share of votes is 
derived by sampling the opinions of the voters.  A random sample of voters is “polled” 
enabling party platform adjustment between elections.  In the poll, the voters sampled, 
Vsample, are assumed to give an honest reply.  These polls may be considered actual polls, 
or citizen responses that are gathered through other vehicles such as public hearings, 
public surveys, newspaper accounts, or interaction with elected officials.  We explore 
different degrees of change among the preferences of citizens, as discussed in the 
experiment section below.  Parties may adapt their ideology to reflect the changing 
citizens’ preferences.  With a probability pI the ideologies X of a party on a particular 
issue are adjusted.  We simply assume that X changes linearly with changes in the 
average preferences among the citizens. 
 There is mixed evidence regarding the impact of public polling on official 
activity.  Greenwald et al. (2003) argue that polling is most effective in determination of 
the agendas for legislatures, but not necessarily important in the determination of actual 
legislation.  We allow the elected officials to alter their policies after polling, but these 
officials still consider their party ideology.  In our experiment, we test how government 
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adaptation after polling impacts the citizen satisfaction and NGO creation.  In our 
simulation we assume that each party can adapt 5 times their program, and every time 
they can tinker their program, they can try out 8 adaptations.  This is in line with the 
adaptive party model of Kollman et al. (1992) and simulates a kind of local search routine 
in a political landscape. 
 The elected officials set priorities for policy implementation, which balance the 
probability of being reelected and the match of the implemented programs and their 
ideals.  Thus the elected officials maximize 
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The expected share in the next election is derived by sampling a share of the population 
on whether they will vote for the party with the program yI.  The second component 
varies between 0 (maximum mismatch), and 1 (perfect fit).  The parameter γ reflect how 
much weight the elected officials put on getting reelected versus implementing the 
programs according to their ideology. 
7.1.2  Entrepreneurial Citizens and Bureaucrats 
After the elected officials determined their program, we allow preference change 
within the population of citizens.  With a probability pinflux we update the preferences of a 
citizen across the seven issues.  In all experiments we start with a population with 
preferences in the lower bound of possible positions, say 0 and 1, and these preferences 
are updated with higher values up to k-1.  When pinflux is low, there will be an increasing 
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diversity of preferences over time (Figures 7.1 and 7.2).  When pinflux is high there is a 
moving cohort of preferences (Figure 7.3). 
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Figure 7.1.  Example of distribution of opinions on an issue when pinflux is 5%. 
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Figure 7.2.  Example of distribution of opinions on an issue when pinflux is 40%. 
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Figure 7.3.  Example of distribution of opinions on an issue when pinflux is 95%. 
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Given the proposed program of the elected official, the bureaucrats implement the 
program.  The bureaucrats are assumed to take into account the queries of both the 
citizens and the elected officials.  If the citizens’ preferences are not taken into account, 
they may start to complain to the elected officials about the provided services. As I 
discussed in Chapter 5, bureaucrats like the zoning inspector are often caught in the 
middle of citizen and elected official demands, especially when citizens like the violator 
and reporter are demanding completely opposite results. 
The bureaucrats chose for every issue i the position j such that Ωij is maximized. 
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Where γb express the weight of the bureaucrats on the satisfaction of the elected officials 
versus the citizens.  Thus, we assume that bureaucrats are attempting to satisfy both 
elected officials and citizens in order to reduce conflict. 
 There are two prevailing theories regarding bureaucrats’ activities.  One of the 
theories argues that bureaucrats seek to influence policy outcomes by imposing their 
preferences.  Another theory argues that bureaucrats seek to increase the budgets in order 
to reduce their workload and increase their prestige. 
 Wintrobe (1997) argues bureaucrats may seek to implement their preferred 
policies or maximize their budgets.  The principal-agent problem with bureaucrats and 
politicians is partially solved by creating competition between agencies, so the 
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bureaucrats are more concerned about job security and seek to implement efficient 
programs that mirror politicians’ preferences.   
 Torenvlied and Thomson (2003) use evidence from Dutch local authorities to 
argue that a multi-stage approach to implementation better predicts policy 
implementation than a political bargaining approach.  Torenvlied and Thomson’s 
research support the theory that agencies are not always able to affect the actual political 
decision, but rather are able to shape implementation. 
 One means for bureaucrats to control policy implementation is through 
information asymmetry and technical knowledge about an issue.  Ringquist et al (2003) 
investigate the effects of salience and technical complexity on the elected officials’ 
control of bureaucratic action.  They argue that public salience of an issue will create 
incentives for legislators to watch bureaucratic activity, whereas complexity of an issue 
will reduce the ability of legislators to monitor.  They find some evidence in the quantity 
of legislative activity for particular types of issues, high salience/high complexity, low 
salience/low complexity, high salience/low complexity, and low salience/high 
complexity, which support these conclusions.  Thus, there is room, especially in low 
salience and high complexity, issues for bureaucratic influence. 
 In our model, as described earlier, the bureaucrats are seeking to balance political 
pressure from citizens and elected officials.  They are possibly given some room for 
influence through vague policy directives from the elected officials or due to inability of 
elected officials to monitor.  We are not modeling the budget-maximizing bureaucrat, but 
rather a conflict-minimizing bureaucrat in this model. 
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 We can calculate the dissatisfaction of the citizens about the provided services by 
the bureaucrats.  The dissatisfaction of a citizen j about a policy issue i is denoted as δij 
and is defined as the squared difference between the opinion of the citizen and the 
provided service, times the strength of the issue for the citizen.   
 
2)( Iiijij yx −=δ          (7.3) 
 
As consumers, citizens chose between government or nongovernment services.  Lowery 
(1998) argues that citizens are often ineffective in their evaluation of public services in a 
quasi-market environment.  Lowery focuses on the quality of the services provided.  We 
are not focusing on efficiency of the provision, but rather that the citizen views the NGO 
provider as more closely matching his/her preference.   
 When there are NGO’s we can also calculate the dissatisfaction of a citizen for the 
NGO programs.  In such a case the yiI is replaced with yiNl .  In case a citizen is 
dissatisfied beyond a threshold δmax for all options, both governmental and non-
governmental, the citizen will create a new program where the yiNl is equal to the 
preference of the motivated citizen xi for that particular issue.  We are building on 
Olson’s idea regarding collection action that individual citizens will not produce a public 
good unless extremely motivated by their individual marginal costs and benefits (Olson, 
1965). 
 Nowness and Neeley (1996) argue that political entrepreneurs are essential in the 
creation of interest groups and that individual support of these groups determines the 
longevity of the organization.  In our model, a political entrepreneur is a citizen 
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motivated by his/her preference mismatch with the programs that are implemented.  This 
citizen creates an NGO that then most be supported through participation by other 
citizens.  We investigate how the transaction costs for NGO creation and participation 
change the political environment.  Thus, we explore at what point a citizen is willing to 
invest resources into NGO creation and acknowledge Olson’s (1965) collective action 
theory with it’s expectation of NGO activity limited by transaction costs and marginal, 
individual benefits.   
 We assume at t=0 that there are no NGOs.  Through the experiment we 
investigate the creation of NGO programs.  At each time point, given the current options 
of programs, the program of the elected government and the NGO programs, the citizen 
will select which program to join.  For each program, the agent calculates the expected 
utility, taking into account the extra transaction costs for NGO programs,  
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Where j=0 is the governmental program, and c0 =0 
 
In our model, NGOs represent an alternative to public service providers.  In some policy 
arenas, such as land use policy, NGOs have been more responsive to citizen preferences 
(York et al., in press), while in other arenas, such as healthcare, Johnson and Bond (1982) 
found that NGOs may be unresponsive to consumer preferences, like a preference for 
abortion services.  Within our model, in the ten abstract policy arenas the NGOs are 
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created and maintained when there is a significant population that is not served by the 
government service providers. 
 If an NGO program is not used, say less than nmin users, than this program is taken 
out of the population of NGO programs.  Thus we assume that a minimum amount of 
users is required to make a NGO program able to overcome the transaction costs.  As 
Nowness and Neeley (1996) argue, there needs to be a group of individuals contributing 
to the maintenance of a NGO. 
7.2  Experiments 
In our basic experiments we assume we have 251 types of voters.  These “voters” 
represent classes of citizen types.  These voters are assumed to vote in every election, and 
provide honest responses when a random sample is polled between elections.  We assume 
that these types represent classes of preferences of voters within our society.   
Number of voter types (V) 251
Number of voter types polled in a sample (Vsample) 51
Number of positions per issue (k) 7
Number of elections 10
Number of issues (n) 10
Steepness of effect utility differences on probability of participating program (µ) 20
Exponent utility function elected officials reelection versus probability of implementing own 
preferences (γ) 
0.5
Exponent utility function bureaucrat weighting satisfying citizens versus elected officials (γb) 1
Maximum tolerable dissatisfaction (δmax) 0.3
Transaction costs for NGO programs (cj) 0.4
Rate of change of parties to adopt to changing preferences (η) 0
Rate of influx of citizens with new type of preferences (pinflux) 0
Maximum tolerable adjustments of parties compared to their ideology (Tmax) 0
Table 7.1.  Parameter Values in the Default Case of the Simulations 
Each condition below was simulated 100 times for 10 election rounds.  The results show 
the average state of the system after the 10th election round.  When we make statements 
of significant differences between different parameter settings, we have taken into 
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account the standard deviation of the results for the 100 simulated runs per parameter 
setting.  Preferences of agents are updates between 2 election rounds.  Each time the 
preferences are updated there is a probability pu that the preferences of an agent are 
updated.  If the preferences are updated, the new preferences are drawn from min(k-
1,0.5*re +u[0,2]).  As a result new preferences appear from 0 and 1 at the beginning of 
the simulated period to opinions 5 and 6 around the 10th election cycle (see Figures 7.1, 
7.2, 7.3).  Such a change of preferences could represent replacement of an older 
generation by a new one, or people from outside the region with different preferences 
moving into the region. 
  In the first set of experiments we vary the rate of preference change pinflux.  We see 
that up to 25% influx per election lead to a sharp reduction in the participation in 
governmental programs (Figure 7.2).   
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Figure 7.2. Number of Voters Using Government Programs 
Note:  This is after 10 election rounds for different levels of pinflux as an average of 100 runs, for 
different parameter values. pI refers to the probability of parties to adjust their ideologies. 
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 When pI is equal to 0, and governmental parties do not change their ideologies, 
the participation in governmental programs declines, and there is a moderate number of 
successful NGOs who provide services (Figure 7.3).   
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Figure 7.3. Number of NGOs 
Note this is after 10 election rounds for different levels of pinflux as an average of 100 runs, for 
different parameter values. Note that pI refers to the probability of parties to adjust their 
ideologies. 
 
For pI equal to 0.5 or 1, representing more adaptive parties’ ideologies, interestingly there 
is a larger number of NGOs.  Under this adaptive party condition NGOs are created that 
cater to agents that previously were served by the traditional party lines.  But due to the 
adaptation of the government, the decline of participation in governmental programs does 
not continue to decline under moderate levels of preference change and actually increases 
under high probability levels of preference change (Figure 7.2).  When pinflux is greater 
than 0.5, the rate of change becomes sufficiently large that the both the government and 
NGOs have trouble to keep up with the changing preferences (Figure 7.3).  With a 
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moderately adaptive government, pI is equal to 0.5, the number of NGOs declines almost 
to the level of a totally adaptive government when pinflux approaches 1.  As expected 
under static government ideology, NGO program numbers are highest with probability of 
preference change.  The greatest number of NGO programs is found under unadaptive or 
moderately adaptive party ideologies with pinflux between 0.2 and 0.4.   
 We also analyzed the impact of flexibility to ideology.  Obviously, if 
governmental parties are adapting, flexibility of ideology has no significant impact (pI=1 
& Tmax=7).  Interestingly if parties do not stick to their ideology when they write their 
programs in order to optimize the probability to win the election, and the parties do not 
adapt to changing preferences, there is an increase of NGOs but the participation in 
governmental programs remain on the same low level (pI=0 & Tmax=7).  The reason for 
this is the default value of γ which leads elected officials not to implement what they 
promised, and do not stick to their ideology either. 
Given pI equal to 0, thus no adaptation of ideology of parties, we explore the 
impact of transaction costs. Participation in NGO programs is not free. Tax is already 
paid for the governmental programs, and extra resources are required for NGO programs. 
For 2 levels of pinflux we analyzed the effects. As expected, higher transaction costs leads 
to more governmental program participation and less NGO creation.  Extreme 
dissatisfaction with government service providers still leads to some NGO creation with 
high transaction costs.  Again, we see some of these general trends in the land use policy 
arena, where many NGO programs are created, but a fairly small portion of the 
population participates.   
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When we vary the threshold at which a voter becomes dissatisfied enough to 
become a political entrepreneur, we see a gradual decline of agents participating in 
governmental programs when the threshold of dissatisfaction is lower (Figure 5). At 
lower threshold there is also a larger number and variety of NGO programs (Figure 6).   
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Figure 7.4.  Number of Voters Government Programs with Varying Dissatisfaction Thresholds 
Note:  This is after 10 election rounds for different levels of transaction costs c as an average of 
100 runs, for two levels of pinflux. 
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Figure 7.5. Number of NGOs with Varying Dissatisfaction Thresholds 
Note: This is after 10 election rounds for different levels of transaction costs c as an average of 
100 runs, for two levels of pinflux. 
 
The priorities set by the elected officials have less influence on citizen 
participation than the priorities set by the bureaucrats, as citizens are making participation 
decisions based on the implemented programs. We analyzed the effect of combinations of 
γ and γb when pinflux is 0.25 and ideologies of parties do not change and as Figure 7.6 
shows, when bureaucrats put more weight on satisfying the preferences of the officials, 
the level of participation in governmental programs drop. This is especially the case when 
elected officials focus on implementing their ideologies, instead of maximizing the 
probability to be reelected.  
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Figure 7.6. Government Participation in Relation to Government Sensitivity to Citizen Demands 
Note: this is after 10 election rounds for different levels of γ, the weight elected officials put on 
becoming reelected versus matching the preferences of the citizens. 
 
A puzzling result is that the number of NGO programs created is low when 
elected officials focus on their ideologies and bureaucrats satisfy the officials (Figure 
7.7). This may occur because the portion of the population with preferences similar to the 
elected officials is well served by the static regime, and with pinflux equal to 0.25, the 
system is only moderately dynamic.  In this type of situation there is no need for 
conservative NGO, since they are served by the governmental programs.    
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Figure 7.7. Number of NGOs in Relation to Government Sensitivity 
Note this is after 10 election rounds for different levels of γ, the weight elected officials put on 
becoming reelected versus matching the preferences of the citizens. 
 
Conclusions 
The computational experiments show that the number of NGOs and variety of 
NGOs is the highest at a moderate level of change of preferences of the citizens, 
especially when parties change their ideologies, yet are unable to fill the gap on the left 
and right of policy preference spectrum. We find that NGO creation initially occurs by 
the newcomers who hold minority preferences, but as this minority becomes a majority 
NGO creation increases by the residents with more traditional preferences.  Within an 
urbanizing landscape, this type of policy preference change has been described by Rudel 
(1989) who argues that rural residents may not be prepared for the difference in land use 
policy views, as exurbanites move into their community.  As demonstrated in Figure 8, 
this does not occur under a static government regime with low preference change.   
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Even with extremely high transaction costs, there is still some NGO creation due 
to the dissatisfaction of citizens with low to moderate dissatisfaction tolerance and 
extreme preferences. These citizens face some challenge in creating and maintaining 
NGOs, as it may be difficult to find similar voter types to participate.  Thus, citizens with 
extreme policy preferences will be more likely to create a NGO option.  In the land use 
policy arena, there are many organizations catering to the needs of citizens with unique 
views on land management, although as discussed in Chapter 6, it is difficult to create 
institutions for cooperative management.  As Janssen and I found in the general model, 
with high transaction costs, which are common for cooperative management, NGO 
institutions will be created, but they will frequently fail with limited citizen demand. 
In our general experiments, we find similar patterns of NGO creation under 
mobile and highly mobile citizen conditions. In a highly mobile jurisdiction, the elected 
officials are less able to adapt, which leads to an increase in NGO creation.  Even with a 
moderately mobile population, it is difficult for both NGOs and government to adapt 
leading to high turnover in programs and an extremely dynamic policy arena.  The effects 
of an increase in mobility on NGO creation are strengthened when citizens are easily 
dissatisfied.  If citizens have low dissatisfaction tolerance, at a level of 0.1, NGO creation 
is almost double with a highly mobile citizenry versus the mobile condition, 
approximately 525 programs versus 275 programs respectively.  Thus the relative 
mobility of within a jurisdiction can have a large impact on the NGO creation. This may 
be important if there is a one time influx of citizens with a particular preference into the 
system, which leads to the NGO creation. Since these are a relatively small portion of the 
constituency there is limited incentive for party adaptation.  
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Empirical work may test the impact of migration on NGO creation, especially 
because migration may indicate fewer resources and greater transaction costs for NGO 
creation.  Given a constant resource base, we expect that a jurisdiction experiencing great 
growth in minority populations will produce more NGOs.  Even with a highly responsive 
government, it is difficult for bureaucrats and elected officials to respond dynamically 
changing citizen preferences. 
Furthermore, the creation of private service providers often has a spatial 
component, such as gated communities.  Future work may examine how the spatial 
distribution of citizen preferences may impact NGO creation for specific districts within 
jurisdictions.  We expect to find neighborhood effects due to clustering of preferences, 
although this may be mitigated in a highly mobile society. 
Our model has illustrated how changes in mobility may be linked to NGO 
creation when incoming agents have different policy preferences. Furthermore we have 
illustrated that a moderately adaptive government is unable to address changing 
preferences in a highly mobile society, but NGOs also struggle under these conditions. 
We find the greatest quantity and diversity of NGOs in a society with some government 
adaptation and moderate influx of citizens. We investigated of the interrelationships 
between elected officials responsiveness, bureaucratic implementation, changing citizen 
preferences, and NGO service provision. This preliminary investigation indicates that the 
private provision exit option is important in the investigation of local policy formation 
and implementation. 
As mentioned earlier, this experiment was designed to evaluate the general local 
political economy, not the land use policy arena.  Even with this consideration the general 
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model offers some insights into the creation of alternative institutions.  Furthermore, we 
find that citizens may be satisfied with government options if bureaucrats and elected 
officials are relatively sensitive to citizen preferences.  Thus, an explosion of alternative 
land use institutions would be expected with a fairly insensitive government and 
moderate to high levels of citizen preference change.  On the other hand, even with a 
responsive government, citizen preference change will drive the demand for alternatives. 
In this chapter, we have found that citizen mobility is an important driver of 
private institutional provision.  This may partially explain the real world cases of demand 
for private institutions discussed in Chapter 6.  Many of these institutions were created 
where there were changing preferences due to exurbanization.  Furthermore, bureaucratic 
and official insensitivity may also drive citizens to seek private options.   
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Chapter 8:  Land Use Institutions:  Conclusions  
 
By Abigail M. York 
 
 Throughout much of its history zoning has been criticized as ineffective, 
especially by visionary planners, and unjust, mostly by property rights advocates.  Few 
individuals have argued that zoning is an effective tool for growth management, 
environmental protection, or historic preservation, although zoning is the most widely 
used land use control.  Much of the attention to these issues has been focused on the 
comprehensive planning process from the time of Babcock’s investigation of The Zoning 
Game, although some scholars focus on institutional impacts (for example Feiock 1994; 
Platt 1996).  In this study, I have explored the ability of communities to control growth 
through zoning and alternative institutions.  I have found mixed evidence regarding 
zoning’s impact on land use change.  Some of the previous criticism of zoning seems 
justified, although there are important ways that zoning could be improved to mitigate 
negative effects in the urbanizing landscape.  Some of these policy recommendations will 
be discussed below. 
 In this final chapter, I will first address the challenge and the need to use a 
multilevel analysis to evaluate a complex local policy, such as land use institutions.  Then 
I sum up the findings with regard to the questions that I laid out in Chapter 1:  1) Does 
zoning protect forest and farmland? 2) Does zoning lead to fragmentation of land cover? 
When do zoning rules match citizen preferences? 3) When do we expect zoning 
compliance? 4) What are the alternatives to zoning?  As I sum up findings, I will 
highlight the conclusions, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of each empirical 
 190
approach.  This dissertation is a part of a larger research agenda, so I also describe for 
upcoming or ongoing research projects that stem from my dissertation work.     
8.1  Multiple Methods 
As can be seen in the breadth of questions that this study addresses, there is no 
single method that can effectively address these issues and aid in our understanding of 
land use institutions.  Part of the importance of this study is simply the use of multi-level 
analysis and use of multiple methods to understand zoning and alternative land use 
institutions.  Most studies of zoning have evaluated policy adoption in communities, not 
the impact of this adoption.  As mentioned earlier, previous studies of zoning have 
included case studies of individual jurisdictions (Babcock 1966; Babcock and Siemon 
1985; Rudel 1989), historical analyses of land use regulation (Diamond and Noonan 
1996; Platt 1996), analyses of zoning rule implementation (Fleischmann and Pierannunzi 
1990; Feiock 1994; Thorson 1997; Ellison 2001), and studies of zoning’s impact on local 
economies (Harrison 1977; Fischel 1985; Hanushek and Quigley 1990; Thorson 1997; 
Fleming 1999).  Some recent work has evaluated the relationships between zoning and 
land cover fragmentation (Brabec and Smith 2002) or land cover change (Kline and Alig 
1999; Hsieh, Irwin et al., 2000).  These studies provide valuable information about the 
impact of zoning on economic development in the theoretical or in a particular study 
area, the context of rule changes within a comprehensive plan, or describe classic battles 
between officials and citizens, but these studies do not attempt to understand broadly the 
impact of zoning across a region, fragmentation at the parcel level, zoning compliance, 
and alternatives to zoning.   
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Furthermore, much of the work has focused on “progressive” states such as 
Florida, Oregon, and Vermont.  These progressive statewide efforts have been hailed as 
means to reduce uncontrolled development (Platt 1996), yet few studies have evaluated 
development and land cover change in states with variation in implementation of 
traditional land use controls.  This study has provided analysis of zoning in a state, 
Indiana, that has great variation in land use controls across the southern region with many 
counties that do not employ any countywide zoning ordinances (Worgan, Harbourn et al. 
2001).  Counties with zoning primarily adopt traditional separation of uses zoning rules 
with a few Smart Growth principles included in comprehensive plans.  In addition, many 
of these plans are out of date and have not been updated since the 1970s.  The empirical 
portions of this dissertation ground my general study of the impact of zoning and 
alternative land use institutions. 
The theoretical analyses enable us to better understand zoning compliance, as 
much work focuses on rule creation not rule implementation.  The use of the game theory 
strengthened our understanding of the weaknesses of zoning without effective citizen 
monitoring and predictable fines for violations.  Within the local political economy 
model, we also began to understand how alternative institutions may be generated by 
unmet demand due to government insensitivity or dynamics in citizen preference 
distributions.  These theoretical analyses lay the ground for further empirical work and 
also further our understanding of complicated issues that may be difficult to comprehend 
with empirical studies.  Using the general political economy model, Janssen and I were 
able to experiment with differing rates of citizen preference change and bureaucratic and 
elected official sensitivity.  The union of theoretical and empirical approaches grounded 
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my work in the real world, while allowing me to evaluate conditions that are difficult to 
observe or nonexistent in the real world. 
Besides using both theoretical and empirical approaches, I also evaluated land use 
institutions at a variety of scales.  I looked at the jurisdiction, county, and parcel levels.  
As described earlier, many prior studies look only at one scale and so are unable to assess 
the broad impact of a particular institution.  Zoning was evaluated at the county and 
parcel levels, as well as the theoretical jurisdiction in the local political economy.  In my 
discussion of alternative institutions, I talked about cooperative management at a sub-
county or sub-municipal level, but with more than one parcel.  By using several different 
scales, I am able to assess some of the impacts of zoning at the jurisdiction wide scale.  
Specifically, are there differences in land cover change in counties with or without 
zoning?  This analysis is important because zoning is adopted at the county or municipal 
level.  While most land use decisions are made at the individual parcel level, so this 
analysis of fragmentation and zoning compliance aids in our understanding of zoning on 
the ground.  Since zoning does not adequately address all citizens’ demands, the local 
political economy model in Chapter 7 highlights when we expect NGO options to be 
created.  My discussion of cooperative management in Chapter 6 illustrates the options 
available to landowner that seek to cooperatively manage land at the sub-county level. 
Investigating local institutions at several different scales is important, but it is also 
important to understand the effects of these institutions over time.  Three chapters 
addressed time effects if very different ways.  First, the land cover change analysis 
evaluated the impacts of zoning from 1940 to 2000 on land cover change from 1970 to 
2000.  The study of zoning compliance investigated the reporting and violating neighbor 
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game over time, although one suspects that this theoretical time horizon is typically 
shorter than sixty or thirty years.  Finally, the local political economy model investigated 
institution adoption, adaptation, and implementation over a ten election period in both the 
government and nongovernment sectors.  These different analyses allow us to understand 
some of the dynamics of institutional change and institutional impacts on a landscape. 
  We must try to understand enforcement’s relationship to land cover change in 
order to assess the impact of zoning.  These multiple methods at multiple scales used in 
allowed investigation of zoning from macrolevel regional change at the county level to 
microbehavior between neighboring landowners.  The combination of approaches helps 
us understand the complicated relationships between bureaucracy, citizenry, and 
politicians at the local level within the land use control arena.   
 We began this study by evaluating the institution of zoning and exploring the 
goods that are producing through zoning adoption and implementation.  We learned that 
the zoning policy arena is complicated, as community types may influence how and if 
zoning is adopted.  After zoning is adopted communities may be more or less inclined to 
monitor landowners’ behavior.  Thus, enacted zoning may have little impact on an 
urbanizing landscape if the de facto rules do not match the de jure.  As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the ability of communities to achieve plan goals is difficult as actors most 
navigate the complex action arena.  Once a plan is in place the limited enforcement of the 
plan and indiscriminate granting of variances reduces the effectiveness of the plan to 
achieve its goals.  Local land use institutions’ complicated nature, especially in the 
dynamic urbanizing landscape, required the use of multiple methods.  In the next section, 
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I evaluate findings for several key questions relating to the effectiveness of these 
institutions. 
8.2 Key Issues Addressed in Dissertation 
 Multiple methods and multiple scales were used to investigate several key issues 
regarding land use institutions in an urbanizing environment.  I addressed whether zoning 
protects forestland and farmland.  I investigated whether zoning contributes to or 
prevents fragmentation of forestland.  The next issue addressed was the relationship of 
zoning to the larger community.  Since zoning is typically enforced through citizen 
complaints, another aspect of this dissertation addressed when citizens will report their 
violating neighbors and when violators will start to comply.  Finally, the dissertation 
investigated alternatives to zoning or institutions that could be used in conjunction with 
zoning to protect forestland.   
8.2.1  Does zoning protect forest and farmland? 
As I discussed in previous chapters, zoning has been routinely criticized for being 
ineffective at protecting natural resources, or even identified as causing some 
deforestation and urbanization.  In Chapter 3, we evaluated zoning across a region, 
southern Indiana, over a thirty year time period with zoning policy lag variables included 
for a total of sixty years.  The econometric analysis yielded some interesting and possibly 
disturbing results.  The positive, although insignificant, relationship between urban to 
agricultural land use and zoning in our models indicates that counties may not adopt 
zoning until there is a relatively high level of urban development.  As discussed earlier, 
this may be an indication of a threshold effect similar to that found in New England 
communities (Rudel, 1989).   
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The inclusion of historic zoning policy variables, zoning 15 or 30 years prior, 
mitigated some of the positive relationship, although was insignificant.  Perhaps zoning 
has a greater impact on land use change over a long time horizon.  On the other hand 
perhaps communities that were early adopters of zoning controls are experiencing a 
decline in the rate of growth because these are already built up.  We need to better 
understand the complex relationship between zoning and land use.  Our study indicates 
that there is a significant relationship between land use and zoning, although the 
interpretation of this relationship is not straightforward.  Zoning is not the cause of the 
level of urbanization, but there are some indications that urbanization may also impact 
zoning adoption.  Our results are not inconsistent with the theorists who argue that zoning 
may accelerate urbanization and sprawl, through ordinances such as minimum lot 
requirements, although the insignificant and mixed directional impact illustrates that 
zoning is a not a clear driver of open space loss or protection in an urbanizing landscape.   
Our findings illustrate a need for further research on the relationship between land 
use and policymaking because of the apparent interactions between land use changes and 
local policymaking.  The purpose of this study was to assess the broad impacts of zoning 
instead of focusing on isolated impacts within particular jurisdictions.  Our results at the 
regional scale do not refute the claim that zoning, through policies like minimum lot 
requirements, accelerates peri-urban development, but neither do we find conclusive 
evidence that zoning causes sprawl.  
 There are two sources of weakness for this preliminary analysis.   First, the area 
of the analysis was the county, although some of the counties did have other zoning 
jurisdictions, usually within the urban areas within the counties.  It would have been 
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useful to somehow merge the zoning and planning for the county and the city.  Since we 
used zoning as a dummy variable to generally address the relationship between 
urbanization and zoning, in counties and cities with zoning this was not necessarily a 
problem.  In counties, without zoning and cities with zoning this county level analysis is 
of greater concern.  Specifically, some cities have zoning control outside the city limits 
into the unzoned county region.  The importance of out study is addressing whether we 
can see any difference between unzoned and zoned counties because leapfrog 
development into unzoned areas has been an issue raised by Carruthers (2003).  
Therefore, I proceeded with out the city zoning data because the focus was on per-urban 
areas.  Using the county dummy variable captured whether there was zoning policy in the 
rural regions. 
 The second weakness is the use of a dummy variable for zoning.  Zoning is a 
complicated policy, as I discussed in several chapters, so it was difficult to determine 
how to quantify zoning.  Furthermore, zoning in the books and on-the-ground are often 
different.  Thus, the dummy variable enables a preliminary investigation of the 
relationship between the policy and its impact. 
In future, research the endogenous relationship between zoning adoption and land 
use should be considered as it will address the whether there is a threshold effect where 
developed communities are more likely to adopt land use policy.  Many communities will 
not adopt zoning until there is a significant amount of land that has urbanized.  A system 
of equations approach should include zoning, percent developed land, and housing starts 
and address the simultaneous relationship between zoning, economic development, and 
land cover change.  The econometric research may also be extended to the entire state of 
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Indiana, which may allow further investigation into the relationship between agricultural 
use and zoning.  It may be possible to represent the variation in implementation and 
enforcement via a zoning index, which may further our understanding of the relationship 
between zoning and land use.  Furthermore, a study of areas employing more modern 
zoning laws, such as use of impact fees and urban growth boundaries, may uncover a 
different impact on land use decision-making. 
 Overall our regional analysis does provide some interesting issues for future 
research.  Few people have attempted to quantify zoning across a region, so starting with 
a dummy variable is appropriate.  Future projects will incorporate more complicated 
zoning measures.  In summary we found that zoning does not necessarily protect farm 
and forestland when measured at the county level. 
8.2.2  Zoning and Fragmentation at the Parcel Level 
 In Chapter 4, we found that zoning played a greater role in fragmentation in the 
urbanizing area of Monroe County, while was of limited importance in the more remote 
areas of the county.  There was a statistical link between zoning and parcel level 
fragmentation.  In our fringe region of northwestern Monroe County there is competition 
between development near the town of Ellettsville’s infrastructure and agricultural land 
use because the flat terrain is ideal for both buildings and agriculture.  The zoning was of 
greater importance in this area possibly because of the direct competition between 
agriculture and development.  Whereas in other forested areas of the city the slope is 
great, so building is relatively difficult.  Therefore, policy has a loss of importance 
because the natural conditions, hilly land with poor soils, limit the viability of potential 
land uses.  Our results indicate that zoning policies have a greater impact on landscape 
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and forest fragmentation in some areas of the county than other areas, i.e., in those areas 
where both the cost of development due to topography is lowest and development 
pressures (in terms of city access) are highest, as in areas near Ellettsville. 
Many planners have advocated the consolidation of planning power at the state 
level.  It may be effective to establish multiple layers of regulation that deal with large 
ecological or topographic features stretching across political boundaries.  However, this 
study indicates that fine-scale, parcel level characteristics may also play an important role 
in the success of zoning policy.  Perhaps, a polycentric political structure that 
incorporates several levels including federal, state, and local policymakers may solve 
more of the problems associated with urbanization than approaches that focus on any one 
particular level exclusively. 
Overall in Chapter 4, we found that zoning’s impact on fragmentation is mitigated 
by biogeophysical factors.  In areas of high development pressure, there is great potential 
for zoning to regulate growth, although in the case of Monroe County we find that lax 
zoning can lead to fragmentation in a high pressure area.  There are complicated 
relationships between parcel characteristics, zoning, and landscape fragmentation 
indicating a need for policymakers to be especially careful in evaluating the 
interrelationships among these factors when making an assessment of the effectiveness of 
planning and zoning policies.  Our initial study illustrates the complexity in evaluating 
the impact of zoning policy and demonstrates the need for further work examining other 
complicating factors such as larger regional effects from major metropolitan regions, and 
the effectiveness of implementing policies over larger biogeophysical areas. 
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8.2.3  When do we expect zoning compliance? 
 The ability of zoning to influence landowner behavior was explored in Chapter 5.  
Specifically we evaluated how greater access to zoning rules could increase reporting of 
zoning violations.  Under certain conditions, repeated games, it appeared that more 
information was of little importance if a zoning inspector was unwilling to monitor and 
fine after citizen complaints.  While, a responsive inspector meant that information would 
lead to an increase in complaints and compliance.   
As was shown in the simple games of Chapter 5, one of the most important 
factors is the fine levied on the violator.  Some jurisdictions increase fines for repeat 
offenders (Ellickson and Been 2000), which may stop the extended game, increasing the 
marginal cost for each violation.  As I discussed, another important factor is the cost of 
reporting for the neighbor.  With difficulty in contacting inspectors and inducing an 
inspector to check out the violator, we may expect that violation will continue.  In the 
repeated game, we expect that a neighbor who has faced a high reporting cost because of 
a struggle may look the other way and not report if the inspector does nothing after the 
first report.  On the other hand, we expect that neighbors who are well connected with 
local government will report often, because of the low cost and high probability of 
response from the inspector.  With the addition of online GIS technology, citizens may 
more easily determine whether there is a violation.  Furthermore, if a community has an 
online compliant system, similar to Reno, Nevada, we expect that reports will increase 
because of a decrease in the reporting costs for neighbors.  
This study investigates a common problem in the zoning arena, as well as other 
types of local enforcement, how do you effectively enforce a rule when official inspectors 
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have limited resources and are unable to canvas an entire jurisdiction?  As discussed 
earlier, violations can be difficult to spot from afar and certain types of violations may 
only be visible during a short period of time.  Therefore, like many police measures, 
zoning relies on citizen complaints to be enforced.  One impetus for zoning within a 
community is to reduce nuisance violations, which impose costs on neighbors and the 
community.  The neighbor games allow us to better understand the impact of zoning on 
the ground, as the institution is only as good as its enforcement.  The games indicate that 
neighbor reporting is an important element in local land use enforcement, and neighbors 
can be effective monitors, if supported by fines and fairly responsive inspectors.   
Neighbors also need to be aware of the zoning ordinances and zones that surround 
them to be effective monitors.  Recently many communities have created electronic 
copies of zoning ordinances that are available online.  I anticipate that access to 
ordinances through the convenience of the internet may increase the numbers of citizen 
reports.  Furthermore, some communities have created parcel level zoning maps that are 
available online.  These maps enable neighbors to determine whether a possible violation 
is actually an allowable use.  Thus, we may see some changes in the number of reports 
and accuracy of citizen reports with the increased access to zoning ordinance 
information. 
8.2.4  What are the alternatives to zoning?   
 Throughout this dissertation I discussed how zoning is limited because it takes 
away property rights, but may not be able to effectively promote land management.  
Because of zoning, landowners are not allowed to do particular activities on their land, 
such as run a home business, but there are limited means to induce landowners to do 
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management activities.  Of notable exception are some of the home repair guidelines and 
lawn maintenance requirements in many cities and towns.  With regard to large land 
areas there are typically few requirements for landowners.  Many landowners are looking 
for alternatives to zoning in order to promote forest management and preservation of 
openspace.  In Chapter 6, we explored these alternatives:  conservation easements, 
conservancy districts, property owners’ associations, and contracts. 
One difficulty of using zoning for cooperative management is the relatively large 
size of the jurisdiction and the public process, which may make it difficult for individuals 
seeking fairly restrictive preservation oriented rules.  The legal mechanisms discussed in 
Chapter 6 could be used by landowners to promote various aspects of cooperative 
management.  These could be coupled with zoning, which directs development away 
from the cooperatively managed land.  Chapter 6 could be strengthened by evaluated with 
case studies of groups using some of these legal institutions for ecosystem management. 
Many of these institutions have not been used for these purposes, as far as we know, 
which is why landowners were contacting the Indiana Department of Natural Resources 
to learn about new mechanisms for cooperative management.  Thus, as groups adopt 
some of these mechanisms for cooperative management, we may be able to assess 
effectiveness. 
Cooperative management is an emerging objective throughout the United States, 
especially with respect to preserving large areas of openspace and forestland.  Zoning can 
be used to promote this goal, but it may difficult to achieve preservation or active 
management solely through the local government.  As demonstrated in Chapter 7, 
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sometimes citizens with minority policy preferences may opt for private provision or 
regulation when the local government is unresponsive to their preferences.   
The ability of citizens to produce these alternatives is related both to the 
government provision of regulation, party adaptation, and elected official and 
bureaucratic responsiveness.  The computer experiments in Chapter 7 showed that the 
number of NGOs and variety of NGOs is the highest at a moderate level of change of 
preferences of the citizens, especially when parties change their ideologies, yet are unable 
to fill the gap on the left and right of policy preference spectrum. NGO creation initially 
occurs by the newcomers who hold minority preferences, but as this minority becomes a 
majority NGO creation increases by the residents with more traditional preferences.  
Even with extremely high transaction costs, there is still some NGO creation due to the 
dissatisfaction of citizens with low to moderate dissatisfaction tolerance and extreme 
preferences. These citizens face some challenge in creating and maintaining NGOs, as it 
may be difficult to find similar voter types to participate.  
There are similar patterns of NGO creation under mobile and highly mobile 
citizen conditions. In a highly mobile jurisdiction, the elected officials are less able to 
adapt, which leads to an increase in NGO creation.  The relative mobility of within a 
jurisdiction can have a large impact on the NGO creation. This may be important if there 
is a one time influx of citizens with a particular preference into the system, such as in an 
urbanizing area, which leads to the NGO creation. This influx may represent a relatively 
small portion of the constituency, so there is limited incentive for party adaptation. Our 
model has illustrated how changes in mobility may be linked to NGO creation when 
incoming agents have different policy preferences. Furthermore a moderately adaptive 
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government is unable to address changing preferences in a highly mobile society, but 
NGOs also struggle under these conditions.  The greatest quantity and diversity of NGOs 
occurs in a local political economy with some government adaptation and moderate 
influx of citizens. This preliminary investigation indicates that the private provision exit 
option is important in the investigation of local policy formation and implementation.  In 
this chapter, we have found that citizen mobility is an important driver of private 
institutional provision.  This may partially explain the real world cases of demand for 
private institutions discussed in Chapter 6.   
Future work may balance the exit opportunity and cost to exit versus initiating 
and participating in private institutions serving the minority preference population 
enabling us to explore Tiebout’s exit option.  In the future experiments, we would include 
transaction costs for moving that are similar to those for creating NGO’s.  Furthermore, 
the creation of private service providers often has a spatial component, such as gated 
communities.  Future work, may examine how the spatial distribution of citizen 
preferences may impact NGO creation for specific districts within jurisdictions where 
there may be neighborhood effects due to clustering of preferences, although this may be 
mitigated in a highly mobile society. 
Empirical work may test the impact of migration on NGO creation, especially 
because migration may indicate fewer resources and greater transaction costs for NGO 
creation.  Given a constant resource base, we expect that a jurisdiction experiencing great 
growth in minority populations will produce more NGOs.  Since this is a computer 
model, it will be useful to ascertain the real world significance of our results.  Both 
Chapter 6 and 7, illustrate the options available for cooperative management, or for 
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alternative institutions in a local political economy.  In the following section, I will 
explore how some of my findings relate to current Southern Indiana land use 
policymaking.  
8.3  Relevant Findings for Southern Indiana Policymakers  
From my research, there are some findings that could be useful for policymakers 
in the southern Indiana region.  Few southern Indiana counties included implementation 
and assessment goals and standards in their comprehensive plans, as I discussed in 
Chapter 2.  Only one county included quantifiable measures for assessment of plan 
progress.  Similarly, only one county included an implementation schedule, although the 
schedule focused primarily on infrastructure.  It is difficult for the citizenry, as well as 
policymakers, to assess the effectiveness of a plan with no quantifiable measures in place. 
Many southern Indiana counties were concerned with balancing economic 
development and protecting their communities and natural resources.  I found that the 
majority of plans in Indiana included some Smart Growth principles in their plans, 
although the counties did not focus on the implementation and funding for these 
initiatives.  The majority of counties were concerned about the protection of their rural 
and agricultural resources, but wanted economic development.  Planning potentially 
could help to aim development toward resource poor areas, while attempting to protect 
valued openspace areas.  Since communities were not given any benchmarks for 
successful plan implementation it is difficult to assess how these communities are doing.   
 Chapter 3 provides some disconcerting results for southern Indiana planners, 
namely that zoning may drive urbanization. This conclusion is not new and has been 
explored theoretically in many studies.  The main driver may relate to minimum lot size 
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requirements.  Thus communities may want to rethink inclusion of large minimums 
especially in the urban-rural fringe.  In order to better understand whether minimum lot 
size requirements are driving the urbanization process, a study focusing on this type of 
rule should be conducted.  Communities should think about zoning rules, such as 
minimum lot size requirements, if protection of forest and farmland is a priority, although 
it is unclear from these results how a community should address this issue.   As discussed 
in Chapter 2, most communities are not focused on coordinating development and 
protecting openspace, or other Smart Growth principles.  Adoption of some of these 
principles may reduce the effect if the positive relationship between zoning and 
conversion of farmland to urban uses. 
 Results from Chapter 4 indicate zoning played an important role in fragmentation 
along the urban-rural fringe in Monroe County.  In our study, this was a negative 
relationship, but communities could improve this through recognition of the importance 
of zoning in this particular area.  Thus, a community seeking to address habitat 
fragmentation should look first at the urbanizing area near the urban-rural fringe, as 
remote properties are under less strain and risk of fragmentation.  On the other hand, 
some communities may recognize that these peri-urban properties will likely be 
subdivided and fragmented in the near future, so focus on the more remote properties to 
provide longer term protection of contiguous forestland.   
 As I mentioned throughout the dissertation, institutions are weakened by limited 
enforcement.  GIS may aid citizens in their role as monitors of zoning compliance.  
Again this may reinforce disparate monitoring in more affluent areas through the digital 
divide.  On the other hand as more individuals gain access to online information, some 
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less affluent communities may be better able to get information quickly in high risk areas.  
Thus communities may seek to improve compliance by offering searchable databases to 
citizens.  There is one municipal example of this in southern Indiana, in Bloomington, 
where citizens are able to search based on address and name.  If counties developed 
similar databases, citizens would have more accurate information about the zoning laws 
restricting land use on their property and on parcels throughout the county.  Communities 
must realize that this may generate too much call volume with complaints.  On the other 
hand, in fairly inaccessible areas, such as in the rural portions of the county, this may 
enable better and more efficient enforcement of zoning.  Within southern Indiana, there is 
limited online information, so small changes such as including zoning ordinances online 
could lead to big improvements.  As communities invest in GIS technology to keep track 
of parcel information for tax collection and zoning, the community may want to consider 
putting this information online.  As citizens gain greater access to the internet, online 
searchable zoning maps will enable more accurate citizen monitoring, which may reduce 
violations, especially if coupled with increasing fines for repeat offenders. 
 Alternatives to zoning may be the best option for protection of particular 
resources within southern Indiana, such as areas of openspace.  Communities may 
support the creation of these alternatives by making it easier for citizens to learn about 
alternatives such as conservancy districts, property owners’ associations, land trusts, and 
contracts.  If communities provide information to landowners about alternative 
institutions there may be an improvement in the protection of community resources, as 
well as less of burden placed on zoning.  Furthermore these alternatives may satisfy the 
demands of long time rural residents that are increasingly a minority in urbanizing areas, 
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or the new exurbanites that a minority in peri-urban areas.  Communities may improve 
their land use institutions by updating out-of-date plans, rethinking zoning rules, making 
zoning information accessible, and providing information about alternative institutions.  
As discussed earlier Indiana is a great case to investigate because of the great diversity in 
policy, economic conditions, and urbanization.  Insight from the southern Indiana case 
can be used generally for many areas, although some of the specific conditions like the 
impact of relatively steep slopes may not apply to other states.  This case is also 
interesting because it differs greatly from most of the studies on zoning, which have 
focused on progressive policies in areas such as: Florida, Vermont, and Oregon. 
8.4  Directions for the Future 
 This dissertation is the beginning of a larger research agenda investigating local 
land use institutions.  There are four major projects at different stages of implementation 
that I have started as a result of dissertation findings.  The first project extends the 
econometric analysis in Chapter 3 by creating a simultaneous equation model of zoning 
policy adoption, urban land cover, and median income.  The second project brings the 
games from Chapter 5 into the experimental lab in order to test some of our conclusions 
regarding citizen reporting, zoning enforcement, and zoning compliance.  The third 
project brings the local political economy from Chapter 7 into a theoretical spatially 
explicit landscape.  We are adding space, an essential ingredient in land use policy, as 
well as many other local policies.  Finally, the last project brings Chapter 6 into the real 
world.  We share insights from our institutional analysis with landowners, bureaucrats, 
and officials in order to improve policy, as well as improve our analysis.   
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First, I will address the simultaneity issue raised in Chapter 3 by using zoning 
policy adoption of what Feiock terms second level policies, development impact fees.  
These policies more directly indicate a counties commitment to growth management, or 
its desire to grow at whatever cost.  The other equations in the system include percentage 
urban land cover as a dependent variable and median income.  This study furthers the 
tradition of Peterson, in that urbanization is expected in areas that are poor with limited 
growth controls.  I control for other attractors to communities such as recreational 
amenities and distance to other urban areas.  Thus I model the growth process and growth 
control in a simultaneous manner.  The 40 county study area will not be large enough to 
effectively model this process with an expected number of dependent and independent 
variables exceeding the number of counties over the time period.  The small study area 
may be supplemented with counties in northern Indiana and Ohio, where a similar 
research project is underway.  The challenge in this process is that there are no archives 
of these documents, so a panel analysis over the thirty years probably is unrealistic.  
Thus, the study will either be done at one or two time points within the past ten years. 
 Second, another ongoing research project is in citizen monitoring of neighbor 
behavior.  I am planning to run economic experiments over an abstract computer 
landscape.  These will build on spatial experiments currently being run that evaluate land 
management behavior with positive externalities from neighbors.  In our experiments, we 
plan to build upon the games in Chapter 5.  In the different experiment conditions, 
landowners will be given varying information gathering costs, regulation information, 
and reporting costs. 
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 The third project moves the local political economy into an abstract computer 
jurisdiction.  The jurisdiction will allow us to evaluate how heterogeneous preferences 
across space may increase or decrease the creation of “gated communities” or other 
alternative land use institutions.  This project investigates movement and political activity 
within a community in a similar vein to Tiebout, but allowing the citizen choice to be 
between public and private institutional options instead of different jurisdictions.  Given 
the urbanizing landscapes throughout within southern Indiana and throughout the United 
States, it will be interesting to generally determine when location oriented NGO 
institutions such as property owners’ associations and land trusts will be created given 
changing demand for openspace and natural amenities. 
 The final research project will assess landowners’ adoption of alternative 
institutions.  I co-chaired a conference, “Forestland Conservation:  An Indiana Portfolio,” 
which brought information about these alternative institutions to landowners throughout 
Indiana, as well as to other academics, bureaucrats, and NGO officials.  Currently, I am 
working with scholars at Purdue, including Drs. William Hoover and Shorna Broussard 
on this alternative institution project.  We plan to focus on groups that are considering 
alternative institutions, and which groups have experience with these alternatives.    
8.5  Conclusion 
 This study focused on land use institutions in an urbanizing environment.  There 
are several important conclusions from the study.  First, zoning may be driving some 
conversion of land to urban uses, although this may be due to the types of zoning rules 
that are adopted.  Second, zoning could be used more effectively to reduce forest 
fragmentation or at least not promote fragmentation.  Third, adoption of online GIS 
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technology could improve zoning enforcement through a reduction in citizen monitoring 
costs.  Fourth, there are viable alternatives to zoning for openspace preservation and 
cooperative management.  Finally, government insensitivity and changing citizen 
preferences may be driving this demand for alternative institutions. 
Another important aspect of this study comes through the union of approaches to 
investigate local land use institutions.  By evaluating zoning at multiple scales and with 
multiple methods, we begin to understand the strengths and weaknesses of zoning as 
currently implemented.  The union of different techniques, theoretical and empirical, and 
evaluation over time and across space provides insights that were lacking in studies that 
only focused on a single study site or a single point in time 
Furthermore, my emphasis on the institutions as implemented and enforced, 
instead of just the rules on the books, differs from many zoning studies that focus 
primarily on planning ideals.  As I discussed in “Directions for the Future,” I need to 
better address the actual zoning rules, such as the impact fees assessed.  This dissertation 
represents the beginning of an investigation of the real zoning game, not just the paper 
game. 
Overall, I have uncovered more puzzles that need to be addressed than I have 
answered with this dissertation.  The most important contribution of this dissertation is 
the understanding that zoning and alternative institutions should be evaluated from 
multiple angles.  Perhaps most importantly we need to understand individual 
decisionmaking under the institutions, as well as the dynamics in the local political 
economy.  Zoning is not the only institution that can control growth in an urbanizing 
environment, especially given some of the negative findings in southern Indiana.  There 
 211
is room for improvement in zoning implementation and enforcement, but communities 
should also look to alternatives to zoning for protection of openspace and promotion of 
cooperative management.  Overall local land use institutions may be hurtful or helpful in 
the urbanizing environment, but their impact is dependent on implementation and 
enforcement, which may be lacking in southern Indiana.  In the theoretical studies, it 
appears that some of this breakdown in government institutions could be due to changing 
citizen preferences, similar to preference changes in urbanizing landscapes.  There are 
opportunities for use of institutions in urbanizing landscapes to protect community 
resources, but communities need to be more conscious about their decisions regarding 
institution creation and implementation in order to control the urbanizing process and 
reduce unwanted effects.  
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“Southern Indiana’s Changing Economic Structure and Forests”  with Darla K. Munroe.  2004. Woodland  
Steward.  13(1) Spring. http://www.inwoodlands.org/    
 
“The Limits of Economic Incentives – Initial Results from a Survey Among Non-industrial Private  
Landowners in Monroe County.”  with Marco Janssen.  Forthcoming. Woodland Steward. 
 
PRESENTATIONS 
“Empirical Foundations for Agent-Based Modeling:  How do institutions affect agents’ land-use decision  
processes in Indiana?” with Laura Carlson, Marco Janssen, Tun Myint, and Elinor Ostrom. Agent  
2002 Conference on Social Agents: Ecology, Exchange, and Evolution.  Chicago, Ill.  Argonne  
National Laboratory, University of Chicago.  Oct. 11-12, 2002.  
 
“The Development Games.” The Midwest Political Science Association Conference, Chicago, Ill. April 3-6, 
2003. 
 
“Public and Private Land Use Regulation:  Which Type for Which Goods.”  Poster Presentation.  American  
Political Science Association 99th Annual Meeting.  Philadelphia, Penn.  August 28-31, 2003. 
 
“Growth Management Policy and Land Use Change.” with Darla K. Munroe.  The Midwest Political Science 
Association Conference.  April 15-18, 2004. 
 
“Do Online Geographic Information Systems Improve Local Ordinance Compliance?  Evidence from the  
Neighborhood Games.” with Becky Nesbit.  Urban Affairs Association Annual Meeting.  
Washington, DC. March 31-April 2, 2004. 
 
“The Niche of Non-governmental Organizations in a Changing Landscape of Citizens’ Preferences.” with  
Marco A. Janssen.  American Political Science Association 100th Annual Meeting.  Chicago, Ill.   
September 2-5, 2004. 
 
“Institutional Dynamics, Spatial Organization and Landscape Change.”  with Tom P. Evans and Elinor  
Ostrom.  Places of Power:  Economic and Political Driving Forces of Landscape Change.  Chicago,  
Ill.  September 10-11, 2004. 
 
“Collaborative Management for Openspace: Alternatives to Zoning.”  Association for Public Policy  
Analysis and Management Fall Research Conference.  Atlanta, GA.  October 28-30, 2004. 
 
“Southern Indiana Collaborative Management Experience.”  Forest Land Conservation an Indiana Portfolio.   
Nashville, Ind.  November 10, 2004. 
 
“Collaborative Wildland Management:  Alternatives to Zoning.”  with William Hoover. Midwest Fish and  
Wildlife Conference.  Indianapolis, Ind.  December 15-17, 2004. 
 
“Cooperative Management of Private Forestland in Indiana: An Institutional Analysis of Existing Legal  
Mechanisms.”  with William L. Hoover.  Institutional Analysis for Environmental Decision-making  
Workshop.  Fort Collins, Colo. January 27-29, 2005. 
 
“Explaining City Economic Development and Growth Management Policy Choices.”  with Richard C.  
Feiock.  DeVoe Moore Critical Issues symposium March 4th 2005.  Tallahassee, Fl.  March 4-5. 
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HONORS  
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Dissertation Fellow, 2004  
School of Public and Environmental Affairs PhD Travel Grant, 2003 and 2004  
Indiana University College of Arts and Sciences Travel Grant, 2003 and 2004  
School of Public and Environmental Affairs PhD Topics Course Competition Winner, 2003  
William Fern Research Award in Honor of Theodore Yelich, 2000 
Herman Muelder Scholar, 1996-2000   
Knox Social Concerns Scholar, 1996-2000  
Knox College Ford Fellow, 1998-2000  
Charles & Arvilla Timme Economics Fellowship, 1998-2000  
Academic All-Midwest Athletic Conference, fall 1998 and 1999, winter 1999 and 2000 
 
ASSOCIATIONS 
Indiana Forest Stewardship Committee, Observing Member 
Association for SPEA PhD Students, Vice-President 2003 and Conference Committee 2004 
American Political Science Association, Member 
American Political Science Association Urban Politics Section, Member 
Midwest Political Science Association, Member 
Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Member 
Urban Affairs Association, Member 
 
OUTISDE VOLUNTEER ASSOCIATIONS 
Missouri Pit Bull Rescue, Member 
 
